Asset integrity case development for normally unattended offshore installations by Loughney, SJ
ASSET INTEGRITY CASE DEVELOPMENT FOR 
NORMALLY UNATTENDED OFFSHORE 
INSTALLATIONS 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Liverpool John Moores 
University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Sean Loughney 
 
 
 
September 2017 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes the initial stages of the development of a NUI – Asset Integrity Case 
(Normally Unattended Installation). An NUI – Asset Integrity Case will enable the user 
to determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity and demonstrate that integrity is 
being managed. A key driver for improved asset integrity monitoring is centred on the 
level of accurate reporting of incidents. This stems from incidents to key offshore systems 
and areas. For example, gas turbine driven generators where 22% of fuel gas leaks were 
undetected with 60% of these 22% having been found to have ignited.   
Accordingly, there is a need for dynamic risk assessment and improved asset integrity 
monitoring. The immediate objective of this research is to investigate how a dynamic risk 
model can be developed for an offshore system. Subsequently, two dynamic risk 
assessment models were developed for an offshore gas turbine driven electrical power 
generation system. Bayesian Networks provided the base theory and algorithms to 
develop the models. The first model focuses on the consequences of one component 
failure. While the second model focuses on the consequences of a fuel gas release with 
escalated fire and explosion, based upon several initiating failures. This research also 
provides a Multiple Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) to determine the most suitable 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) configuration for asset integrity monitoring. The WSN 
is applied to the same gas turbine system as in the dynamic risk assessment models.  
In the future, this work can be expanded to other systems and industries by applying the 
developed Asset Integrity Case framework and methodology. The framework outlines the 
steps to develop a dynamic risk assessment model along with MADA for the most suitable 
remote sensing and detection methods. 
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1 CHAPTER 1:  
 INTRODUCTION 
Summary 
This chapter first introduces the key definition used in this research. The research aim 
and objectives are then defined, followed by the background. The objectives and 
hypotheses of this thesis will serve to set out a logical structure of this thesis which is 
aimed at addressing the inherent problems outlined.  
1.1 Project Background and Rationale 
The idea of an Asset Integrity Case was proposed by RMRI Plc. in 2011 and will enable 
the user to determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity on the potential loss of 
life and demonstrate that integrity is being managed to ensure safe operations. The 
Integrity Case is an extended Safety Case. Where safety cases demonstrate that safety 
procedures are in place, the Integrity Case shall ensure that the safety procedures are 
properly implemented. The Integrity Case can be applicable to operations for any large-
scale asset, and in the case of this research project the large asset for which the Integrity 
Case shall be developed is an offshore installation (RMRI Plc., 2011).  
By expanding on this Integrity Case proposal, it is intended that an Integrity Case be 
developed for a Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) in conjunction with a dynamic 
risk assessment model to maintain a live representation of an offshore installations 
integrity. Furthermore, it is proposed that the NUI-Integrity Case initially be developed 
utilising a manned installation, but modelling failure and risks without human presence 
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on board. This is due to a much larger range of failure data being available regarding 
manned installations as opposed to unmanned installations. Similarly, should a risk 
assessment model be feasible for various hazardous zones of an installation, and the 
dynamic model demonstrates effective operation in the detection of failures and mapping 
of consequences, it may be possible to reduce the number of personnel on board manned 
offshore installations. To develop the initial stages of the NUI-Integrity Case, certain 
systems must be analysed utilising dynamic risk assessment. For the purpose of this 
research project, the electrical generation equipment shall be the focus, specifically, the 
gas turbine driven generators in an offshore electrical generation module. 
Gas turbines are used for a variety of purposes on offshore installations, such as: power 
generation, compression pumping and water injection, most often in remote locations. 
Gas turbines are most commonly duel fuelled. They have the ability to run on fuel taken 
from the production process under normal operations, known as fuel gas. They can also 
run on diesel fuel in emergency circumstances. Typically, offshore gas turbines run from 
1 to 50 MW and may well be modified from aero-engines or industrial engines. The most 
often used gas turbines are Aeroderivative, particularly for the gas generator. It is known 
that relatively little information is contained within safety cases regarding the operation 
and safety of gas turbines. What is contained is the model, manufacture, ISO power rating 
(in Mega Watts (MW)), the fuel types and the location of the turbine shown on the 
respective installations drawings. Information in reference to integrity management and 
maintenance can also be limited (HSE, 2006c). This information provides sound 
reasoning to produce dynamic risk assessment models regarding the integrity and safety 
of gas turbines. 
3 
  
Industrial power plants are critical systems on board offshore platforms as they supply 
electrical power to safety critical systems, such as: refrigeration systems, HVAC (Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning), detection systems and fire suppression systems.. 
These safety critical systems not only provide safe working for crew and other personnel, 
they also protect the integrity of the offshore platforms systems and structures. All of this 
protection stems from power supplied by the electrical generation systems, which is why 
offshore platforms and marine vessels ensure they have back-up generators in the event 
that one or two generators fail to operate (Perera, et al., 2015). 
Ideally on offshore platforms, there are three generators, two in the same module for main 
power generation and one in an upper module as the emergency generator. There are 
many safety precautions that protect offshore generators and their locations, however, 
failures do occur. The most common failures within a gas turbine generator occur due to 
components under heavy stress fracturing and affecting the balance and rotation of the 
turbine and alternator, Similarly, these component failures also cause fuel gas releases, 
which in turn can develop into fuel gas fires and explosions (HSE, 2006c) (HSE, 2012) 
(HSE, 2014). A number of incidents, scenarios and failure statistics are outlined in detail 
in Chapter 2. 
It is situations such as those described that increase the requirement for a dynamic risk 
assessment model to accurately monitor the consequences of failures within gas driven 
generators as they are critical in the survival of crew members as well as the integrity of 
the respective offshore installation. Similarly, the information regarding gas turbines and 
the reporting of incidents is invaluable as it demonstrates that, in terms of gas turbine 
failures, offshore platforms in the UKCS are not completely equipped to be unmanned. 
A system must be developed to detect these failures and releases given that there is no 
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human presence on board. This moves the focus to the Internet of Things (IoT) and 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).  
In the present world smart homes, smart water networks, and intelligent transportation, 
are infrastructure systems that connect the world together more than was thought possible. 
This common vision of interrelating systems is associated with a common concept, the 
IoT, where, through the use of sensors, an entire physical infrastructure is paired with 
information and communication technology. Intelligent monitoring and management can 
be achieved through the application of network embedded devices. In these sophisticated 
and dynamic systems, devices are interconnected to transmit useful information regarding 
measurements and control instructions through distributed sensor networks (IEC, 2014). 
Furthermore, a WSN is a network formed by several sensor nodes, where each node is 
equipped with a sensor to detect physical phenomena such as: heat, light, sound and 
pressure. WSNs are considered a revolutionary information harvesting method in the 
building of information and communication systems which will greatly improve the 
systems efficiency and reliability. WSNs feature easy deployment and vast flexibility of 
devices, and with the rapid growth in today’s development of sensor technology, WSNs 
are becoming the key technology for IoT (IEC, 2014) (Fischione, 2014). 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of the research is to investigate how a dynamic risk assessment model for 
an NUI - Integrity Case can be developed to facilitate safety assessment for the duty 
holder, the regulatory body and other various parties involved in the oil and gas industry. 
A key part of the study is that it is the development of a logical and consistent risk 
assessment model, by applying Bayesian Network techniques to a specific system of an 
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offshore installation. Furthermore, the issue of detecting incident on NUIs given that there 
is not a human presence on board. The objectives of this study are as follows: 
i. Identify a key offshore system that can be utilised as a base study for the Asset 
Integrity Case. 
ii. Develop a substantial research methodology and Asset Integrity Case framework 
for producing a dynamic risk assessment model utilising risk assessment and 
decision-making modelling methods.  
iii. Develop flexible risk assessment and decision-making models for modelling 
offshore risk under uncertainty. As well as developing a number of viable methods 
that allows for the detecting and monitoring of asset integrity without a human 
presence on board an offshore installation. 
iv. Provide validation of the risk assessment and decision-making models, through 
the use of case studies, to demonstrate a reasonable level of confidence in the 
results.  
v. Discuss the results and provide hypotheses for further development of the NUI-
Asset Integrity Case. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations of the Research 
It is important to highlight that there are limitations in regards to what the presented 
research can achieve. The project may not completely encompass all possible failure 
incidents and scenarios that can occur regarding gas turbines and offshore power 
generation. Nor will it cover the software aspect of WSNs even though an outline of the 
cyber-security is conducted in Chapter 2. There are a number of specific limitations that 
are identified that clarify the scope of the research and its applicability. These points are 
as follows: 
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 The research is focused around developing dynamic risk assessment models and 
WSN designs for one key area of an offshore installation. This area is the electrical 
generation module of a fixed steel offshore platform in the North Sea.  
 The BN models are built for the situation where the offshore platform contains no 
crew and hence does not consider fatalities. There are two key reasons for this; 
the first is that the BN models are to be for an NUI (Normally Unattended 
Installation) Integrity Case, where humans are not present on the platform for 
large periods of time, and are monitored from other platforms or onshore. 
Secondly, the BN is part of the development of an Integrity Case which shall focus 
on maintaining the integrity of the equipment as a priority, as well as the effects 
of incidents on the environment. Hence fatalities are not part of the consequences 
for the models. 
 The scope of the BN models is primarily within the power generation module of 
a large fixed offshore platform. Therefore, the section of the models assigned to 
the probability of equipment damage confined to the equipment and machinery 
located only within the stated module, unless stated otherwise. Further limitations 
of BNs are outlined in Chapter 2. 
 Within the limitations of the scope of the research there are limitations within the 
methodology and application of the modelling and mathematical techniques. This 
can be stated as all techniques are not ideal for all applications but some are ideal 
for certain applications. The Limitations of BNs has been outlined in chapter 2 
along with the justification. AHP is used within Chapters 4 and 6 for the purpose 
of determining weights from subjective expert judgement. Yet AHP does have its 
limitations. With AHP one of the main limitations is that the decision problem is 
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decomposed into a number of subsystems, within which and between which a 
substantial number of pairwise comparisons need to be completed. This approach 
has the disadvantage that the number of pairwise comparisons to be made, may 
become very large and thus analysis can become a lengthy task (Macharis, et al., 
2004). However, the pairwise comparisons in this research are developed to 
reduce the complexity and ask fewer questions of the experts. Hence, the issue of 
substantial evaluation of pairwise comparisons can be addressed.  
 There are many gas turbine component failures that can have an effect on the 
outcomes of the BN models, however, the models presented are part of a 
development. Hence, the cause and effects of a specific number of failures is 
analysed. 
 It is important that some remarks are made regarding the uniformity of the data 
within the models. Statistics exist in a number of formats and originate from many 
sources. When formulating a model as specific and confined as the one being 
created, it is almost impossible to gather data sets from the same consistent 
sources.  
 When considering the design of WSNs, only the hardware and the topology are 
considered not any software aspects. This due to the increased levels of 
complexity that including a software aspect would bring to the research. In terms 
of what the scope of the research is, a decision is made based upon how a WSN 
would fit into asset integrity monitoring. 
These are generic limitations regarding the whole research project. Each technical chapter 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) contains their own specific limitations relating to both the domain 
of operation and the issue of data gathering and analysis. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters which are supported by a number of appendices. 
Following the introductory chapter, a comprehensive literature review is conducted 
examining offshore safety assessment and trends of regulations with the reporting of 
offshore incidents, as well as justification of BNs and WSNs. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
research methodology, while Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the main focus of the projects 
research and results. These chapters are presented in accordance with the aims and 
objectives as well as the research methodology. Finally, the thesis is concluded in 
Chapters 7 and 8 where a final discussion and conclusions are presented. The following 
explanations summarise what is contained within each chapter. 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
This chapter provides the background, justification, and aims and objectives of the project, 
and an outline of the thesis is provided. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review. 
The literature review is vital for organising and planning research appropriately. It allows 
the researcher to learn from, progress and expand from previous academic / industrial 
achievements. More importantly it should ensure that the research is novel and 
meaningful. The literature review commences by examining the beginnings of offshore 
safety cases and the potential introduction of the asset integrity case to operate in 
conjunction. Similarly, the reasoning for the expansion of safety cases is outlined. 
Statistics regarding the gas turbine incidents are outlined and examined, with emphasis 
on the reliance of manual fuel; gas detection and reporting. Furthermore, an investigation 
of ship to platform collision incident and accidents is outlined to demonstrate that other 
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areas of the offshore industry are following a trend of reporting or under reporting of 
incidents with the updating of safety case regulations. Finally, a review of WSN 
technology is presented, with an outline of the applications on offshore platforms that are 
heavily applicable to asset integrity monitoring.  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology. 
The research methodology aims at delivering a risk-based research methodology framework 
to establish the guidelines for developing the dynamic risk assessment and the remote 
detection methods for the NUI-Asset Integrity Case. The Bayesian Network elements of the 
framework shall be capable of dealing with dynamic risk assessment by accommodating the 
ability to continually update the conditional probability data. Furthermore, the remote sensing 
and detection methods along with the decision-making methodology shall allow for the 
determination of a suitable method for detecting and identifying asset integrity on an offshore 
platform. The chapter also includes the individual dynamic risk assessment and decision-
making methodologies, along with the applied research techniques. 
Chapter 4: Initial BN model for a single gas turbine failure. 
This chapter focuses on the development of an Initial Bayesian Network (BN) model for 
modelling system and component failures on an offshore installation. The intention is to 
model a sequence of events following a specific component failure, under certain 
conditions and assumptions. This should provide a base with which to expand the BN 
model to facilitate the requirement of having a dynamic risk assessment model within an 
NUI (Normally Unattended Installation) - Integrity Case.  
Chapter 5: Expanded BN model for several failures and fuel gas release. 
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This chapter focuses on the development of a Bayesian Network (BN) model for 
modelling control system and physical failures of a gas turbine utilised in offshore 
electrical generation. The intention is to model a sequence of events following several 
component failures, under certain conditions and assumptions. These initial failures are 
defined in two categories; control system failures and physical or structural failures. This 
should provide a base with which to expand the BN model to facilitate the requirement 
of having a dynamic risk assessment model that allows for accurate representation of the 
hazards and consequences associated with gas turbine fuel gas releases. 
Chapter 6: Development of WSN for offshore asset integrity monitoring. 
This chapter focuses on the development of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) for and 
offshore system. The system in question is the electrical generation units. The intention 
is to design the structure of a number of WSNs within the electrical generation system 
with varying connection types and methods of relaying data. The research is concerned 
only with the design of the WSNs, i.e. the hardware and orientation of the sensor nodes 
and not the software, programming or data protection. This should provide a good base, 
once an ideal WSN design is determined, to expand the network further incorporating 
more attributes and develop the necessary software to complete the WSN. Sensitivity 
Analysis and validation is provided for the analysis. 
Chapter 7: Discussion and further Research. 
The way the research was developed and its applicability are discussed. The limitations 
of the work are outlined and examined. Future research ideas are proposed including some 
which deal with these limitations 
Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
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The contributions to knowledge and research conclusions are presented. 
1.5 Conclusion 
The background of the project and the NUI-Asset Integrity Case have been introduced, 
with the development to be centred on offshore power generation. Hence, an outline of 
the importance of the gas turbine generator on board offshore installations has been 
outlined with a brief, initial outline of gas turbine incidents. From this the aims and 
objectives of the project have been outlined. Some additional information is presented 
regarding the scope of the project. The introduction has then been finalised by presenting 
the outline of the thesis.  
1.6 Publications Generated from the Research 
During the course of the research, three publications were produced. These are outlined 
as follows: 
 S. Loughney, J. Wang, D. Lau, D. Minty, “Integrity Case Development for 
Normally Unattended Offshore Installations - Initial Bayesian Network 
Modelling”, Risk, Reliability and Safety: Innovating Theory and Practice – Walls, 
Revie & Bedford (Eds). 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-1-138-
02997-2. ESREL 2016. Sep 13, 2016. 
 S. Loughney, J. Wang, “Bayesian network modelling of an offshore electrical 
generation system for applications within an asset integrity case for normally 
unattended offshore installations”, Proc IMechE Part M: J Engineering for the 
Maritime Environment, 1–19, online: May 12, 2017. 
 S. Loughney, J. Wang, P. Davies, “Bayesian network modelling for offshore 
installations: Gas turbine fuel gas release with potential fire and explosion 
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consequences”, Safety and Reliability. Theory and Applications – Cepin & Bris 
Hardback (Eds). 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-1-138-62937-
0. ESREL 2017. May 25, 2017. 
These publications can be found in Appendices A, B and C  
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2  CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Summary 
In this chapter, the important literature influencing the current study is reviewed. It includes 
the examination of the beginnings of offshore safety cases and the potential introduction 
of the asset integrity case to operate in conjunction. Similarly, the reasoning for the 
expansion of safety cases is outlined. Statistics regarding the gas turbine incidents are 
outlined and examined, with emphasis on the reliance of manual fuel gas detection and 
reporting. Furthermore, an investigation of ship to platform collision incident and 
accidents is outlined to demonstrate that other areas of the offshore industry are 
following a trend of reporting or under reporting of incidents with the updating of safety 
case regulations. Finally, a review of WSN technology is presented, with an outline of the 
applications on offshore platforms that are heavily applicable to asset integrity 
monitoring. 
2.1 Offshore Safety Assessment 
2.1.1 Outline of Safety Cases and ALARP 
Following the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster, the responsibilities for offshore 
safety regulations were transferred from the Department of Energy to the Health and 
Safety Commission (HSC) through the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as the singular 
regulatory body for safety in the offshore industry (Wang, 2002) (Department of Energy, 
1990). In response to this the HSE launched a review of all safety legislation and 
subsequently implemented changes. The propositions sought to replace the legislations 
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that were seen as prescriptive to a more “goal setting” approach. Several regulations were 
produced, with the mainstay being the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSE, 1992). Under 
this a draft of the offshore installations safety case regulations was produced. The 
regulations required operational safety cases to be prepared for all offshore installations, 
both fixed and mobile. Within this all new fixed installations require a design safety case 
and for mobile installations, the duty holder is the owner (Wang, 2002). 
Offshore operators must submit operational safety cases (SC) for all existing and new 
offshore installations to the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) Offshore Safety 
Division for acceptance, and it is an offence to operate without an approved SC (HSE, 
2006b). The SC must show that it identifies the hazards with potential to produce a serious 
accident and that these hazards are below a tolerability limit and have been reduced to the 
ALARP Level (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) (Wang, 2002). The HSE framework 
for decisions on the tolerability of risk is shown in Figure 2-1. 
Safety and risk assessment for offshore installations is vigorous and requires 
demonstration from duty holders that all hazards with potential to cause major accident 
are identified, all major risks have been evaluated, and measure have been or will be taken 
to control the major accident risks to ensure compliance with the statutory provisions 
(HSE, 2006a). 
This is vitally important as accidents in the offshore industry lead to devastating 
consequences, such as the explosion on board the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of 
Mexico which was caused by the failure of a subsea blowout preventer (BOP), with some 
failures thought to have occurred before the blowout. This solidifies the use of 
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quantitative risk and reliability analysis, with recent emphasis on Bayesian networks, as 
the model can perform predictive analysis and diagnostic analysis (Cai, et al., 2013).  
After many years of employing the safety case approach in the UK offshore industry, the 
regulations were expanded in 1996 to include verification of safety critical elements. Also, 
the offshore installations and wells regulations were introduced to deal with various 
stages of the life cycle of the installation. Safety Critical Elements (SCE) are parts of an 
installation and its plant, including computer programs or any part whose failure could 
cause or contribute substantially to or whose purpose of which is to prevent or limit the 
effect of a major accident (Wang, 2002) (HSE, 1996). 
2.1.2 Safety Case Expansion, Dynamic Risk Assessment and Integrity 
Case 
Recently, however, it is felt that an expansion on Safety Cases is necessary, especially in 
the offshore and marine industry, as they are static documents that are produced at the 
Figure 2-1: HSE Framework for decisions on the tolerability of risk 
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inception of offshore installations and contains a structured argument demonstrating that 
the evidence contained therein is sufficient to show that the system is safe (Auld, 2013). 
That is the extent of the Safety Case, it involves very little updating unless an operational 
or facility change is made. It can be difficult to navigate through a safety case; they can 
be difficult for project teams and regulators to understand, as well as often being 
monolithic (Risktec, 2013).  
This is where the e-Safety Case comes into play. They are html web-based electronic 
Safety Cases. They are much easier to navigate and have clear concise information about 
the safety of the facility they are provided for. However, the QRA data (Quantified Risk 
Assessment) is only updated with the release of updated regulations (Cockram & 
Lockwood, 2003). 
The Integrity Case, an idea proposed by RMRI Plc. (Risk Management Research 
Institute), can be said to be dynamic as it shall be continually updated with the QRA data 
for an installation as the QRA data is recorded. This allows for the integrity of the various 
systems and components of a large asset, such as an offshore installation, to be continually 
monitored. This continual updating of the assets QRA data allows for the users to have a 
clearer understanding of the current status of an asset, identify the impact of any deviation 
from specified performance standards, facilitate more efficient identification of 
appropriate risk reduction measures, identify key trends within assets (i.e. failures, failure 
modes), reporting to regulators would improve greatly and it would provide a historical 
audit trail for the asset. Furthermore, the integrity of an asset is maintained so that 
potential loss of life is kept ALARP. This means that an asset may continue safe 
operations under circumstances that may have instigated precautionary shutdown, 
resulting in considerable cost saving for the owner and operator (RMRI Plc., 2011). 
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2.2 Offshore Gas Turbines 
Gas turbines are used for a variety of purposes on offshore installations, such as: power 
generation, compression pumping and water injection, most often in remote locations. 
Gas turbines are most commonly duel fuelled. They have the ability to run on fuel taken 
from the production process under normal operations, known as fuel gas. They can also 
run on diesel fuel in emergency circumstances. Typically, offshore gas turbines run from 
1 to 50 MW and may well be modified from aero-engines or industrial engines. The most 
often used gas turbines are Aeroderivative, particularly for the gas generator. It is known 
that relatively little information is contained within safety cases regarding the operation 
and safety of gas turbines. What is contained is the model, manufacture, ISO power rating 
(in Mega Watts (MW)), the fuel types and the location of the turbine shown on the 
respective installations drawings. Additional information can be found on occasion, such 
as: text regarding the power generation package or back-up generators. However, 
information in reference to integrity management and maintenance can be very limited 
(HSE, 2006c). This information, or lack of, provides sound reasoning to produce dynamic 
risk assessment models regarding the integrity and safety of gas turbines. 
2.2.1 Offshore Gas Turbine Incidents and Incomplete Incident Data 
Industrial power plants are critical systems on board offshore platforms as they supply 
electrical power to safety critical systems, such as: refrigeration systems, HVAC (Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning), detection systems, and fire suppression systems. 
These safety critical systems not only provide safe working for crew and other personnel, 
they also protect the integrity of the offshore platforms systems and structures. All of this 
protection stems from power supplied by the electrical generation systems, which is why 
offshore platforms and marine vessels ensure they have back-up generators in the event 
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that one or two generators fail to operate (Perera, et al., 2015). Usually, on offshore 
platforms, there are three electrical generation systems, with two in the same module and 
the third in a separate module on a higher level which usually acts as the emergency 
generator. Despite the safety precautions behind the number of generators and their 
locations, there is still the possibility of all generators failing to operate (Ramakrishnan, 
2007). A situation, similar to the one described, had the potential to occur on board the 
Thistle Alpha platform in the North Sea, off the coast of Scotland. In this particular event 
in 2009, the platform was running off one generator, known as Unit B. Units A and C 
were out of commission due to damages and repair. It is possible for one gas driven 
generator to supply a large fixed platform of over 200 crew members, like Thistle Alpha, 
with power when running at full capacity. In this event Unit C was the emergency 
generator on a in a different module to A and B. During maintenance, it was found that 
all generators had cause for failure due to a single component. The components in 
question, the rotor retaining ring, were highly susceptible to fracture and fragmentation, 
hence it was of vital importance that they were replaced. Should they have failure within 
generator B, the offshore platform would have been temporarily without power, with the 
exception of the Temporary Refuge which has its own power supply in the form of 
batteries, separate from the rest of the platform (RMRI Plc., 2009). Continually, it is these 
single component failure that can lead to situations were fuel gas can be released from 
the gas turbine system. It is also possible for external factors to begin a series of events 
that can cause a fuel gas release such as: control system errors, operational errors and 
corrosion. 
Furthermore, in recent years there has been a marked increase in fires associated with fuel 
gas leaks with offshore gas turbines. A detailed review of offshore gas turbines incidents 
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conducted in 2005 showed that there were 307 hazardous events over 13 year period, 
from 1991 to 2004. The review concerned itself with over 550 gas turbine machines. The 
analysis concluded that the majority of incidents (approximately 40%) occurred during 
normal operations, with approximately 20% during start-up, another 20% during or after 
maintenance and the remaining 10% of fuel gas leaks occur during fuel changeover. With 
the majority of incidents occurring during normal operations, the fuel gas detection is 
heavily reliant on either turbine fuel detectors and/or fire and gas system detectors. This 
is due to the modules containing the electrical power generators being almost totally 
unmanned during normal operation. It was also found that based upon the review 
conducted on machines in the stated 13 year period, shows that approximately 22% of 
gas leaks remained undetected. Subsequently, 60% of those undetected leaks were found 
to have ignited (HSE, 2008b). 
It is situations such as those described that increase the requirement for a dynamic risk 
assessment model to accurately monitor the consequences of failures within gas driven 
generators as they are critical in the survival of crew members as well as the integrity of 
the respective offshore installation. 
2.3 Ship/Platform Collisions 
As stated previously in Section 1, the research presented in this thesis focuses on the 
development of dynamic risk assessment model and WSNs for use on board an offshore 
installation. The emphasis is on the electrical power generation systems, for Asset 
Integrity Case development for NUIs. Furthermore, it has been stated that there have been 
gas turbine incidents over the past 20 years that have been detected by humans with little 
reporting of the incidents. This is key as the Asset Integrity Case proposes to maintain the 
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status of asset integrity using dynamic risk assessment model and WSNs while operating 
alongside safety case regulations. It is known that the rate at which safety case regulations 
are updated is slow, making safety cases monolithic. However, due to under reporting 
and the availability of data, it is difficult to demonstrate the trend of gas turbine incidents 
with the updating of offshore regulations.  
On the other hand, it is possible to demonstrate the effect that slow updating and 
enforcement of regulations, as well as under reporting, has on incidents on-board offshore 
platforms. A key area that can be assessed is the issue of ship to platform collisions. The 
current database of ship to platform collisions provided by the HSE is out dated as it was 
last published in 2001, similarly the OGP produced a document in 2010 of worldwide 
collision statistics (HSE, 2003). However, the OGP document provides only the 
frequency of collisions of incidents over key offshore and shipping areas around the world. 
Neither is sufficient enough to demonstrate the trend between offshore collision incidents 
and offshore regulations. Therefore, a statistical analysis is conducted for ship to platform 
collisions from 1971 – 2014 across the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and the North Sea. 
Information is provided by the HSE’s RIDDOR database, the World Offshore Accident 
Databank (WOAD) from DNV GL and the Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAIB). The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that there is a trend between key 
offshore regulations and ship to platform collision incidents.  
2.3.1 Key Offshore Regulations and Events 1975 - 2015 
Before any data is presented, it is important to understand the timeline of key offshore 
regulations and incidents that have shaped the modern-day safety case regulations. Table 
2-1 shows the timeline of incidents that have built the current safety case regulations. 
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Similarly, Figure 2-2 shows the number of ship to platform collision incidents from 1971 
– 2014 as well as the key regulations and incidents from Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Time line of key regulations and events that have shaped the modern offshore safety case 
Year Name Description 
1974 Health & Safety 
at Work Act 
(HSWA) 
The HSWA adopted a holistic approach to the health, safety 
and welfare of workers. The Act focuses on the concept that 
any situations that may give rise to harm need to be 
recognised and suitable measures put in place to eliminate or 
reduce the potential for harm. It set up two new organisations 
to oversee its implementation: The Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) and the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE). The HSE is the executive organisation that enforces 
the provisions of the HSWA. However, in April 2008 the 
HSC was dissolved and merged with the HSE. The HSC used 
to protect health and safety at work in the UK by conducting 
research, training and providing advice and information. The 
Commission also used to propose new regulations and 
approved codes of practice under the authority of the Act. 
This is all now conducted by the HSE (Inge, 2007) (The 
Stationary Office, 1974). 
1988 Piper Alpha 
Disaster 
Piper Alpha was an oil production platform in the North Sea 
off the coast of Aberdeen, Scotland. The platform began 
production in 1976, initially as an oil platform but was later 
converted to accommodate gas production. Oil & Gas fires 
and explosions destroyed Piper Alpha on 6 July 1988, killing 
167 people, including two crewmen of a rescue vessel and 61 
workers aboard survived. Thirty bodies were never 
recovered. The total insured loss was about £1.7 billion ($3.4 
billion), making it one of the costliest manmade catastrophes 
ever. At the time of the disaster, the platform accounted for 
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approximately ten per cent of North Sea oil and gas 
production. The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 
to establish the cause of the disaster, chaired by Judge 
William Cullen. After 180 days of proceedings, the "Public 
Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster" or "Cullen Report" 
was released in November 1990. It concluded that the initial 
condensate leak was the result of maintenance work being 
carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety 
valve. The report was critical of Piper Alpha's operator, 
which was found guilty of having inadequate maintenance 
and safety procedures (Inge, 2007) (Oil & Gas UK, 2008). 
1989 Offshore 
Installations 
(Safety 
Representatives 
& Safety 
Committee) 
Regulations 
The document provides information on interpretation and 
enforcement of the Offshore Installations (Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989. 
These regulations were made under the Mineral Workings 
(Offshore Installations) Act 1971. They allow the workforce 
on an offshore installation to elect safety representatives 
from among themselves, and confers on those functions and 
powers in relation to the health and safety of the workforce. 
They also provide for time off with pay for safety 
representatives so they can perform these functions and 
undergo relevant training (The Stationery Office, 1989). 
1990 The Cullen 
Report  
The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish 
the cause of the disaster, chaired by Judge William Cullen. 
After 180 days of proceedings, the "Public Inquiry into the 
Piper Alpha Disaster" or "Cullen Report" was released in 
November 1990. It concluded that the initial condensate leak 
was the result of maintenance work being carried out 
simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The 
report critical of Piper Alpha's operator, which was found 
guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety 
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procedures. 106 recommendations were made calling for, 
amongst many matters, the requirement of a SCs, the 
transference of the discharge of offshore regulation from the 
Department of Energy to a discrete division of the HSE. The 
responsibility of implementing the recommendations was 
spread across the regulators and the industry with, the HSE 
overseeing 57, the operators were responsible for 40, the 
offshore industry were given 8 to progress and the final one 
was for the Standby Ship Owners Association. The industry 
acted urgently to carry out the 48 recommendations that 
operators were directly responsible for. The HSE developed 
and implemented Lord Cullen's key recommendation: the 
introduction of safety regulations requiring the 
operator/owner of every fixed and mobile installation 
operating in UK waters to submit to the HSE, for their 
acceptance, a SC (Inge, 2007). 
1992 Safety Case 
Regulations 
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations came 
into force in 1992. By November 1993 a safety case for every 
installation had been submitted to the HSE and by November 
1995 all had had their safety case accepted by the HSE. The 
Safety Case Regulations require the owner/operator/duty 
holder of every fixed and mobile installation operating in UK 
waters to submit to the HSE, for their acceptance, a safety 
case. The safety case must give full details of the 
arrangements for managing health and safety and controlling 
major accident hazards on the installation. It must 
demonstrate, for example, that the company has safety 
management systems in place, has identified risks and 
reduced them to as low as reasonably practicable, has 
introduced management controls, provided a temporary safe 
refuge on the installation and has made provisions for safe 
evacuation and rescue (Inge, 2007) (HSE, 2005). 
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1995 Offshore 
Installations 
Prevention of 
Fire and 
Explosion, and 
Emergency 
Response 
(PFEER) 
PFEER deals primarily with fire and explosion events but it 
also deals with any event which may require emergency 
response and includes systems that may rely on radar on a 
standby vessel or responsible staff on the installation 
monitoring incoming vessels. The Regulations, ACOP and 
guidance deal with: (a) preventing fires and explosions, and 
protecting people from the effects of any which do occur; (b) 
securing effective response to emergencies affecting people 
on the installation or engaged in activities in connection with 
it, and which have the potential to require evacuation, escape 
and rescue (Amended in 2005 and 2015)  (HSE, 2015). 
1996 Offshore 
Installation 
(Design & 
Construction) 
Regulations 
DCR Requires the installation to possess integrity at all 
times, as is reasonably practicable. It requires the design of 
the installation to withstand such forces that are reasonably 
foreseeable and in the event of foreseeable damage it will 
retain sufficient integrity to enable action to be taken to 
safeguard the health and safety of persons on or near it. The 
duty holder also has to record the appropriate limits within 
which it is to be operated. Further duties can be found in the 
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, 
etc.) Regulations 1996.(HSE, 2008a). 
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2005 Offshore 
Installations 
(Safety Case) 
Regulations 
(April 2006) 
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 
came into force on 6 April 2006. They replace the previous 
1992 Regulations. The primary aim of the Regulations is to 
reduce the risks from major accident hazards to the health 
and safety of the workforce employed on offshore 
installations or in connected activities. The Regulations 
implement the central recommendation of Lord Cullen’s 
report on the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. 
This was that the operator or owner of every offshore 
installation should be required to prepare a safety case and 
submit it to HSE for acceptance  (HSE, 2005). These SC 
regulations have been replaced by the 2015 regulations.  
2008 Safety Zones 
around Oil & 
Gas 
Installations in 
Waters around 
the UK (HSE)  
While this document is not a regulation, it explains the 
purpose and significance of safety zones around offshore oil 
and gas installations and their effect on marine activities, 
particularly relating to fishing vessels. A safety zone is an 
area extending 500 m from any part of offshore oil and gas 
installations and is established automatically around all 
installations which project above the sea at any state of the 
tide. Subsea installations may also have safety zones, created 
by statutory instrument, to protect them. These safety zones 
are a 500m radius from a central point. Vessels of all nations 
are required to respect them. It is an offence (under section 
23 of the Petroleum Act 1987) to enter a safety zone except 
under the special circumstances. (HSE, 2008c). 
2015 Offshore 
Installations 
(Offshore 
Safety 
Directive) 
(Safety Cases 
The Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) 
(Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015 came into force on 19 
July 2015. They apply to oil and gas operations in external 
waters, that is, the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain and 
any designated area within the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf (UKCS). They replace the Offshore Installations 
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etc.) regulations 
(July 2015) 
(Safety Case) Regulations 2005 in these waters, subject to 
certain transitional arrangements (HSE, 2015a). 
 
Figure 2-2 demonstrates the number of ship to platform collision incidents between 1971 
and 2014. The incidents are incidents have been compiled from WOAD, HSE and MAIB. 
All incidents presented have resulted in some form of damage to the platform, either, 
insignificant, minor, severe and in one case total loss. The graph is a depiction of 582 
reported incidents in the 43-year period (GL, 2017) (HSE, 2016) (MAIB, 2016).
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Figure 2-2: Graph demonstrating the number of ship to platform collision incident s per year, as well as the key regulations and events that formed the modern safety case 
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2.3.2 Analysis of Incidents and Regulations Timeline 
It can be seen from Figure 2-2 that the number of ship to platform collision incidents from 
1971 to 2014 is very turbulent, as more clearly demonstrated by the average trend line. 
At a first glance, this trend seems to be rather erratic, following no clear pattern. However, 
when the milestones in the safety case regulation timeline are taken into consideration, 
patterns begin to emerge in the number of incidents each year in UKCS and the North 
Sea. 
2.3.2.1 HSE and the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1971 - 1981 
Initially, from 1971 to 1973 the number of incidents is very low at one per year. A possible 
reason for this is that the data entries for 1971 to 1973 are from WOAD only, as the HSE 
began their ship to platform collision recordings from 1975. However, from 1975 
onwards the number of incidents per year greatly increases until 1981 from 12 to 32 
respectively. There are a number of possibilities that can cause this rapid increase. Firstly, 
the HSWA is enforced from 1974 hence, the recognition of dangerous incidents that can 
cause harm to personnel is increased. Secondly, as more and more dangerous incidents 
are being recognised, the need to report said incidents also increases. Therefore, it is safe 
to say that an increased awareness of dangerous situations coupled with the need to report 
these incidents gives rise to a dramatic increase in the number of collision incidents. 
Thirdly, according to the HSE, the average number of installations operating in the UKCS 
alone increases from 88 in 1975 to 120 in 1981. The increase in the number of operating 
platforms would statistically increase the number of collisions at that time.  
2.3.2.2 Pre-Piper Alpha and Cullen Report, 1981 - 1987 
From 1981, however, the number of incidents per year begins to decrease until 1987, from 
32 to 7. This decrease is much greater that the increase in incidents from 1975 to 1981. It 
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is possible that the enforcement of the HSWA had a large effect on the safety procedures 
on offshore platforms in the North Sea. This hypothesis would also be consistent with the 
average number of platforms operating in the UKCS which increases from 120 in 1981 
to 174 in 1987. This contradicts the previous statement that the number of incidents would 
increase with the number of platforms in operation. However, in the 6-year period 
between 1981 and 1987 this is not the case. This further backs up the idea that the 
regulations form 1974 have been increasingly enforced and have reduced the number of 
incidents. However, it is also possible to state that the level of reporting of the collision 
incidents has decreased. This is a much more difficult claim to validate as there isn’t any 
possible way to determine whether an incident has happened and hasn’t been reported. 
This is part of the reasoning behind the Asset Integrity Case, as the only way wireless 
sensor will not detect and log any information is if it is faulty. On the other hand a human 
has the ability to choose not to carry out an action. Hence it is difficult to accurately 
determine the level of underreporting that would have taken place between 1981 and 1987.  
2.3.2.3 Piper Alpha and Offshore Installations Regulations, 1988 - 1989 
Continually, the time period between 1988 and 1994, in terms of collision incidents, is 
very interesting. The year 1988 is well known in the offshore industry and indeed the 
world as the year of the Piper Alpha disaster in which 167 crew members lost their lives 
in the July of that year. When one examines the collision incidents that were reported in 
1988, more than 60% were reported after the loss of Piper Alpha on 6th July (See 
Appendix D). This may suggest that a large-scale disaster, such as Piper Alpha, triggered 
an increase in the level of incident reporting. However, the number of collision incidents 
in 1988 alone are not enough to state this with any conviction. What is interesting 
however, is that the number of collision incidents increase in 1989 to 21, from 8 in 1988. 
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This is a drastic increase in terms of the number of reported incidents in the North Sea, 
after a large-scale offshore disaster. Furthermore, in 1989 the Offshore Installations 
(Safety Representatives & Safety Committee) Regulations were published. This stated 
that the workforce could elect safety representatives from amongst themselves. This may 
have increased the level of reporting of collision incidents in 1989. However, it appears 
to be too much of a drastic increase from the previous year to conclusively state that the 
new regulations in 1989 resulted in a considerable number of reported incidents. It seems 
much more likely that a combination of the Piper Alpha disaster and the release of the 
Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives & Safety Committee) Regulations 
contributed to the vast increase in reported collision incidents.  
2.3.2.4 Cullen Report and Inception of Safety Case Regulations, 1990 - 1995 
Continually, in 1990, the Cullen Report was published which was public enquiry into the 
Piper Alpha disaster. The report was heavily critical of the platform operators. Lord 
Cullen made a total of 106 recommendations within his report, all of which were accepted 
by industry. The responsibility of implementing them was spread across the regulators 
and the industry with, the HSE overseeing 57, the operators were responsible for 40, the 
offshore industry were given 8 to progress and the final one was for the Standby Ship 
Owners Association. The industry acted urgently to carry out the 48 recommendations 
that operators were directly responsible for. By 1993 all had been acted upon and 
substantially implemented. Furthermore, the HSE developed and implemented Lord 
Cullen's key recommendation: the introduction of safety regulations requiring the 
operator/owner of every fixed and mobile installation operating in UK waters to submit 
to the HSE, for their acceptance, a safety case. Hence, in 1992 the Offshore Installations 
(Safety Case) Regulations came into force. By November 1993 a safety case for every 
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installation had been submitted to the HSE and by November 1995 all had had their safety 
case accepted by the HSE.  
2.3.2.5 PFEER and Further Safety Case Regulations, 1996 - 2004 
 If the number of collision incidents is examined from the Cullen Report in 1990 to all 
installation Safety Cases being accepted in 1995, it can be seen that the number of 
incidents per year decreases rapidly from 27 to 3 respectively. This again a massive 
fluctuation in the number of incidents following a series of key regulations being enforced. 
Its shows that the release of new regulations prompts the level of incidents to decrease as 
the regulations are enforced. However, as 1995 is a number of years after the Cullen 
Report and the introduction of Safety Cases it is possible that an element of complacency 
in terms of reporting may occur. This can be seen from the number of incidents between 
1995 and 2004. The number of collision incidents increases from 3 in 1995, to a peak in 
1999 of 22, then to a new low of 5 in 2004. This fluctuation could be attributed to jus the 
number of incidents increasing after 1995 due to the increase of the average number of 
installations operating in the UKCS from 289 to 319 in 1999. However, the increase in 
installations does not correlate well with the increase in incidents. 
What appears to be more likely is at the low point of 3 collisions in 1995, a new set of 
regulations are introduced and enforced, the Offshore Installations Prevention of Fire and 
Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) along with the Offshore Installation 
(Design & Construction) Regulations in 1996. At that point, the number of incidents 
increases and peaks in 1999. It is likely is that the increase of new regulations prompts a 
more proactive response in the accuracy of incident reporting. 
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2.3.2.6 Amended Safety Case Regulations and Attention to 500m Safety Zones, 
2005 - 2015 
This trend can be seen yet again from 2004 to 2012, were the number of collision incidents 
per year increases from 5 in 2004 to 12 in 2007 then decreases to 4 in 2012. This could 
be attributed to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 being enforced 
in 2006. As with the regulations in 1995 and 1996 the number of incident increases and 
begins to decrease. However, the number of collision incidents becomes much steadier 
and doesn’t fluctuate as much as previous years, as an increase from 5 to 12 is not a huge 
increase, but it is an increase none the less. Furthermore, in 2008 the document entitled 
Safety Zones around Oil & Gas Installations in Waters around the UK is introduced by 
the HSE. This specifically targets the area of offshore collisions and near misses. 
Therefore, it makes sense to state that this introduction has maintained a steady level of 
incidents between 2008, with 9, and 2015, with 3.  
From the information presented in Figure 2-2 and Appendix D it can be seen that the 
offshore industry can be said to be reactive in its approach to reporting incidents, 
especially in the area of ship to platform collisions. What is also apparent is that the 
fluctuation has become gradually smaller in more recent times. This shows that the effect 
of introducing and amending regulations over time has a positive effect on the overall 
trend of collision incidents. While this study identifies trends in ship to platform 
collisions, it would still be valid to state that the offshore industry would profit greatly 
from have a dynamic risk monitoring tool to aid with the continual enforcement of 
regulations across all areas of an offshore platform. In the near future, the Asset Integrity 
Case could be the answer to this problem. 
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2.4 Dynamic Risk Assessment in the Offshore Industry 
Improving offshore safety is a large objective for various offshore companies such as the 
HSE and DNV GL (Det Norske Veritas) (Germanischer Lloyd). In order to help achieve 
this improvement in offshore safety risk assessment, analysis models need to become 
more efficient and dynamic. Hence, in this section, the justification of the development 
of a potential dynamic risk assessment model utilising BN methods is presented. 
(Matellini, 2012). 
2.4.1 Comparison of Dynamic Risk Assessment Techniques 
Over the past 10 years it has been stated that a dynamic risk assessment model is required 
within the offshore and process industries. Khakzad, et al., (2013) proposed to apply BN 
to Bow-Tie (BT) analysis. They postulated that the addition of BN to BT would help to 
overcome the static limitations of BT and show that the combination could be a 
substantial dynamic risk assessment tool. Similarly, in the oil, gas & process industry 
(Yang & Mannan, 2010) proposed a methodology of Dynamic Operational Risk 
Assessment (DORA). This starts from a conceptual framework design to mathematical 
modelling and to decision making based on cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, Eleye-
Datubo, et al. (2006) proposes an offshore decision-support solution, through BN 
techniques, to demonstrate that it is necessary to model the assessment domain such that 
the probabilistic measure of each event becomes more reliable in light of new evidence 
being received. As opposed to obtaining data incrementally, causing uncertainty from 
imperfect understanding and incomplete knowledge of the domain being analysed. 
Furthermore, dynamic risk assessment has been developed through the use of BT alone. 
Abimdola et al., (2014) present a dynamic risk assessment model utilising the BT 
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approach. The work outlines a predictive failure probabilistic model which is determining 
failure probabilities of basic components of during drilling operations. The dynamic 
model is capable of updating the failure probabilities of the components of the bow-tie, 
thus, overcoming the static nature of common risk assessment techniques (Abimdola, et 
al., 2014). Other research has developed algorithms tailored to specific incidents and 
events. For example, Liu et al., (2016) developed a system specific, novel methodology 
coupling the reservoir/wellbore model with distribution of uncertainties of a number of 
independent variables to obtain a risk picture of possible uncontrolled wellbore flow 
events. They state that industry could implement this methodology with minor 
modification as a benchmark to evaluate the onshore/offshore blowout risk (Liu, et al., 
2016).   
2.4.2 Bayesian Networks in Dynamic Risk Assessment 
The risk of hazards and failures offshore is determined by a huge array of factors due to 
the innumerable possible scenarios in which incidents and accidents can develop. This 
makes establishing risk both qualitatively and quantitatively an intimidating task. There 
are many techniques which can aid risk analysis, yet in this report the focus is to be around 
BNs, and a large number of studies have been conducted for marine, offshore and process 
industries. Most studies usually associate themselves around a particular area. For 
example, BNs have been utilised by (Cai, et al., 2013) to conduct quantitative risk 
assessment of operations in the offshore oil and gas industry. Their method involves 
translating a flow chart of operations into the BN directly. They then validate their model 
through the use of a case study involving Subsea Blowout Preventer Operations, in light 
of the Deepwater Horizon sinking in 2010, whose cause was the failure of subsea blowout 
preventer (Jones, 2010). In another instance, Eleye-Datubo, et al. (2006) apply BN to 
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produce a marine and offshore decision support tool to realistically deal with random 
uncertainties, while at the same time making risk assessments easier to build and to check 
(Fenton & Neil, 2013). Continually, Wu et al. (2016) further apply the use of Bayesian 
Networks for prediction and diagnosis of offshore drilling given certain geological 
conditions. Their work also applies the use of the BT approach to develop the BN and 
apply a case study (Wu, et al., 2016). This application of merging the BT approach with 
the BN approach is not uncommon which can be clearly seen in the outlined literature.  
There are several advantages of using BNs over alternate approaches, for example, in 
BNs diverse data, expert judgement and empirical data can all be combined. This is very 
useful in situations where there is incomplete data or a complete absence of data, and thus 
other forms of data and information can be incorporated into the network (Bolstad, 2007). 
The advantageous nature of BNs over other methods is outlined by (Khakzad, et al., 2011), 
who presented a journal paper with the exclusive nature of comparing BNs and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) in safety analysis within the process industry. It was concluded by 
Khakzad, et al., (2011) that a BN is a superior technique in safety analysis due to its 
flexible structure, which allows for it to fit a wide variety of accident scenarios. These 
views are also supported by Wu et al. (2016) and Yeo et al., (2016). 
In conjunction to this, BNs provide a clear visual representation of what they are 
representing and can be a very powerful tool for formulating ideas and expanding the 
model in itself (Fenton & Neil, 2013). This trait is shared by other risk modelling 
techniques; however, BNs are particularly adaptable method. BNs also facilitate inference 
and the ability to update predictions through the insertion of new evidence or observations 
into its parameters. This makes them a very useful tool when dealing with uncertainty.  
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2.4.3 Limitations of Bayesian Networks 
The BN methodology provides a substantial way in which the modelling of relationships 
between variables, within a given domain, through the assignment and linking of nodes.  
The method also allows for clear graphical representation of a scenario resulting from a 
series of events. The uncertainty between multiple dependencies of nodes is captured 
through the assignment of conditional probabilities (Neapolitan, 2004). It is worth noting 
that BNs are not without their critics. Bayesianism is analysed by (Wang, 2004) and 
discusses some of the limitations of BNs. He addresses in particular that the Bayesian 
approach cannot combine conflicting beliefs that are based on different implicit 
conditions and cannot carry out inference when the premises are based on different 
implicit conditions (Fenton & Neil, 2013). The key disadvantage of BNs is the 
computational complexity which can be generated. This is because the number of 
permutations in the CPTs grow exponentially with the number of parent nodes.  (Matellini, 
2012).  This can be combated by the application of the Symmetric Method assesses large 
CPTs as being linear and not exponential (the method is outlined further in Chapter 3). In 
terms of the research presented throughout this thesis, the BN should be thought of as a 
probabilistic approach to risk analysis which considers factors and chains of potential 
events, which can result in an undesired situation or conditions and is therefore ideal for 
this research. 
2.5 Wireless Sensor Networks 
2.5.1 Brief history of Wireless Sensor Networks 
The initial development of WSNs was motivated by military applications, such as: 
surveillance in conflict zones. In the modern world, they consist of independent devices 
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using sensors to monitor physical conditions with applications across industrial 
infrastructure, automation, health and consumer areas. These sensor devices are usually 
spread over areas of varying size. The sensor nodes are usually transceivers scattered 
within the sensor field where they can detect and transfer information to the gateway or 
sinkhole for use by the end user (IEC, 2014) (Fischione, 2014).  
The beginnings of the research into WSNs initiated in the 1980’s where the United States 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) conducted the Distributed 
Sensor Networks (DSNs) programme for the military. DSNs had a number of distributed, 
low-cost sensor nodes connecting to each other autonomously, with the information being 
sent to the node that could best utilise the information. Despite early interpretations of 
sensor networks had the DSN idea as a base, the technology was not readily available. 
More specifically, the first sensor nodes were much larger than the modern sensor nodes 
that are known today. These sensor nodes were roughly the size of a standard shoe box 
or bigger, with the number of practical applications being very limited. The earliest DSNs 
were not associated with wireless connectivity (Chong & Kumar, 2003) (IEC, 2014). 
However, recent advancements in the fields of communication and micro-
electromechanical technology have resulted in a significant movement in WSN research. 
The increasing research of WSNs has put its focus in networked information processing 
and networking technology for application in highly dynamic environments. Similarly, 
sensor nodes have become increasingly smaller in size with greater output potential and 
a reduction in cost, hence many applications in the civilian world have emerged, such as: 
vehicle sensor networks, environment monitoring and body sensor networks. Currently 
WSNs are viewed as the most important technologies of the 21st Century, with countries 
like China incorporating WSNs in their national strategic programmes (Ni, 2008). This 
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has resulted in a massive acceleration in the commercialisation of WSNs and many more 
technology companies are emerging (IEC, 2014).  
Industrial automation is one of the key areas of WSN applications. The Freedonia Group 
state that the global market share of sensors for industrial use is approximately $11 billion 
USD, with the cost of installation, including cabling costs, and usage is up to $100 billion 
USD. It is this cost hindering the further development of industrial communication 
technology. WSNs can improve the whole industrial process by securing the important 
parameters that are unavailable through online monitoring due to the costs stated by the 
Freedonia Group.  
Furthermore, according to the ON world, the number of wireless networking devices 
installed in industry will have increased 553% between 2011 – 2016, with 24 million 
wireless sensors, actuators or sensing points deployed worldwide. It is stated that 39% of 
these sensors will be applied to new applications which are only made possible by the 
development of WSNs. Figure 2-3 shows the global installed industrial wireless sensing 
Figure 2-3: Increase of global industrial wireless sensing points, in thousands (IEC, 2014) (Halter, et al., 2012) 
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points, courtesy of (IEC, 2014) and (Halter, et al., 2012). At the present time, 75% of 
industrial WSN income arises from the process industry, with Oil and Gas being the 
fastest growing sectors. For example, PetroChina is conducting Internet of Things (IoT) 
projects across its oil fields, with the focus on the reconstruction of more than 200, 000 
oil wells. The WSN technology applied in the oil wells will provide the ability to monitor 
the oil well production and the integrity of the oil well systems to ensure safe production 
(IEC, 2014).  
2.5.2 Wireless Sensor Network Technology 
A WSN is composed of a number of sensor nodes which are densely deployed either 
inside or very close to a physical phenomenon. The sensors cooperatively detect and 
control events and anomalies within the environment, enabling interaction between 
persons or computers and the environment. WSNs consist of a grouping of sensor nodes 
in a sensor field, cluster heads (in some cases), a sink or gateway and clients, as shown in 
Figure 2-4. The sensor nodes are usually transceivers scattered in the sensor field where 
each has the capability to collect data and route it back to the sink/gateway. They apply 
specific processing capabilities to conduct simple computations and transmit only the 
required and partially processed data. During the transmission, several nodes may handle 
the monitored data on route to the gateway. This is known as multi-hop routing. The data 
finally reaches the client or management node through the internet or via satellite. The 
end user configures and manages the WSN through the management node (Fischione, 
2014).  
The sensor node is one of the main parts of a WSN. The hardware of a sensor node 
contains five key components: the power supply, the transceiver, the microcontroller, the 
sensor and possible memory storage capabilities. Figure 2-5 demonstrates these five 
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components. Each one of these components is determinant in the design of a WSN.  The 
microcontroller runs the different tasks such as: data processing and control of the other 
components. All other components are managed through the microcontroller. It is 
possible that there is a data storage capability associated with the controller, subject to 
the WSN design requirements. However, it is also viable to have a small storage unit 
integrated into the embedded board (Fischione, 2014).  
The sensor node is the key component of the node, and may consist of a number of sensing 
units. Each sensor unit is responsible for gathering and collecting certain types of data 
and information such as: temperature, moisture content or light. Most sensing units are 
comprised of two subunits: the sensor and an analogue-digital converter (ADC). The 
ADC converts the analogue signals detected by the sensor, given an observed 
phenomenon, to digital signals. These signals are then fed to the processing unit and 
transceiver. The transceiver transfers the data collected by the sensing unit by performing 
communications with other nodes and parts of the WSN. It is the unit that consumes the 
most power. The memory unit is purely for temporary storage of the collected data and 
OBSERVER
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Nodes 
Sensor Field 
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Figure 2-4: Generic wireless sensor networks 
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can being the form of RAM, flash or even external storage, such as USB devices (Chhaya, 
et al., 2017).  
The most critical part of the sensor node is the power unit or power supply. It is most 
common to power the sensor node via batteries, either rechargeable or not. It is possible 
to utilise natural sources for extra power or for recharging capabilities, such as: solar 
power through photovoltaic cells. It is important that the design of all the parts of the 
WSN nodes consider key features, such as: the increasingly small sizes that WSN nodes 
have become and the levels and limits of the power supply.  
2.5.3 Topology Data Aggregation and Battery Power 
Generally, as previously stated, a WSN consists of a number of sensor nodes and a 
gateway for connection to the internet. The general deployment of WSNs follows a 
number of steps and is shown by Figure 2-6. Firstly, the sensor nodes will broadcast their 
status to the surrounding environment as well as receiving information regarding the 
status of other nodes in the sensor radius. Secondly, the nodes are organised into a 
connected network dependant on the given topology (single-hop, multi-hop). The final 
Power Supply 
Sensor unit Microcontroller Transceiver 
Memory 
Figure 2-5: Components and hardware structure of a typical sensor node 
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stage is determining the most efficient routes for the information to be transmitted through 
(IEC, 2014) (Mhatre & Rosenberg, 2004). 
As the power for sensor nodes is usually provided through the use of batteries, their 
sensory range can be quite short. The optimal ranges are between 800 – 1,000 meters 
given that the nodes are in free space with a clear line of sight to one another.  However, 
this is not always the case. Given that the sensor nodes are in a sheltered environment or 
within machinery, such as a gas turbine, the sensory range reduces rapidly to no more 
than a few meters (IEC, 2014). As power is a key factor in the operation of a sensor node, 
it is possible to put transceivers into an idle state, i.e. they are ready to receive information 
but are not doing so. Where some utilities can be powered down and reduce energy 
consumption. Figure 2-7 demonstrates a breakdown of the power consumption of a 
typical WSN node. Figure 2-7 shows that a transceiver consumes almost the same energy 
when transmitting/receiving as when it is idle. Furthermore, a large amount of energy can 
be saved if the transceiver is put in the sleep state, effectively turning it off when the node 
does not need to send or receive information. While in the ‘sleep state’ certain parts of 
A 
C 
B 
Figure 2-6: Organisation and transmission process of a WSN. A) Waking and detecting, B) Connecting 
as a network & C) Routing through multi-hop topology (assuming data routing from left to right) 
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the transceiver are switched off, and nodes cannot immediately relay information. This 
results in a significant allocation of battery power for start-up and recovery time to leave 
the sleep state (Fischione, 2014) (Mhatre & Rosenberg, 2004). 
 
2.5.3.1 Single-hop Transmission 
When the transmission ranges of the sensor nodes are large enough or the radius of the 
sensor cloud is less than that of the transmission radius of the sensor nodes, the nodes can 
transmit their information directly to the centralised gateway. They form what’s known 
as a star topology with single-hop communications, as shown by Figure 2-8. When 
sensors utilise single-hop communication, there is no relaying of packets of information. 
Since the communication is directly between the sensor node and the gateway, each node 
should transmit their data in sequence, i.e. one at a time. In this instance, the lifetime of 
the network is determined by the node with the shortest life span. In a single-hop network, 
this is the node furthest away from the gateway as it must expend the most energy to 
33%
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Figure 2-7: Power consumption of a generic sensor node to receive and transmit information (Fischione, 2014) 
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transmit information (Chhaya, et al., 2017) (Gupta & Kumar, 1998). If it is assumed that 
within the sensor network that all sensor nodes are alike, it is possible to dimension the 
battery given the worst-case scenario. Similarly, the battery power is also heavily related 
to the environment, this is known as the propagation loss exponent, usually referred to as 
a k value. An example value of k would be when the WSN is in free space, resulting in k 
being equal to 2. This value is dependent on the environment surrounding the sensor 
nodes. For example within buildings, factories, machinery spaces and dense vegetation, 
the value of k increase to approximately 3 – 5. 
2.5.3.2 Multi-hop Transmission 
It is more common for the transmission ranges of the sensor nodes to be less than the 
radius of the sensor cloud, in which case the transmission range of the sensor nodes is 
kept at a minimum to conserve battery life. In this instance, nodes relay information from 
one another, utilising the shortest possible route to the gateway. Here the nodes form a 
mesh topology using multi-hop communications. In this topology not only do nodes have 
to capture and process their own data, but they must collaborate to propagate sensor data 
towards the gateway (Fischione, 2014). Figure 2-9 shows an example of multi-hop 
routing. When a node serves as a relay for multiple routes, it has the opportunity to 
analyse and pre-process data in the network, which can lead to the elimination of 
Figure 2-8: Star topology with single-hop communication 
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redundant information or aggregation of data that can be smaller than the original data 
set. Furthermore, when considering multi-hop communication, each sensor has a 
communication range R, as shown in Figure 2-9, and R must be sufficiently large to 
maintain connectivity across the network. Gupta & Kumar (1998) developed a lower 
bound on the communication radius, R, in order to ensure connectivity of the nodes with 
a high probability when n nodes are distributed uniformly or randomly 
Mhatre & Rosenberg, (2004) also state that in order to determine the worst-case energy 
drain in the network, the sensor cloud is divided into a number of concentric circles of 
thickness R. In multi-hop connections of radius, R, where a packet of information is 
generated in the nth ring, the packet must travel through the inner rings to reach the 
gateway. For each data gathering cycle it is possible to determine the mean energy 
expenditure of a node in the nth ring. The ring, n, can vary given that the total number of 
rings is a/R. When R is at maximum, it corresponds to single-hop transmission (a = R). 
However, in the event that k > 2 the propagation loss term scales as µRk, whereas the 
average number of packets scales at 1/Rk. Therefore, the choice of whether to use multi-
hop or single-hop transmission depends on other factors when k > 2, such as energy spent 
in the transceiver electronics, the propagation loss, antenna gains, the radius of the sensor 
R 
Figure 2-9: Multi-hop wireless network with indicated sensor communication radiuses, R 
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cloud and the propagation loss exponent. (Gupta & Kumar, 1998) (Mhatre & Rosenberg, 
2004). 
2.5.4 Cyber Security 
As WSNs become larger and increasingly complex, creating more and more intricate 
autonomous systems from industrial to civilian applications, the level of security for an 
operator or individual exponentially increases, with the weakest link or point in the 
network defining the overall level of security. While the research contained within this 
report is focused on the physical design and layout of a WSN and not the software, it is 
important to give an overview of cyber security and cyber-attacks (Chhaya, et al., 2017) 
(Radmand, et al., 2010).  
The security issues related to the confidentiality, availability, authentication, integrity, 
authorization and freshness. Confidentiality deals with the secrecy of data communication. 
Authentication is necessary for the prevention of fake data from malicious nodes. 
Availability means the consistency in service is upheld in the presence of attacks. 
Integrity implies that the data, information or messages are received, unaffected at the 
destination. Authorisation means that only authorised sensor nodes can communicate to 
each other, and unauthorised access of data must be prevented. Freshness of data is 
important to ensure that the attackers do not replay old data to hinder the security of the 
WSN (Chhaya, et al., 2017) .  
WSNs must implement strict encryption, transmitter availability and consistent data 
validation with constraints on power, memory, computation and bandwidth. The 
following defines the typical attacks that can affect WSNs. Generally, WSNs are 
susceptible to a multitude of cyber-attacks and security issues. In such sensitive 
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commercial, industrial and civilian applications it imperative that the security of WSNs 
is assured from generic attacks (Radmand, et al., 2010) (Alajmi, 2014).  
WSNs are generating a more significant interest as industrial and civilian system move 
further into the wireless domain. Such technology is beneficial, by eliminating the use of 
cables, for example, can reduce operating cost and installation time. A security risk level, 
however, must be accepted with WSNs. The key is to producing effective WSNs is to 
ensure that addressable security issues are dealt with and others managed and accepted. 
In this case many WSN devices and nodes would be for redundancy purposes as they 
cannot be relied on for critical tasks (Radmand, et al., 2010). As this research is concerned 
with the physical design of WSNs, the issue of cyber-security shall not be discussed in 
more detail. However, more information can be found in (Alajmi, 2014) (Chhaya, et al., 
2017) (Dini & Tiloca, 2012) (Radmand, et al., 2010) (Singh, et al., 2010). 
2.5.5 WSNs in Offshore Industry 
The requirement to collect measurements relating to temperature, flow, pressure and 
vibration, in often remote and unsafe locations is common and vital in the offshore oil 
and gas industry. The offshore industry is continually expanding and progressing, 
particularly technological advances. This growth in industry and technology is also 
driving the need to measure, record and transmit data in real time. Wireless sensor 
networking is the way to do this without the need for cables and the associated problems 
that come with unsafe and inaccessible locations (Akhondi, et al., 2010).  
Offshore platforms house an abundance of remote and unsafe locations associated with a 
variety of systems. Wired sensors and equipment require power, cables and conduit to 
reach devices in remote locations. This is costly, inconvenient, time consuming and in 
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some cases impossible. Other factors include the man power associated with the 
installation, as well as the monitoring recording and data processing. This leave a lot of 
room for human error, which is a big concern when operating in high risk and extreme 
offshore conditions. (Lajoie, 2010)  
WSNs can eliminate the expensive and inconvenient conduit and cables of wired 
networks. Measurement data can be collected accurately and in real time for faster 
response and decision making, with limited loss in the system integrity and availability. 
Similarly, a WSN can minimalize the personal required to perform manual duties where 
there is a high-risk level (Lajoie, 2010). This is key in the development of the Asset 
Integrity case outlined in Chapter 1. 
The offshore industry includes processes for exploration, extraction, refining, 
transporting and marketing of products. As the demand for fossil fuels increases, so does 
the need for offshore companies to develop and employ new technologies. As well as 
improve operations to increase productivity, reduces injury and fatality and maintain 
system integrity. WSNs can quickly be organised and continually adapted to monitor and 
control a surrounding environmental conditions and machinery. There are a number of 
reasons as to why WSNs are vital to the progression of the offshore industry. Some are 
outlined as follows:  
 Numerous remote and hazardous location (as stated previously). 
 The difficulties and inflated cost of installing wired devices on and near pipelines. 
 The requirement for temporary sensory equipment. 
 Evolution of control solutions that require more and improved sensors. 
 The continual demand for increased and optimized production. 
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 The demand for improved safety.  
 The increased demand to more accurately and remotely monitor the integrity of 
systems. 
 The increasing number and size of normally unattended installations. 
As wireless technologies are being developed, there is an increase in the use of wireless 
sensors being deployed on older, end of life platforms in order to gain new insights and 
to attempt to optimise the platforms production (Carlsen, et al., 2008). There are many 
challenges associated with the deployment of WSNs on offshore platforms. Akhondi, et 
al., (2010) have outlined some key difficulties and properties of offshore WSNs. These 
are outlined as follows:  
 Restricted size, shape, construction and certification. 
 Operators must accommodate for limited processing power, memory storage and 
battery consumption. 
 Devices should generate their own power where possible, or contain battery packs 
with extended battery life of many months or years to reduce maintenance 
requirements. 
 Sensors must operate in difficult wireless environments, both in terms of radio 
noise and obstructions, as well as areas where there are restrictions on the use of 
radio devices, such as areas with hydrocarbon containment or a flammable risk. 
 Must operate in harsh environmental and platform conditions. 
 Contribute in a simple Ad hoc and multi-hop network. 
 Integrate with the existing IT solutions. 
 Provide services in a dynamic and changing environment. 
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 Exhibit some level of fault tolerance and recovery. 
 Operate in the unlicensed sections of the frequency spectrum. 
 Clearly defined operational reliability and availability on the WSN in the 
operational environment. 
Studies have shown that required changes in plant work processes may be the largest 
hindrance on the introduction of WSNs into the oil and gas industry. It was noted by 
Petersen, et al. (2008) that problems are typically experienced when human factors are 
ignored in the adoption of new technology (Petersen, 2008). 
2.5.5.1 Applications in Offshore Oil & Gas 
WSNs are a key investment across the whole offshore oil and gas industry, including 
pipelines, exploration, production and transportation. By providing secure and reliable 
wireless communications, WSNs enable automation and control solutions that are not 
feasible with wired networks. It is a multidisciplinary research area which requires good 
collaboration between users, hardware designers and engineers and software developers 
(Akhondi, et al., 2010). 
There are four main application areas where WSNs would be extremely useful on board 
offshore platforms: 
i. Remote monitoring: WSN solutions provide remote monitoring capabilities or the 
offshore industry to adhere to new technology, regulatory and productivity demands. 
Below are some examples of where WSNs can be applied for remote monitoring 
purposes (Petersen, 2008). 
 Pipeline Integrity monitoring. 
 On-board system integrity monitoring. 
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 Tank Level monitoring. 
 Wellhead Automation and monitoring. 
ii. Condition monitoring and maintenance: The overall aim of fault diagnostics is the 
estimation of the status of a component through sensor measurements and the 
monitoring of system components. Equipment diagnostics tries to determine the root 
cause of a component failure whereas system diagnostics is performed on a system of 
components. Utilising sensor measurements preventative and almost predictive 
maintenance can be performed, and subsequently post-fault diagnostics is improved. 
The predictive maintenance methodologies require that the system be monitored in 
real time. Sensors may detect vibration, temperature, power consumption, gases, 
performance and electromagnetic properties, when combined with other sensors in a 
network, these continuous signals can demonstrate clear and significant information 
about the status and integrity of a component or system. This allows for the detection, 
or even prediction, of potential upcoming failures (Ferreira & Alves da Silva, 2007). 
iii. Toxic substance monitoring: During the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, 
many types of toxic gases are produced as a product or by-product of the production 
processes. The largest concern, with all toxic substances, is the potential for leaks. 
Not only is this damaging to people and the environment, any leak in a transport 
pipeline required a shutdown of the process. Leakages can be caused by any number 
of faults, such as: corrosion, earthquakes, general wear and tear, material flaws and 
even sabotage (Akhondi, et al., 2010) (Xiaojuan, et al., 2009).  
Due to the extensive installation and maintenance costs, a stationary, wired sensing 
system may not cover the whole containment and transport system. Hence, each crew 
member must carry a portable sensor device as a safety precaution. The application 
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of a WSN here would potentially give a cross section of any leaks for a more extensive 
analysis. Existing sensing systems do not correlate data, sensors produce information 
independently, and so determining the nature of the leak can be difficult and time-
consuming (Xiaojuan, et al., 2009). 
iv. Production performance: Given the relevant level and amount of data, from a 
number of performance aspects of an offshore platform facilitated by WSNs, an 
unsupervised self-organising map can prioritise key sensor values and classify 
operational performance. This can show when a plant is operating normally or 
abnormally. This type of WSN is often used in conjunction with supervised methods. 
Whereby the unsupervised network will perform pre-processing of data and the 
supervised system will conduct the analysis and estimate the associated parameters 
(Akhondi, et al., 2010).  
2.5.6 Decision-Making for WSNs and ER Justification 
There is increased demand for diverse applications within the communication services 
industry, within which WSNs gain increasingly more attention. WSN development and 
deployment has been and is continually being enhanced in terms of autonomously 
supporting a variety of potential applications as well as providing more adept solutions. 
However, decisions lie within the appropriate selection of key WSN features such as, 
topology, the number of sensors, and the most efficient pathway for data transfer. This 
has given rise to the application of MADA techniques to determine the best or most 
suitable aspects of WSNs for specific deployment scenarios. One such example is the 
work presented by Tang et al., (2014) in which an algorithm is developed based upon 
multiple criteria decision making to determine the most energy efficient routing within a 
WSN. Their research takes into account key factors affecting the network lifetime, and a 
53 
  
chaos genetic algorithm to determine the next most energy efficient hop in the data route 
(Tang, et al., 2015). Similarly, a fuzzy decision model has been applied to the selection 
of wireless technology by Jiang, et al., (2012). This work develops n evaluation hierarchy 
with six major criteria and a set of sub-criteria in order to determine the most suitable 
WSN technology for the tracking of construction materials. The work concluded that a 
Wi-Fi device was the best alternative, as opposed to RFID, GPS, ZigBee and UWD 
devices (Jiang, et al., 2012).  Finally, Gao, et al., (2010) propose a novel MADA approach 
to cluster head selection within WSNs. The approach combines fuzzy-AHP and 
hierarchical fuzzy integral in order to analyse the optimum criteria that can influence 
energy efficiency to determine the selection of cluster head nodes in the WSN (Gao, et 
al., 2010).  
Numerous decision-making problems in management and engineering involve a several 
attributes of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. A comprehensive decision cannot 
be made with taking into account all attributes in question. It is the normal handling of 
qualitative attributes along with uncertain or incomplete information that causes 
complexity in multiple attribute assessments. There has been an increase in the 
development of theoretically sound methods and tools which deal with Multiple Attribute 
Decision Analysis (MADA) problems in a coherent, rational, reliable and repeatable 
manner (Chen, et al., 2015) (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Yang, 2001). In more recent times, the 
ER approach has been applied to decision-making problems in engineering, design and 
safety and risk assessment and supplier assessment. For example, motorcycle assessment, 
cargo ship design (Yang & Xu, 2002) and maritime safety analysis and risk assessment 
(Ren, et al., 2005) (Zhang, et al., 2016). Hence, the evidential reasoning algorithm was 
selected as a viable and accurate decision-making tool. 
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The ER algorithm is not without its limitations in terms of its application to belief decision 
matrices. The main limitation of the ER approach in belief decision matrices is that it can 
be seen as highly complex when compared to conventional decision matrices. This issue 
is more apparent when dealing with purely quantitative MADA problems. However, the 
application of IDS software and modern computer power assist with the computational 
complexity (Ruan, et al., 2008). Furthermore, in this research the belief decision matrix 
is not highly complex, hence limiting the complexity of the ER algorithm and its 
respective calculations. Similarly, the IDS software is not applied here. Instead the ER 
algorithm is entered using the formula functions in EXCEL spreadsheets as the computing 
power can more than handle the level of complexity within the calculation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The fundamentals of offshore safety assessment have been outlined along with the 
introduction of safety cases in the offshore industry.  Similarly, the advantages and 
disadvantages of safety cases has been demonstrated with areas that could be improved 
with the addition of live dynamic risk assessment via the Asset Integrity Case. 
Furthermore, statistics regarding offshore gas turbine incidents have been outlined and 
examined. The emphasis on these incidents is to outline the significant role that human 
fuel gas detection and incident reporting has on the management of gas turbine fuel gas 
releases. This in turn showed that there is consistent under reporting or submission of 
incomplete data where human detection is concerned. In addition to this, an in depth 
statistical analysis of ship to platform collisions is conducted to demonstrate the reporting 
of incidents could potentially be heavily influenced by the periodic release of regulations. 
This analysis further adds to the claim that offshore safety assessment and safety case 
regulations would be much improved by the inclusion of a coherent real-time dynamic 
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risk assessment approach. The justification of utilising Bayesian Networks as a viable 
risk assessment tool to develop a dynamic risk assessment model has also been outlined. 
Finally, an overview of the current status of WSNs is presented with key areas that can 
benefit the offshore industry as well as specific areas that would benefit greatly from the 
inclusion of WSNs as an asset integrity monitoring tool.  
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3 CHAPTER 3:  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES 
Summary 
This chapter aims at delivering a risk-based research methodology framework to establish 
the guidelines for developing the dynamic risk assessment and the remote detection methods 
for the NUI-Asset Integrity Case. The Bayesian Network elements of the framework shall be 
capable of dealing with dynamic risk assessment by accommodating the ability to continually 
update the conditional probability data. Furthermore, the remote sensing and detection 
methods along with the decision-making methodology shall allow for the determination of a 
suitable method for detecting and identifying asset integrity on an offshore platform. The 
chapter also includes the individual dynamic risk assessment and decision-making 
methodologies, along with the applied research techniques.  
3.1 Research Framework 
Conducting and operating any project or organisation of any size without a proper 
framework in place is a difficult task. It is hard to control the steps within a project if 
there aren’t clear, established aims and objectives. The effectiveness and success of the 
project depends greatly on a clear and coherent research or management framework.  
Figure 3-1 demonstrates an illustrative view of a research framework proposed for the 
purpose of this research, from which the research methodology is directed. 
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Figure 3-1: Proposed research framework for the initial development of a NUI-Asset Integrity Case 
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Integrity Case for the specified scope and domain. 
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The research framework has been developed from a generic risk management framework 
and adapted to assist with the development a NUI-Asset Integrity Case. The framework 
breaks down the key elements required for the Asset Integrity Case, namely a coherent 
dynamic risk assessment model and the ability to sense and detect asset integrity on a 
NUI. As the Asset Integrity Case is a novel idea, a research management framework has 
never been presented and so it makes sense to adapt a risk management framework for 
use in this research. 
Figure 3-1 outlines a number of key components and steps. These steps directly correlate 
to the technical research presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Initially the framework requires 
the identification and outline of the scope and domain of the project. This is determined 
based upon the literature review in Chapter 2 as well as the project rationale in chapter 1. 
By analysing the literature regarding offshore incidents the domain for the research can 
be stated. In this situation, the domain to be utilised for developing the NUI-Asset 
Integrity Case is to be the electrical generation module. The reasoning for this is stated in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Briefly, the rationale is that there have been many incidents regarding 
gas turbine driven electrical generators over the past 20 years in the offshore industry, 
with the majority detected by human methods. There is a direct correlation between the 
number of under reported incidents and the number of incidents detected by human 
methods. Similarly, the scope and domain is also determined by the statistical analysis of 
other offshore areas, further solidifying the scope that a dynamic risk assessment model 
should be employed to aid with the enforcement of regulations. 
Moving into the area of the dynamic risk assessment development, the domain must again 
be stated. This applies to the research in Chapters 4 and 5, where the dynamic risk 
assessment models are developed utilising BN modelling techniques. However, before 
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the models can be constructed a separate methodology for formulating BNs must be 
determined. This methodology is outlined in Section 3.5. The BN formulation 
methodology is outlined here and not in Chapters 4 and 5 as the methodology is repeated 
for two BN models. Hence, demonstrating the methodology here avoids some elements 
of repetition. Furthermore, the framework is defined as risk-based, therefore a risk 
analysis is required. Hence the process of determining risk is essential to the framework 
and methodology. The proposed framework, in the long term, has the potential to result 
in more comprehensive application to offshore systems for asset integrity management 
with regard to the offshore regulations. As the dynamic modelling in the research is a risk 
assessment, key components of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) are contained within 
the modelling process and structure. FSA was developed and introduced by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1993, during the 62nd session of the IMO 
Marine Safety Committee (MSC) by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (DNV, 
2002). The initiative was preceded by a number of marine incidents which brought into 
question the safety-related rules and regulations. The prior rules were derived as a 
reaction to an incident at sea in order to prevent accidents of a similar nature occurring in 
the future (Yang & Wang, 2008). 
FSA is a systematic process for assessing the potential risks relating to maritime safety, 
the marine environment and cost and benefit analysis of these risks (Maistralis, 2007). 
The FSA consists of five steps, and the interaction between these steps is shown by Figure 
3-2. There are repeated iterations between the steps which make the process effective, as 
it constantly checks for changes within the analysis. The execution and recording of each 
task is imperative as it enables the preceding steps to be carried out with ease. Similarly, 
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for the process to be accurate the analyst appreciates and understands the objectives of 
each step, and carries them out without any half measures (Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
The proposed dynamic risk assessment methodology and framework incorporates Steps 
1, 2, 3 and 5 of FSA. Step 4, Cost Benefit Analysis is not considered at this stage of the 
Asset Integrity Case development. Similarly, the dynamic risk assessment methodology 
also incorporates the core steps of compete risk management. Figure 3-3 gives a 
demonstration of a risk management process. The components of the risk management 
diagram are contained within dynamic risk assessment section of the Asset Integrity Case 
framework. For example, the step Analysis from Risk Assessment, in Figure 3-3, is 
embedded in the framework stage of Domain outline and Hazard ID. Similarly, the 
components of Evaluation are contain within the Dynamic Risk Analysis and 
Development & Analysis steps of the framework Finally, areas of Reduction and Control 
Step 1:  
Identification of 
Hazards 
Step 2:  
Risk Estimation 
Step 5:  
Recommendations 
for Decision 
Making 
Step 3:  
Risk Control 
Options 
Step 4:  
Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
Figure 3-2: Flowchart of the five FSA Steps (Pillay & Wang, 2003) 
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are incorporated in Consequence Evaluation. Having this risk-based framework within 
the Asset Integrity Case methodology and framework provides a clear generic base that 
can potentially be applied to several offshore systems. This will allow for the further 
development and expansion of the Asset Integrity Case to other offshore areas and 
systems effectively.  
 
The final section of the framework is concerned with the detection and remote sensing 
techniques. This incorporates areas and ideas that are key to developing system whereby 
asset integrity can be monitored without the use of manual methods. This includes both 
wired and wireless techniques. However, due to the remote and hazardous locations of 
some offshore equipment, wireless methods tend to be preferred. This methodology 
incorporates the design of a number of WSNs in a number of orientations regarding the 
Reduction and Control 
- Decision making 
- Monitoring  
- Implementation 
Analysis 
- Domain and 
system definition 
- Hazard ID 
- Risk estimation 
Evaluation 
- Risk tolerability 
options 
- Analysis of 
options 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Figure 3-3: A risk management process, adapted from (Matellini, 2012) 
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hardware and most suitable forms of connectivity. Furthermore, the framework includes 
a methodology to determine the most suitable WSN design based upon a set evaluation 
hierarchy and criteria. This methodology can again be applied to a number of offshore 
areas where remote sensing of asset integrity would be of great importance, not only for 
the ability to continually monitor components and equipment in remote locations, but also 
to remove the hazards associated with using manual methods. In theory, this eliminates 
the risk to personnel who would normally be given the task of monitoring equipment in 
remote and hazardous locations.  
Given that a dynamic risk assessment model has been developed, along with the remote 
monitoring and sensing method, the two can be combined to develop the Asset integrity 
Case for the specified domain. Further work is required in order to combine the two 
models and methods by incorporating the sensors into the dynamic risk assessment model. 
Furthermore, these sensors, once incorporated would transmit data to update the risk 
assessment model. This results in a live, dynamic risk assessment model for a given 
system. 
Finally, all generic aspects of the analysis sections of the framework are outlined in the 
rest of this chapter. This includes an overview of the BN and probability techniques, as 
well as the BN methodology employed in Chapters 4 and 5. Similarly, the data analysis 
techniques applied across Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are outlined. This removes the need for any 
unnecessary repetition. The techniques are outlined in Chapter 3 while the numerical 
assessments are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The decision-making methodology 
applied in Chapter 6 is also outlined along with the decision-making techniques employed. 
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3.2 Overview of Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) encoding Conditional 
Probability Distribution (CPD). There are two main components to BNs are the graphical 
structure which is the qualitative part and the probability distribution which is the 
quantitative part (Matellini, 2012). 
3.2.1 The Graphical Representation 
There are two key elements to the graphical structure of BNs, these are Nodes and Arcs: 
 Nodes: Drawn as circles, represent random variables such as "events" that take 
values form the given domains. The relationship between nodes is expressed using 
a family notation. Influencing Nodes are "Parents", influenced nodes are 
"Children". If a node has no "Parent" it is Marginal or Unconditional. Nodes 
without Parents are “Root” nodes and nodes without children are “leaf” nodes. 
 Arcs: Represent the direct probabilistic dependence relationship between 
variables. 
The graphical structure is referred to as the DAG. The DAG contains a set of nodes each 
representing a random/chance variable which can take the form of an event, the presence 
Figure 3-4: A simple BN 
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of something, a measurable parameter, a latent variable and an unknown parameter or 
hypothesis. Nodes are connected together by arcs in one-way directions. Arcs can also be 
referred to as directed edges, and they represent the direct probabilistic dependence 
relationship between variables. A simple example of a BN is shown in Figure 3-4. In this 
example, nodes A and B are the parents of node C. Node C is the parent of nodes D and 
E and the child of A and B. Nodes D and E are children of C. Following this logic, nodes 
C, D, and E are descendants of A and B. Nodes A and B are the root nodes, while nodes 
D and E are the leaf nodes (Fenton & Neil, 2013) (Bolstad, 2007). 
3.2.2 Probability Distribution 
Each node in the DAG has a number of possible states which must apply at any one time. 
Probability distribution indicate the strength of the belief in how the states of parent nodes 
can affect the states of their child nodes. Nodes can represent either discrete random 
variables with a finite number of states, i.e. ‘Yes/No’ and ‘Low/Medium/High’ or they 
can represent a continuous random variable with a normal density distribution, such as 
for temperature ranges or altitude. For root nodes a marginal probability table is defined. 
Non-root nodes are assigned conditional probability tables (CPTs) (Neapolitan, 2004). If 
the node is discrete then each cell in the CPT contains a conditional probability for the 
state of the node given the state of the parent node or combination nodes. When 
constructing a BN it is important to note that the number of permutations in the CPTs 
increases exponentially with the number of parent nodes and the number of states in the 
CPT. For example, if node a has ‘x’ parents with ‘n’ number of states, then there will be 
‘xn’ permutations in the CPT or node A. Similarly, the total number of cells in a CPT is 
equal to the product of the possible number of states in the node and the number of states 
in the parent nodes (Fenton & Neil, 2013).  
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3.3 Principles of Probability Theory 
It is important to review the fundamentals of probability theory Bayes Theorem in order 
to further explore BNs, as the technique is built upon these principles. Assume that there 
are two events that exist in sample space 'S', these events are A and B. 
𝑆 ⊇ 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆 ⊇ 𝐵 
P(A) is assigned to measure the degree of uncertainty occurred by event A. The 
probability must adhere to four properties or axioms (Matellini, 2012). 
Axiom 1: The probability of event A lies between 0 and 1.0, it cannot have a negative 
probability.  
This is because if you divide a percentage probability by 100, the result lies between 0 
and 1.0, as the percentage that expresses uncertainty cannot be more than 100. This also 
means that an event cannot have a negative probability (Fenton & Neil, 2013). Therefore, 
the following can be stated; 
0 ≤ 𝑃(𝐴) ≤ 1 
Axiom 2: All possible outcomes are contained within the sample space 'S'.  
For 𝑆 ⊇  𝐴 => The sum of the probabilities of A and its complement Ā must be equal to 
1.0. The complement of P(A) is simply the Probability of the event being 'not' A. 
𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(?̅?) = 1                                               (3-1) 
If 𝑃(𝐴)  =  0.3, then 𝑃(Ā)  =  0.7. In some cases the values of the probability are not 
given, words such as 'True & False' or 'Yes & No' may be used. In this case if P(A) is 
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True, then P(Ā) is False. This can also be written as, 𝑃(𝐴)  =  1 and 𝑃(Ā)  =  0, should 
the values be needed for calculation purposes (Neapolitan, 2004) (Fenton & Neil, 2013).  
Axiom 3: For mutually exclusive events, the probability of either event happening is 
the sum of the probabilities of the individual events. 
This is the probability of either events A OR B occurring. The notation OR in probability 
is also known as the Union and is denoted by '∪'. 
𝑃(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵)  𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆 ⊇ 𝐴, 𝑆 ⊇ 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 0              (3-2) 
Two events are considered mutually exclusive if they have no elementary events in 
common. For example; 
In a die rolling experiment, these two events are considered:  
 E1 - Roll a number greater than 4 (i.e.; the set of elementary events {5,6}) 
 E2 - Roll a number less than 4 (i.e.; the set of elementary events {1,2,3}) 
Events E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive as there are no elementary events in common 
(Fenton & Neil, 2013). 
Axiom 4: If events are not mutually exclusive then their conditional probability is 
subtracted from their union. 
The conditional probability or Intersection is the probability of both events occurring 
simultaneously, and is denoted by '∩'. The intersection is the product of the events. 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵)                                             (3-3) 
Therefore, the union of none mutually exclusive events is; 
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𝑃(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) − 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆 ⊇ 𝐴, 𝑆 ⊇ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) ≠ 0      (3-4) 
The proof for Axiom 4 is demonstrated below, with Figure 3-5 being used as a visual 
representation for the interactions of events A and B. It is based on the idea of breaking 
the union of the two events down into events that are mutually exclusive. Figure 3-5 
shows events represented by shaded areas (Fenton & Neil, 2013) (Neil, et al., 2000). 
1. A∪B is the union of the mutually exclusive events (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵), (𝐴 ∩ ?̅?), (𝐵 ∩ Ā). 
2. A is the union of mutually exclusive events (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵), (𝐴 ∩ ?̅?). 
3. B is the union of mutually exclusive events (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵), (𝐵 ∩ Ā). 
4. (𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) +  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ ?̅? )  +  𝑃(𝐵 ∩ Ā) , by Axiom 3 applied to 1.  
5. (𝐴)  =  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) +  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ ?̅? ) , by Axiom 3 applied to 2. 
6. Therefore, 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ ?̅?)  =  𝑃(𝐴)  −  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) , by rearranging 5. 
7. (𝐵)  =  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) +  𝑃(𝐵 ∩ Ā) , by Axiom 3 applied to 3. 
8. Therefore, 𝑃(𝐵 ∩ Ā)  =  𝑃(𝐵)  −  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) by rearranging 7. 
9. (𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)  =   𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) +  𝑃(𝐴) −  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)  +  𝑃(𝐵)  −  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) , by 
substituting 6 and 8 into 4. 
10. 𝑃(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)  =   𝑃(𝐴)  +  𝑃(𝐵)  −  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵), by simplifying 9. 
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3.4 Conditional Probability 
Conditional probabilities are essential to BNs. they can be expressed by statements such 
as "B occurs given that A has already occurred" and "given event A, the probability of 
event B is 'p'", which is denoted by 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) =  𝑝. This specifically means that if event A 
occurs and everything else is unrelated to event B (except event A), then the probability 
of B is 'p' (Fenton & Neil, 2013). Conditional probabilities are part of the joint probability 
of the intersection of A and B, P(A∩B), and can be shown as; 
𝑃(𝐴│𝐵) =   𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)/𝑃(𝐴)                                           (3-5) 
For any two events A and B: 
Figure 3-5: Visual representation of the interactions between events A and B, 
adapted from Fenton & Neil, (2013) 
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𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵). 𝑃(𝐴)                         (3-6) 
It should be noted that if 𝑃(𝐴) = 0  then A is an event with no possible outcomes. 
Therefore, it follows that 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 also contains no possible outcomes and 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 0. 
The independence of events can be shown by definition. Let A and B be any events with 
𝑃(𝐴) ≠ 0. then A and B can be defined as independent if, 
𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)                                                      (3-7) 
Thus, it follows from the previous definition, that; 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵)                                                               (3-8) 
3.4.1 Bayes Theorem 
Bayes Theorem of probability theory is seen as a way of understanding how the 
probability that a theory is true, is affected by new evidence. For example, the probability 
of A can be updated if new evidence about event B is known (Matellini, 2012). 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =  
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴).𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
                                                                     (3-9) 
It is very common for Bayes theorem to accommodate more than two events, for example 
if a second parent node, C, for child A is introduced then the equation becomes: 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵, 𝐶) =  
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴,𝐶).𝑃(𝐴|𝐶)
𝑃(𝐵|𝐶)
                                                           (3-10) 
3.4.2 BN Connections and d-separation 
From very simple to very complex BNs the nodes contained within a network are always 
connected through one of the following three types of connections (Fenton & Neil, 2013) 
(Matellini, 2012): 
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1. Serial connections (Casual and evidential trails) feature nodes in which the first node 
influences the second, which in turn influences the third. An example of this is shown 
in Figure 3-6 where node A connects nodes B and C. In this case if new evidence is 
known about node B, then it shall influence node C through A, and this is true in 
reverse if new evidence is known about C. However, if the state of A is known then 
nodes B and C become independent of each other. Hence, nodes B and C are said to 
be d-separated given A. 
If the relationships in the serial connection are casual, then it is known as a causal trail. 
If one is interested in reasoning from C to B then it is known as an evidential trail. 
. 
2. Converging connections (common effect) feature two or more parents, B and C, which 
influence a child node, A, as shown in Figure 3-7. If no new evidence is available then 
parent nodes B and C are independent of each other, but if new evidence is known 
about child node A, then B and C are conditionally dependent on A. In other words, B 
and C are d-connected given A.  
If the relationships in the connection are casual then node A is a common effect as it 
is shared by more than one cause. 
 
Figure 3-6: A Bayesian Network serial connection. 
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3. Diverging connections (common cause) feature a parent node, A, which 
influences at least two child nodes, B and C, as shown in Figure 3-8. All child nodes in 
this type of connection can influence each other, provided new evidence about A is 
unknown. However, if new evidence is known at A, then B and C are conditionally 
independent or equivalently, B and C are d-separated given A. 
If the relationships in the connections are casual, then A is a common cause because it is 
the cause of more than one effect variable. 
 
3.5 Formulating a BN Model 
When formulating a BN it is important to clearly outline the domain that it is to represent. 
Nodes and their subsequent states must be appropriately allocated, with much attention 
being paid to what each node shall symbolise and how they relate to one another. This is 
essential as to leave no area for misinterpretation. The fundamental part of building a BN 
Figure 3-7: A Bayesian Network converging connection. 
Figure 3-8: A Bayesian Network diverging connection. 
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with the ability to deliver meaningful results lies in its graphical structure and the input 
of data, hence the precise linking of nodes and the assignment of probability distributions 
is imperative (Fenton & Neil, 2013). With this in mind a BN has been produced to model 
the probabilities of failure within an electrical generation unit within one contained 
section of an installation. To ensure that a coherent model was constructed, knowledge 
was obtained through reviewing literature and speaking to members of RMRI Plc. 
Attempting to build a model that incorporated several modules of an installation or an 
entire installation at this point in the research would be impractical. The focus is to 
determine whether it is possible to coherently model the cause and effect relationships of 
various components within a system to establish a base model for expansion further to 
other connected systems and an increased number of observed failures. From this some 
constraints and assumptions were made to ensure that the model remained simple yet 
clear and relevant to the research aims, these assumptions and limitations are outlined in 
Chapters 4 and 5 for each specific BN model.  
3.5.1 BN Formulation and Analysis Methodology. 
There are many step-by-step procedures in use that allow for construction of the various 
parts of the BN model. The procedures are useful as it allows for maintaining consistency 
throughout the process and offers an element of confident to the model. The procedures 
have varying parts depending on the context of the model and how much information is 
already available (Neapolitan, 2004) (Neil, et al., 2000). However, there are key elements 
which all the procedures follow, these are: 
Step 1 - Establish the domain and project definition.   
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This involves putting boundaries in place for the model. It has already been stated 
that the model represents the series of events within a system where a specific 
component failure has been observed, within module 2 on the Thistle Alpha 
platform. The model begins with the initial failure and ends with major events 
occurring. 
Step 2 - Identify the objective.  
This involves stating what results are expected to be achieved from the model. For 
the initial model the focus is on the interaction of the components and their 
probability of occurrence. 
Step 3 - Identify the set of variables relative to the problem.  
This involves filtering possible parameters that are relevant to the description and 
objective. For the initial model the initial variables where devised utilising a 
sequence of events diagram. It is always necessary to keep the number of 
variables/nodes to a minimum to avoid over complication initially. For the initial 
model approximately twenty-one nodes where first outlined. 
Step 4 - Create appropriate nodes corresponding to the variables identified. 
 From reviewing the risk assessment projects and relevant literature, the list of 
variable/nodes from step three is reduced to those that will be used in the model. 
Step 5 - Creating arcs between nodes.  
Once the relevant nodes are identified, they are input into a BN software package, 
HuginResearcher7.7, and connected. This entails referring to the sequence of 
events from the initial failure to determine the most effective way of connecting 
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the nodes together. The network is reviewed to ensure there are no missing factors. 
HuginResearcher7.7 was selected as the BN software package for this research 
based upon testing comparisons with another BN package in Netica. These two 
were tested due to the availability of full software licences. It seemed much more 
prudent to utilise an existing software licence. After testing both packages, Hugin 
was selected due to the preferred interface and ease of use of its key features, such 
as, the Sensitivity Analysis Wizard.  
Step 6 - Obtain data and construct probability tables.  
The data is sought from various sources including; experts, industrial & academic 
publications, the RMRI Plc. risk assessment projects, as well as databases such as: 
OREDA, HSE & OGP. The data is then used to create the marginal or conditional 
probability tables. 
Step 7 - Analyse BN model.  
This is where the Hugin software is used to run the model and test for conflicts in 
data by inserting evidence in various nodes. 
Step 8 - Validate the BN Model.  
Validation is a key aspect of the methodology as it provides a reasonable amount 
of confidence to the results of the model. In current work and literature, there is a 
three axiom based validation procedure, which is used for partial validation of a 
proposed BN model. The three axioms to be satisfied are as follows (Jones, et al., 
2010): 
 Axiom i. 
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A small increase or decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each parent 
node should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase or decrease of the 
posterior probabilities of the child node. 
 Axiom ii. 
Given the variation of subjective probability distributions of each parent node, its 
influence magnitude to the child node should be kept consistent. 
 Axiom iii. 
The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from “x” attributes (evidence) on the values should always be greater than that 
from the set of “x-y” (y ϵ x) attributes. 
3.6 Data Acquisition and Analysis Methods 
3.6.1 Developing Relative Weights through Pairwise Comparison and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The AHP approach is a structured technique for organising and analysing complex 
decisions. It is based on the well-defined mathematical structure of consistent matrices 
and their associated right eigenvector’s ability to generate true or approximate weights 
(Merkin, 1979) (Saaty, 1980). Also, it enables comparison of criteria or alternatives with 
respect to a criterion in a nature of the pair-wise comparison mode. Such a comparison 
uses a fundamental scale of absolute numbers, for example, in this research the scale is 
as follows; “1 is equally important”, “3 is a little important”, “5 is important”, “7 is very 
important”, “9 is extremely important” and “2, 4, 6, and 8 are intermediate values of 
important”. This fundamental scale has been shown to be a scale that captures individual 
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preferences with respect to quantitative and qualitative attributes (Saaty, 1990) (Saaty, 
1994). 
To find the relative weight of each criterion, an AHP approach containing a pair-wise 
comparison matrix will be used. To conduct the pair-wise comparison matrix, at first, set 
up 𝑛  criteria in the row and column of a 𝑛 × 𝑛  matrix. Then, perform the pair-wise 
comparison to all the criteria by applying a ratio scale assessment. The assessment scale 
is shown in Table 3-1 and each expert has to understand it before completing the pair-
wise comparison. This table contains two parts which describe the numerical weighting 
together with the explanation of each number. The first part is on the left hand side which 
explains “IMPORTANT”, while the right hand side is the second part of the table which 
describes “UNIMPORTANT” (Ahmed, et al., 2005) (Kou, et al., 2016). 
Table 3-1: Weighting scale for the Pairwise Comparison 
IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
1 
Equally 
important 
1 
Equally 
important 
3 
A little 
important 
 1/3 
A little 
unimportant 
5 Important  1/5 Unimportant 
7 Very important  1/7 
Very 
unimportant 
9 
Extremely 
important 
 1/9 
Extremely 
unimportant 
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2, 4, 6, 8 
Intermediate 
important 
values 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 
1/8, 
Intermediate 
unimportant 
values 
 
The qualified judgements on pairs of attributes 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐴𝑗  are represented by a n × n 
matrix A as shown in Equation 3-11 (Koczkodaj & Szybowski, 2015). 
𝐴 = (𝑎𝑖𝑗) =
[
 
 
 
1 𝑎12 … 𝑎1𝑛
𝑎
𝑎12⁄ 1 … 𝑎2𝑛
. . … .
1
𝑎1𝑛⁄
1
𝑎2𝑛⁄ … 1 ]
 
 
 
                                            (3-11)                          
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, … , 𝑛 and each 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is the relative importance of attribute 𝐴𝑖 to attribute 
𝐴𝑗. 
For a matrix of order n, (𝑛 × (𝑛 − 1)/2) comparisons are required. According to Ahmed 
et al. (2005), the weight vector indicates the priority of each element in the pair-wise 
comparison matrix in terms of its overall contribution to the decision-making process 
(Tan & Promentilla, 2013). Such a weight value can be calculated using Equation 3-12. 
𝑤𝑘 =
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑎𝑘𝑗
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
)𝑛𝑗=1  (𝑘 =  1, 2, 3, … , 𝑛)                                                   (3-12) 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 stands for the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. 
The weight values obtained in the pair-wise comparison matrix are checked for 
consistency purpose using a Consistency Ratio (CR). The CR value is computed using the 
following equations (Saaty, 1980): 
𝐶𝑅 = 𝐶𝐼/𝑅𝐼                                                           (3-13) 
𝐶𝐼 =
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑛
𝑛−1
                                                            (3-14) 
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𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
∑
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑎𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
                                                  (3-15) 
where n equals the number of items being compared, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 stands for maximum weight 
value of the 𝑛 × 𝑛 comparison matrix, RI stands for average random index (Table 3-2) 
and CI stands for consistency index (Donegan & Dodd, 1991) (Saaty, 1980). 
Table 3-2: Saaty's Random Index (RI) values 
 
 
CR is designed in such a way that a value greater than 0.10 indicates an inconsistency in 
pair-wise comparison. If CR is 0.10 or less, the consistency of the pair-wise comparisons 
is considered reasonable (Saaty, 1980). 
3.6.2 Developing Relative Weights through Incomplete Data 
When constructing a BN the prior probabilities are required to be assigned locally to the 
probability link, P(Parent(Ai)) → P(Child(Bi)), as a conditional probability, P(Bi|Ai). 
Where i is the number of possible states of the parent node and the child node. However, 
it is not always a straightforward process to obtain the relevant data. In principle, the 
majority of the data can be acquired through failure databases or experimentation. 
However, designing and conducting experiments can prove difficult and historical data 
does not always satisfy the scope of certain nodes and CPTs within a BN. Therefore, in 
practice, it is necessary to rely on subjective probabilities provided by expert judgement 
as an expression of an individual’s degree of belief. However, since subjective 
probabilities are based on informed guesses, it is possible for deviation to occur when the 
data is expressed as precise numbers.  
Order of Matrix 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Saaty's CI 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1 1.45 1.49 
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As the process of creating PC questionnaires, distributing them and waiting for feedback 
can be time consuming, this process to be amended by utilising hard data from risk 
assessment experimentation and historical data. This entails utilising hard data from the 
parent nodes and sections of the child node CPT to create relative weights for the parent 
nodes and apply those to the symmetric method algorithm.  
Figure 3-9 demonstrates a sample BN with three parents and one child, with the notation 
A, B, C & D respectively. While it is not possible to accurately obtain P(D|A, B, C) or 
even P(D|A, B) through historical or experimental data. It is possible to obtain the 
conditional probability of event Z give the individual parents. i.e.; P(D|A), P(D|B) and 
P(D|C).  These conditional probabilities can be used to develop normalised weights for 
the parent nodes. 
The individual local conditional probabilities of the parent to child can be distributed by 
relative importance for the associated child node, i.e. the normalised weight. Hence, in 
normal space and using the notation outlined in Figure 3-9, the probability of D being of 
state “Yes” given that the probability of A being in state “Yes” is equal to ?̂?𝐴, where ?̂?𝐴 
is the relative importance of the parent node A. This is applied across all the parent nodes 
and is demonstrated by Equation 3-16 (Riahi, 2010). 
A C 
D 
B 
Figure 3-9: Sample BN representing 3 parents and 1 child 
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𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑃(?̂?𝐴) =
𝑃(𝑋𝐴)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝐴
          (𝑚 = 𝐴, 𝐵, … .𝑁) 
…            (3-16) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝑛 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑃(?̂?𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎
 
where, 𝑃(𝑋𝐴) is the individual probability of A. 
Therefore, 
𝑃(?̂?𝐴) + 𝑃(?̂?𝐵) + ⋯+ 𝑃(?̂?𝑛) = 1 
In normalised space, based on the influence of each parent node, the conditional 
probability of a binary child node "D" given each binary parent node, Xn  , where n = A, 
B, ..., n., can be estimated as follows. 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤1 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐵 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤2 
…            (3-17) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝑛 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤𝑛 
∑ 𝑤𝑛 = 1
𝑛
𝑛=1
 
Following from Equations 3-16 and 3-17, it is possible to calculate the weights of the 
parents given the individual parent to child conditional probabilities (Riahi, 2010). 
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3.6.3 Symmetric Method  
The symmetric method provides an input algorithm which consists of a set of relative 
weights that quantify the relative strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes on the 
child-node, and a set of probability distributions the number of which grows only linearly, 
as opposed to exponentially, with the number of associated parent-nodes. Yet the most 
common method of gathering the required data for the algorithm is to use expert 
judgements. It is also possible to utilise the symmetric method with historic data and 
experimentation. While it is very difficult or not possible to complete a large CPT in a 
BN using hard data, it is possible to obtain key conditional probabilities for a node. 
To outline the symmetric method let us consider the network in Figure 3-9. In this 
example, node D has 23 different parental configurations, as there are three parents with 
two states each (Yes and No). Hence the CPT will consist of 23 probability distributions. 
The scale and scope of the CPT and node provides considerable difficulty when 
attempting to gather data to complete the CPT. Even if one were to utilise expert 
judgements to complete the CPT, it would demand a considerable amount of intensive 
effort on the part of the expert. An additional issue is that the CPT grows exponentially 
given the number of parents and states. A CPT quantifying the dependency on n parents 
would demand 2n distributions in order to be functional. It is this exponential growth with 
the number of parents that constitutes the essential problem. This symmetry method 
simplifies the problem of exponentially large CPTs.  
For calculation of the CPT for the child node “D”, assume that the number of distributions 
grows linearly as opposed to exponentially. i.e. with the network shown there are 2×3 
distributions linearly as opposed to 23 exponentially. If the states of the parents have one-
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to-one capability correspondence (which is an equivalence relation) then the number of 
‘Questions’ regarding the CPT for the child node is reduced (Das, 2008). 
The parent nodes, A, B and C, in this instance, have the same number of states: k1 = k2 
=.... = kn, = k, where, kn represents the number of states of the n
th node. 
Suppose: B = bt  is compatible with A = at , for 1 ≤ t ≤ k. 
B = bt  is not compatible with A = bs   whenever t ≠ s where t and s are the sets of n 
elements of the parents. 
Let {comp(B = bs)} denote the Compatible Parent Configuration where parent B is in the 
state ys and the rest of the parents are in states compatible to B = bs  
Therefore, using the symbol '≡' to relate two identical sets, one has: 
{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐴 = 𝑎𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐵 = 𝑏𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐶 =  𝑐𝑠)} ≡ {𝐴 = 𝑎𝑠 , 𝐵 = 𝑏𝑠 , 𝐶 = 𝑐𝑠 }   
Consider the network shown in Figure 3-9, Starting with parent A and interpreting the 
compatible parent configurations as follows in equation 3-18 (Das, 2008): 
{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐴 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐵 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝐴 = 𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑠, 𝐶 = 𝑠}               (3-18) 
where the set contains two states. S = Yes, No  
Hence the probability distribution over the child node D will be: 
𝑃(𝐷|{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐴 = 𝑠)}) = 𝑃(𝐷│{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐵 = 𝑠)}) = 𝑃(𝐷│{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑠)})                       (3-19) 
where the set contains two states. s = Yes, No  
However, the CPT requires probability distributions for all possible parental 
configurations compatible or not. This leads to the concept of relative weights. The 
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relative weights are calculated utilising the individual parent to child conditional 
probabilities (Das, 2008).  
The Weighted Sum Algorithm 
It is possible to apply the weighted sum algorithm as the following information has been 
identified: 
i) The relative weights of the parent nodes w1 , ... , wn , and, 
ii) The k1+ ... +kn probability distributions over event “D”, of the linear type, for 
compatible parental configurations. 
Given the information provided the following algorithm is used to produce an estimate, 
based information from historical data sources, of the k1 × ... × kn distribution for child 
node “D” (Das, 2008). 
 𝑃(𝑥𝑙| 𝑦1
𝑆1 ,  𝑦2
𝑆2 ,  … ,  𝑦𝑛
𝑆𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 𝑃 (𝑥
𝑙  | {𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌𝑗 =  𝑦𝑗
𝑆𝑗)})                   (3-20) 
where: l = 0, 1, ..., m and Sj = 1, 2, ..., kj. 
This weighted sum algorithm is applied to the distribution over child node “D” for 
compatible parental configurations. The algorithm utilises the weights determined by the 
AHP method.  
3.7 Decision-Making Formulation and Analysis Methodology 
When developing a decision-making methodology it is important to clearly define the 
domain that it is to represent. The attributes must be appropriately allocated, which careful 
attention being paid to what each attribute shall represent and where they shall rank in the 
evaluation hierarchy. The fundamental part of developing a coherent decision-making 
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method, with the ability to deliver coherent results, lies in its evaluation hierarchy and the 
allocation the belief degrees and weights. With this in mind, a decision-making method 
has been established to ascertain the most suitable WSN design for use in the asset 
integrity monitoring of an offshore electrical generation system. To ensure a coherent 
method was established knowledge was obtained through reviewing literature and 
conversing with industrial experts (Liu, et al., 2004).  
There are a number of steps involved in the procedure for applying a decision-making 
algorithm to a problem. Having a number of steps is key for maintaining consistency 
throughout the process and offers and element of confidence to the final analysis (Liu, et 
al., 2004). There are key elements that the procedure must follow, these are outlined as 
follows: 
1. Establish the domain and definition. 
This involves putting boundaries in place in order to prevent the process from 
becoming too complex. A finite number of wireless sensor nodes will be 
established in key areas of the machinery. 
2. Identify the objective. 
This involves stating what results are to be expected to be achieved from the 
problem-solving process. For this procedure and analysis, the goal is to determine 
the most suitable WSN based upon a set of attributes related to the design of a 
WSN. Furthermore, the evidential reasoning approach shall be utilised for the 
decision-making process. 
3. Identify a set of attributes relative to the problem. 
This involves filtering possible attributes that are relative to the description and 
the objective. For this problem, the attributes were devised from literature studies 
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based upon the key hardware attributes and criteria of a WSN. It is necessary to 
keep the attributes to a sensible number at this stage to avoid over complications 
when applying the decision-making algorithm. 
4. Develop the evaluation hierarchy. 
Once the attributes have been established, a hierarchy must be determined n order 
to coherently develop a solution to the problem. This hierarchy groups certain 
attributes under one general attribute. This allows for a smaller number of 
attributes to be aggregated gradually to reduce the calculation complexity of the 
decision-making algorithm. 
5. Outline suitable evaluation grades. 
This key for the process of data gathering for the decision-making algorithm. A 
sensible set of evaluation grades was established to maintain consistency 
throughout the problem-solving process. In the end, five grades were selected in 
order to accurately outline each WSNs suitability and to assist with the qualitative 
to quantitative assessment. 
6. Obtain data develop the belief degrees and attribute weights. 
The belief degrees are sought from expert judgement through the use of data 
questionnaires. Initially the weights of the attributes are assumed to be normalised, 
then weights determined from expert judgements through Pairwise Comparison 
and AHP are to be applied to the decision-making process. The Pairwise 
Comparison and AHP processes have been outlined in section 3.6.1. This allows 
for a good degree of comparison when establishing the final results and WSN 
performance rankings. 
7. Attribute aggregation. 
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Once the weights and beliefs of the basic attributes are determined the ER 
algorithm can be applied to aggregate the attributes to determine the belief degrees 
for the general attributes. Similarly, once the beliefs for the general attributes are 
determined, they also can be aggregated to find the overall suitability belief degree 
for each WSN. The data aggregation for both the basic attributes and general 
attributes is conducted with both normalised weights and calculated weights.  
8. Utility assessment and ranking. 
Once the overall belief degrees of each WSN have been determined, then the 
WSNs can be ranked in terms of their suitability for offshore applications. A 
utility interval is determined for each WSN for both the normalised weights and 
the calculated weights. These utility intervals are then ranked from greatest to 
smallest. The WSN with the greatest value is the most suited for offshore 
application.  
9. Analyse the results. 
Each of the proposed WSNs are to be ranked based upon their performance in the 
decision-making analysis. The analysis includes the comparison of applying 
normalised weights and calculated weights. This is useful to test conflicts on the 
data and the potential accuracy of the belief degrees. 
10. Sensitivity analysis. 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine how responsive the output of the 
analysis are to small variations in the input data. The sensitivity analysis provides 
a degree of confidence that the ER algorithm has been applied correctly and has 
functioned as intended. 
11. Validate the decision-making process. 
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Validation is a key aspect to the methodology, as it provides a reasonable amount 
of confidence to the results. In current literature, there is an axiom based validation 
procedure, which is useful for partial validation of the process. The aggregation 
process may not be rational or meaningful if it does not follow certain axioms. 
The four axioms to be assessed are as follows (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Durnbachm, 
2012): 
 Axiom 1 (Independence). 
A general attribute must not be assessed to an evaluation grade, Hn, if none of 
the basic attributes in E are assessed to Hn.. This means that if βn, i = 0 for i = 
1, …, L  then βn, = 0 (n = 1, …, N, n ≠ k). 
 Axiom 2 (Consensus). 
The general attributes should be precisely assessed to a grade Hn, if all of the 
basic attributes in E are assessed to Hn. This means that if βk, i = 1 and βn, i = 0  
and n = 1, …, N, n ≠ k,  then βk, = 1 and βn, = 0. 
 Axiom 3 (Completeness). 
If all basic attributes in E are completely assessed to a subset of evaluation 
grades, then the general attributes should be completely assessed to the same 
subset of grades. 
 Axiom 4 (Incompleteness). 
If an assessment for any basic attribute in E is incomplete, then the assessment 
for the general attribute should be incomplete to a certain degree. 
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3.7.1 Evidential Reasoning 
3.7.1.1 Background 
Numerous decision-making problems in management and engineering involve a several 
attributes of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. A comprehensive decision cannot 
be made with taking into account all attributes in question. It is the normal handling of 
qualitative attributes along with uncertain or incomplete information that causes 
complexity in multiple attribute assessments. There has been an increase in the 
development of theoretically sound methods and tools which deal with Multiple Attribute 
Decision Analysis (MADA) problems in a coherent, rational, reliable and repeatable 
manner (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Chen, et al., 2013).  
There has been considerable research conducted on integrating techniques from Artificial 
Intelligence to Operational Research for handling uncertain information. From this line 
of research, the Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach was developed for MADA. This 
method of decision-making is based on an evaluation analysis model and the Dempster-
Schafer (D-S) theory of evidence. The ER approach has been applied to decision-making 
problems in engineering, design and safety and risk assessment and supplier assessment. 
For example, motorcycle assessment, cargo ship design (Yang & Xu, 2002) and marine 
system safety analysis (Ren, et al., 2005). The key component of the ER approach is an 
ER algorithm developed around a multi-attribute evaluation framework or hierarchy and 
the evidence combination rule of D-S theory (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Chen, et al., 2013).  
This ER algorithm can be used to aggregate attribute in a multilevel structure, and a 
rational aggregation process needs to satisfy certain self-evident rules, commonly referred 
to as synthesis axioms. Suppose there are two levels of attributes with general attributes 
at the top and several basic attributes at the bottom level. Each basic attribute can be 
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assessed against a given set of evaluation grades. An attribute may be assessed against an 
individual or a subset of the evaluation grades, with different degrees of belief (Yang & 
Xu, 2002) (Yang, et al., 2003) (Zhang, et al., 2016). 
In order to apply the ER algorithm, a set of variables and a hierarchical structure of 
general and basic attributes must first be defined. The variables and hierarchical structure 
are based the definition and scope of the given problem. Figure 3-10 shows an example 
of a general attribute with 3 basic attributes, taken from the full analysis presented in 
Chapter 6. 
3.7.1.2 The Evidential Reasoning Algorithm 
Subjective judgements may be used to distinguish one alternative from another in terms 
of qualitative attributes. For example, to evaluate the Maintainability of a WSN some 
typical judgements may be that “the maintainability of the WSN is poor, average or good”. 
In this instance the terms poor, average and good denote clear, distinct evaluation grades. 
However, in terms of applying evidential reasoning, three evaluations grades are not 
sufficient. Therefore, five evaluation terms have been outlined, with Hn denoting the n
th 
Complexity 
Maintainability, z 
 
Cost, e8 
Complexity Auto-Configuration, 
e7 
Complexity Ease of Maintenance, 
e6 
Figure 3-10: Evaluation hierarchy example 
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evaluation grade (Ren, et al., 2005) (Yang & Xu, 2002) . This is demonstrated by 
Equation 3-21: 
𝐻𝑛 = {𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 (𝐻1)  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐻2)   𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝐻3)  
  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝐻4)   𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐻5)}   (3-21) 
Maintainability is not an easy attribute assess directly, so it is defined by three basic 
attributes, as previously stated.  It is possible to directly assess the basic attributes and 
hence the general attribute.  
In hierarchical assessment, higher level attributes are assessed through lower level 
attributes, i.e. if the Ease of Maintenance (e6), Auto-Configuration (e7) and cost (e8) are 
all deemed to be Average for a WSN. Then the Maintainability (z) is deemed to be 
average. In evaluation of the qualitative attributes, uncertain judgments can be used. It is 
important to note that in the analysis expert judgements are used for data collection and 
analysis. In this instance, the assessment of maintainability (z) may be as follows (Yang 
& Xu, 2002): 
i. 50% sure that Ease of Maintenance (e6) is good and 50% sure that it is 
excellent. 
ii. 20% sure that the Auto-configuration (e7) is indifferent, average and good 
and 40% sure that it is excellent. 
iii. 20% sure that the Cost (e8) is poor and average and 60% sure that it is 
good. 
In the above assessment, the percentages are referred to as belief degrees, and sometimes 
used in decimal format (0.2, 0.4, 0.6 etc.). It should also be noted that all assessment 
grades sum to 1 for each attribute. This is key in the application of the ER algorithm and 
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all beliefs in the future analysis shall sum to 1. It is possible to adapt the ER algorithm to 
deal with incomplete belief degrees. However, that shall not be outlined further. For 
further reading purposes, Yang & Xu (2002) outlines an ER algorithm for incomplete 
beliefs in great detail.  
Continuing on, it is supposed that there is a simple two-level hierarchy, as outlined. 
Suppose there are L basic attributes ei (i =1… L) associated with general attribute z. the 
basic set of attributes are defined by Equation 3-22: 
𝐸 = {𝑒1   𝑒2 … 𝑒𝑖 … 𝑒𝐿}    (3-22) 
Suppose the weights of each attribute are given by Equation 3-23: 
𝜔 = {𝜔1   𝜔2 … 𝜔𝑖 … 𝜔𝐿}    (3-23) 
where, ωi is the relative weight of the ith basic attribute (ei) with 0 ≤ ωi ≤ 1. The relative 
weights play a vital role in the ER assessment. The relative weights may be estimated 
using simple rating methods or pairwise comparison methods  (Li & Liao, 2007) (Ren, et 
al., 2005) (Yang & Xu, 2002).  
Suppose there are N evaluation grades defined collectively to provide a full set of 
standards for the assessment of the attribute, as shown by Equation 3-24: 
𝐻 = {𝐻1   𝐻2 … 𝐻𝑖 … 𝐻𝑁}    (3-24) 
where, Hn is the n
th evaluation grade and it is assumed that Hn+1 is preferred to Hn. The 
given assessment for ei (i = 1… L) an alternative can be represented by Equation 3-25: 
𝑆(𝑒𝑖) = {(𝐻𝑛𝛽𝑛,𝑖), 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁}𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐿   (3-25) 
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where, βn, i ≥ 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1 ≤ 1 and denotes the belief degree of an attribute given a certain 
evaluation grade. In other words, the attribute ei is assess to the grade Hn with a degree of 
belief of βn, i, n = 1… N. the assessment of an attribute, S(ei) is complete if the sum of the 
belief degrees is equal to 1, i.e.  ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1 = 1. 
Let βn be the belief degree that the general attribute z is assessed, to the grade Hn. the 
problem is to generate βn (n = 1, …, N) by aggregating the assessments for all of the 
associated basic attributes. This is where the ER algorithm is applied. 
The ER algorithm can now be outlined. Let mn,i be the probability mass representing the 
degree to which the ith basic attribute, ei, supports the hypothesis that the attribute z is 
assessed to the n-th grade, Hn. Similarly, let mH,i be the remaining probability mass 
unassigned to any individual grade after all grades have been considered for the 
assessment of the general attribute (Li & Liao, 2007) (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Chen, et al., 
2013). In terms of the basic attributes, ei, the probability mass is calculated by Equation 
3-26: 
𝑚𝑛,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖𝛽𝑛,𝑖     𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁    (3-26) 
Similarly, mH, i is given by Equation 3-27: 
𝑚𝐻,𝑖 = 1 − ∑ 𝑚𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1 = 1 − 𝜔𝑖 ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
𝑁
𝑛=1    (3-27) 
Also, EI(i) must be defined as the subset of the i basic attributes, as given by Equation 3-
28: 
𝐸𝐼(𝑖) = {𝑒1   𝑒2 … 𝑒𝑖}    (3-28) 
Let mn,I(i) be the probability mass defined as the degree to which all i attributes in EI(i) 
support the hypothesis that z is assessed to the grade Hn. Similarly, mH, I(i) is the remaining 
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probability mass which is unassigned to individual grades after all of the basic attributes 
in EI(i) have been assessed. The terms mn,I(i) and mH, I(i) can be determined by combining 
the basic probability masses mn, j and mH, j for all values of n=1, …, N, j=1, …, i. (Li & 
Liao, 2007) (Yang & Xu, 2002) (Chen, et al., 2013). 
Given the definitions and terms outlined in the above paragraphs the ER algorithm can 
be demonstrates by Equations (3-29), (3-30) and (3-31): 
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1) (
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1 + 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝐻,𝑖+1
+𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1
)       𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁 (3-29) 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝐻,𝑖+1    (3-30) 
𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1) =
[
 
 
 
 
1 − ∑∑𝑚𝑡,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑗,𝑖+1
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
]
 
 
 
 
−1
 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐿 − 1    (3-31) 
where 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)  is a normalising factor so that ∑ 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖+1)
𝑁
𝑛=1 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 1 . It is 
important to note that 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(1) = 𝑚𝑛,1for n=1…, N and 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(1) = 𝑚𝐻,1. Continually, the 
basic attributes are numbered subjectively, meaning that the results in 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝐿) and 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)are not the dependent on the order that the basic attributes are aggregated (Li & 
Liao, 2007) (Yang & Xu, 2002).  
Furthermore, in the ER algorithm, the combined belief degree βn must be found in order 
to finalise the decision –making process. This is calculated through Equation 3-32: 
𝛽𝑛 =
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝐿)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)
,         𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐿 
𝛽𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1     (3-32) 
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where, βH is the belief degree that is unassigned to any individual evaluation grade after 
all of the basic attributes have been properly assessed. It shows a degree of 
incompleteness in the assessment (Liu, et al., 2004). 
Finally, the attributes must be ranked based upon their aggregated belief degrees from the 
ER algorithm. This can be done through utility assessment. Suppose the utility of an 
evaluation grade, Hn, is denoted by u(Hn). The utility of the evaluation grade must be 
determined beforehand, with u(H1) = 0 and u(H5)=1 assuming there are five evaluation 
grades (Yang, 2001). If there is not preference information available then the values of 
u(Hn) can be assumed to be equidistant, as shown by Equation 3-33: 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = {𝑢(𝐻1) = 0, 𝑢(𝐻2) = 0.25, 𝑢(𝐻3) = 0.5, 𝑢(𝐻4) = 0.75, 𝑢(𝐻5) = 1}     (3-33) 
The estimated utility for the general and basic attributes, S(z(ei)), given the set of 
evaluation grades is given by Equation 3-34: 
𝑢 (𝑆(𝑧(𝑒𝑖))) = ∑ 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 (𝑒𝑖)    (3-34) 
In Equation 3-34 the term 𝛽𝑛,𝑖(𝑒𝑖)determines the lower bound of the likelihood that ei is 
assessed to a grade Hn. the upper bound is given by 𝛽𝑛(𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽𝐻(𝑒𝑖). This is given the 
assumption that there is an incomplete belief degree. In the event that ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 = 1then 
this is the utility estimation and a rank for each attribute can be determined (Yang, 2001). 
A numerical assessment and example shall be conducted in Chapter 6. 
3.8 Conclusion 
A framework and methodology for the Asset Integrity Case has been proposed to assist 
with the initial development and decision making. A generic risk based framework has 
been used as the basis as the majority of the Asset Integrity Case development focuses on 
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dynamic risk assessment. Hence it makes sense to primarily base the framework for 
development from a risk based framework. There are a number of components within the 
framework, split into three key areas. These three areas involve the scope and domain of 
the risk assessment, the dynamic risk assessment itself and the addition of remote 
monitoring and sensing. The framework is designed so that it can be employed to several 
offshore areas to further develop the Asset Integrity Case. This framework should be 
viewed as part of a process of continuous improvement. 
Two key research methodologies are outlined; i) a BN formulation methodology which 
is applied in Chapters 4 and 5, and ii) a decision-making methodology which is applied 
in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the research techniques used throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
have been outlined to avoid continuous and unnecessary repletion within the thesis. All 
techniques are outlined in Chapter 3 and are applied to numerical analyses across 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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4 CHAPTER 4:  
INITIAL BAYESIAN NETWORK MODELLING OF A 
SINGLE COMPONENT FAILURE IN AN OFFSHORE 
ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATOR 
Summary 
In this chapter, the proposed Bayesian Network methodology, outlined in Chapter 3, is 
demonstrated by applying it to a case study. The study undertakes the evaluation of the 
effects a rotor retaining ring failure has on an offshore electrical generation unit and key 
surrounding systems, within a module of a fixed steel offshore platform in the North Sea. 
4.1 Introduction 
The Thistle Alpha Platform, located in the North Sea, has three gas turbine driven 
electrical generators, (termed Unit A, Unit B & Unit C), each of which is capable of 
providing 100% of the platform power requirements. The platform is currently part of the 
Thistle Late Life Extension (LLX) strategy, which aims to recover over 35 million barrels 
of oil through to 2025 from the Thistle and Deveron oil fields. In order for the platform 
to be operable to 2025 and beyond, the LLX strategy incorporates a series of major 
initiatives to improve structural and topside integrity, upgrade safety and control systems, 
improve the oil production and water treatment process and provide reliable power. This 
provides an ideal scenario to identify possible areas of failure and what possible 
consequences could occur (Cresswell, 2010). 
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During the initial part of the LLX strategy, in 2009, the Unit A generator was no longer 
in operation due to a fire which occurred in 2007 and Unit C was providing all of the 
power as Unit B was under refurbishment. The alternator on each generator has two rotor 
retaining rings which ensure that the rotor windings, insulation and packing blocks are 
contained as they rotate at the operational speed of 3600 rpm. These rings are considered 
to be the most highly stressed components in the generator unit. There was a concern on 
the Thistle Alpha platform of the possibility of one or both of the rings failing due to 
stress corrosion cracking. This provided a sound basis with which to begin constructing 
an initial BN to show the cause and effect relationships on failure potentially has on the 
surrounding equipment and systems. 
4.2 Location of Equipment  
The potential damage scenarios from the failure of the retaining rings shall be assessed 
for the Unit B generator as it is contained within module 2 of the platform, which has 
significant hydrocarbon inventories adjacent to either side of the module, as shown by 
Figure 4-1. Hence the potential for damage to key hydrocarbon systems is present and 
provides an ideal position to model the cause and effect relationship of the retaining ring 
failure across various systems. Unit C on the other hand is located in module 21 (see 
Figure 4-2) with no hydrocarbon inventories adjacent or directly below (module 5 is 
redundant), and therefore the potential major events regarding hydrocarbon release is not 
considered for this area. Figure 4-3 shows the north elevation of the platform and 
locations of Units B and C for completeness. Figure 4-1, Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 are 
adapted from the plot plans for the Thistle Alpha platform in Appendix E. 
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4.3 Damage Scenarios 
The turbine generator set consists of a primary alternator, driven by a gas turbine. Located 
after the alternator is an exciter, which generates the electromagnetic field in the stator 
coils of the alternator. The alternator rotor and shaft are forged in one piece with the 
exciter coupled onto one end. The opposite end of the shaft is coupled to the turbine drive 
shaft, which has an operating speed of 3600 rpm. The main shaft is supported by two 
main bearings, housed in large pedestals, on stools on the baseplate. The main bearings 
are situated in two places, between the turbine and the alternator and between the 
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Figure 4-4: Schematic of a generator unit 
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alternator and the exciter. Figure 4-4 shows the generic layout of the generator set 
(McGeorge, 2002). 
Should one of the retaining rings fail, the main shaft would become unbalanced causing 
potential fragmentation of the rings inside the alternator. Given the extreme tolerances’ 
within the generator construction, the unbalanced shaft could also cause damage to other 
areas of the equipment, such as: the turbine blades and the exciter. Should the retaining 
ring fail within the alternator casing, and fragment, debris would be created within the 
casing. Furthermore with the machine operating at 3600rpm, an out of balance shaft 
would cause substantial vibrations, which could cause the main bearings to fail. Should 
the bearings fail, causing the shaft to become misaligned, it would result in increased 
damage to the turbine, alternator and exciter (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
From this the most likely point of failure within the turbine is the turbine blades shearing. 
Multiple blade failure could lead to the turbine casing not fully containing the turbine 
blade debris. This would result in turbine blades being expelled through the turbine casing 
as high velocity projectiles. Continually, the violent shaft vibrations and misalignment 
could have a severe impact on the exciter and which may result in the exciter, weighing 
approximately one tonne, becoming detached from the main shaft. Some catastrophic 
failures have resulted in the exciter breaking up and some have had the exciter remain 
mostly intact (RMRI Plc., 2009). Should the bearings not fail, the alternator stator coils 
& casing, can provide enough resistance and are substantial enough to prevent the debris 
from the retaining ring penetrating the alternator casing. However, it is possible for the 
fragments to be expelled axially towards either the turbine or the exciter or both (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
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4.3.1 Physical Consequences  
In the event of one or two rotor retaining ring failures, significant damage could occur 
within the alternator casing and fragments of the retaining ring could be expelled axially. 
Should the ring debris be expelled, it is assumed that it will travel in two possible direction; 
i) towards the turbine or ii) towards the exciter and out of the casing. Should the debris 
travel to the turbine there is potential for the fragments to impact the fuel gas line within 
the turbine. This then provides the escalation to a fire (given the location of the potential 
release, ignition is assumed). Should the debris travel out of the casing towards the exciter, 
it is considered by RMRI. Plc (2009) that while the axial velocity may be considerable, it 
is likely to be lower than the radial velocity that the debris would be expelled at were the 
casing and stator not there. Therefore, while it is possible for the ring debris to penetrate 
the casing, they would not have the required velocity to penetrate the module walls or 
deck. From this it is deemed that if retaining ring failure does not cause a bearing failure, 
then the consequence of the event is likely to be limited to the damages caused by the 
retaining ring (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
However, should the main bearing fail, the potential consequences become much more 
severe. It has been stated by (RMRI Plc., 2009) that the significant damage caused by the 
bearing failure can potentially produce high velocity projectiles from the turbine blades 
being expelled and/or the exciter becoming detached. In these events, there is potential 
for the projectiles to impact the hydrocarbon containment around generator Unit B. 
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4.3.2 Areas of Escalation. 
4.3.2.1 Escalation due to Turbine Blades 
Based upon research conducted by the FAA (US Federal Aviation Agency) and RMRI 
Plc., there is a possibility of the gas turbine blades being expelled radially, through the 
casing as high velocity projectiles. However, it is considered not to be feasible for the 
projectiles to have enough energy to penetrate the module walls, nor will it be possible 
for the projectiles to penetrate the module decking/floor as the turbines are mounted on a 
substantial steel baseplate (Lundin, 2002) (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
On the other hand, should the turbine blades be expelled axially out of the generator, there 
is potential for the blades to impact the gas import riser located in module 5a. It is 
important to note that should Loss of Containment (LOC) occur, due to the impact from 
projectiles, ignition is not assumed for the initial model. The escalation to gas riser loss 
of containment is taken as either Small (10mm Diameter), Medium (50mm Diameter), 
Full-bore and No LOC (Meher-Homji & Gabriles, 1998). 
4.3.2.2 Escalation due Exciter 
As stated in section 4.3, should the main bearings fail, it is considered that the exciter 
may become detached from the main rotor shaft and be expelled radially as a projectile. 
Should the exciter remain largely intact, the weight of the exciter coupled with the 
generator housing would prevent it from exiting the confines of the module. However, 
should the exciter fragment, the debris could be projected in several directions, but 
according to RMRI Plc. (2009), the likelihood of both the generator housing and the 
module wall being penetrated is reduced.  
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Based upon the layout of the modules, the location of the equipment and engineering 
judgement, it is considered possible for the exciter to impact the High Pressure (HP) Flare 
drum contained in module 2a, should the exciter become detached and be expelled from 
the housing. As stated in the instance with the gas import riser, ignition is not assumed in 
the event of LOC from the HP flare drum. 
4.4 Possible Sequence of Events 
Based upon the information stated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 a possible sequence of events 
is outlined to demonstrate the initial variables identified, as shown by Figure 4-5.  
As shown in Figure 4-5 if the retaining ring fails, there is a possibility that this will have 
an effect on the bearings, and potentially cause a failure with the bearings. This can result 
in one of two scenarios, violent shaft vibrations could be caused or only the bearing fail 
and shaft vibrations do no occur.  
If violent vibrations do not occur, attention is drawn to the fragments of the failed 
retaining ring. These fragments potentially become projectiles within the alternator and 
are expelled in three possible direction; towards the gas turbine, towards the exciter or 
remaining in the alternator.  Should the fragments of the ring fragments not become 
projectiles and remain within the alternator, this would provide no further escalation in 
terms progression of the fragments within the generator. However, should the fragments 
be expelled, they are assumed to move axially either to the turbine or towards the exciter. 
Should the fragments project towards the exciter they can potentially leave the generator 
unit but have no further impact on the surrounding equipment due to their low velocity 
(Meher-Homji & Gabriles, 1998). In the event that the fragments are expelled toward the 
turbine, they have the potential to impact the turbine’s fuel gas line. This event can 
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escalate to a fuel gas fire, as the conditions within the turbine are sufficient to ignite the 
gas, should a leak from the impact occur (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
On the other hand, should violent vibrations occur following a bearing failure, attention 
is drawn to the possibility of turbine blades being expelled as projectiles or the exciter 
detaching from the shaft. If the turbine blades are not expelled and/or the exciter does not 
detach, that it is deemed that a major event has occurred regarding the failure of the 
bearing but the situation doesn’t have enough potential to escalate. However, in the event 
that the turbine blades become projectiles, they have the potential to cause escalation in 
the form of possibly impacting a gas import riser located in module 5a. This event can 
cause escalation to the failure of the gas import riser, or should the gas riser not be 
impacted, a major event is deemed to occur without further escalation. Similarly, should 
the exciter become detached and become a projectile in any way, it is deemed to have the 
potential to impact the HP gas knockout flare drum. This event has the potential to 
escalate to failure of the HP gas flare drum, yet should the gas flare drum not be impacted, 
the situation is again deemed to be a major event without further escalation.  
The sequence of events shown in Figure 4-5 are to form the basis of the BN by 
representing the possible variables outlined in step 3 of the BN methodology. The 
sequence of events diagram is created by analysing the situations highlighted in the 
potential damage scenarios and the possible physical consequences. 
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Figure 4-5: Possible sequence of events following a Retaining Ring failure within Unit B 
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4.5 The Initial BN Model  
4.5.1 Assumptions and Limitations 
There are some underlying assumptions within the model that must be explained for the 
model to valid and understood: 
 The model has been built for the situation where the offshore platform contains 
no crew and hence does not consider fatalities, i.e. human injury and death. There 
are two key reasons for this; the first is that the BN model is to be for an NUI 
(Normally Unattended Installation) Integrity Case, where humans are not present 
on the platform for large periods of time, and are monitored from other platforms 
or onshore. Secondly, the BN is part of the development of an Integrity Case 
which shall focus on maintaining the integrity of the equipment as a priority, as 
well as the effects of incidents on the environment. Hence fatalities are not part of 
the initial model. 
 The model is only an initial model in the development of a NUI-Integrity Case. 
Its purpose is to demonstrate that the cause and effect relationships between 
offshore failure modes, systems and components can be modelled effectively 
using the methodology stated in Chapter 3.  
 There are many component failures that can have an effect on the outcomes of the 
stated events, however, the BN model presented is an initial model. Hence, the 
cause and effects of one component failure are analysed, to show that the model 
is valid before expansion to other related component failures. 
 For “Fuel Gas Feed Impact & Failure” being of the state “Yes”, ignition is 
assumed due to the nature of the environment where the fuel release is located. In 
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other words, the temperature within the turbine, during normal operations, is 
sufficient enough to ignite any fuel released from the fuel gas line.  
 In contrast it is assumed that if “Gas Riser impact & Failure” and “HP Flare Drum 
Impact & Failure” are of the state “Yes”, then ignition is not assumed due to the 
area where the leaks would be located. This keeps the model from becoming too 
complicated by adding possible ignition sources to the analysis.  
4.5.2 Nodes and Structure 
The initial model is demonstrated in Figure 4-6 and is designed around the variable 
identified in the sequence of events shown in Figure 4-5, and is to represent the cause and 
effect of one initial component failure has on systems within the stated domain. The Initial 
BN model is not a direct representation of the sequence of events in terms of the section 
of the model where possible debris is expelled. Within the sequence of events if the debris 
is not expelled initially, it is assumed to remain in the alternator, yet if debris expelled, it 
is assumed to travel towards the exciter. Similarly, should the debris not be expelled to 
the exciter, it is assumed to be expelled towards the turbine. While this is all possible, it 
is more realistic to assume that if the debris is created from the retaining ring failure, it 
has the potential travel to the turbine and the exciter in the same instance. However, it is 
possible for debris to be expelled to the exciter and not to the gas turbine, whereby some 
debris would remain in the alternator. The way in which the BN model is created ensures 
that it contains all relevant possible outcomes.  
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In this case the analysis is conducted within module 2 of the Thistle Alpha Platform. The 
initial model is made up of seventeen chance nodes labelled 1 to 10 and E1 to E7. The 
latter nodes represent the possible events that can result from the initial mechanical failure. 
All nodes have two states except for event node E6 which has four. The nodes are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Initiating Circumstance. 
1. Retaining Ring [States: Failure, No Failure] – This is a root node or parentless chance 
node which represents the initiating, observed component failure. The data within the 
node represents the frequency of either of the two retaining rings contained within the 
alternator failing. 
Intermediate Events. 
Figure 4-6: Initial BN Model representing Retaining Ring failure within an offshore generator. 
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2. Debris Expelled [States Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability of 
debris being created from fragments of the retaining ring and being expelled. Its 
conditional probabilities are set based upon the states of its parent node 1. 
3. Debris Expelled into Turbine [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of the retaining ring debris being expelled towards the turbine. Its 
conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 2. 
4. Debris Expelled towards Exciter [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of the debris created by the retaining ring being expelled towards the 
exciter. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the sates of its parent node 2. 
5.  Fuel Gas Feed Impact [States: Yes, No] – This node describes whether the debris 
from the retaining ring impacts the fuel gas feed within the gas turbine. Its conditional 
probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 3. 
6. Generator Bearings [States: Failure, No Failure] – This chance node represents the 
generator bearings failing or not failing. The conditional probabilities of this node are 
based upon the states of its parent node 1.  
7. Turbine Blades Expelled [States: Yes, no] – This chance node represents turbine 
blades being expelled axially out of the turbine casing, due to the generator bearings 
failing and causing violent vibrations. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the 
states of its parent node 6. 
8. Exciter Detaches [States: Yes, no] – This chance node represents the exciter being 
detached and acting as a projectile due to the generator bearings failing causing 
violent vibrations. Its conditional probabilities are based on the states of its parent 
node 6. 
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9. Gas import Riser Impact [States: Yes, No] - This chance node represents the gas 
import riser being impacted due to turbine blades being expelled. Its conditional 
probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 7. 
10. HP Flare Drum Impact [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the HP flare 
drum being impacted due to the exciter detaching and acting as a projectile. Its 
conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 8. 
Final Events. 
E1. Debris contained in Alternator [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
debris being contained within the alternator following debris being expelled and 
debris not being expelled into the turbine and/or towards the exciter. Its conditional 
probabilities are based upon the states of its parent nodes, 2, 3 and 4. 
E2. Debris Escapes Generator Housing [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents 
the retaining ring debris leaving the generator unit following its expulsion towards the 
exciter. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 4. 
E3. Fuel Gas Fire [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents a fuel gas fire occurring 
within the turbine following the retaining ring fragments impacting the fuel gas line 
within the gas turbine. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its 
parent node 5. 
E4. Debris Remains in Turbine Housing [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents 
the retaining ring debris remaining within the gas turbine in the event that there is not 
a fuel gas feed impact. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its 
parent node 5. 
E5. Event Escalation [States: No, Yes] – This chance node represents the probability of 
there being no further escalation to “Gas import Riser LOC” or “H.P. Flare Drum 
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LOC”. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent nodes 7, 8, 
9, and 10. 
E6. Gas Import Riser Loss of Containment [States: Small (10mm Dia.), Medium (50mm 
Dia.), Full-bore, None] – This chance node describes key loss of containment levels 
in terms of the size of the hole in the gas import riser, from impact by turbine blade 
projectiles. Its conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 9. 
E7. H.P. Flare Drum Loss of Containment [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents 
escalation to the release from the high pressure flare knockout drum, located in 
module 2a (see Figure 4-1), following impact from the detached exciter. Its 
conditional probabilities are based upon the states of its parent node 10. 
4.6 Data for the Initial BN Model 
It is important to note that the numerical results of the model are not significant in terms 
of being absolute, but rather to serve to demonstrate the practicability of the model. Once 
a full set of verified data is fed into the model, the confidence level associated with 
planning and decision making under uncertainty will improve.  
Data for the initial model was compiled from various sources and is by no means a fully 
complete representative of each possible variable. Some problems were encountered in 
terms of data being scarce or non-existent, data being based on small samples or data 
based within a given time and not up to date, such as: failures for components occurring 
between 1991 and 2004. It has been previously mentioned that the initial BN model 
presented here is purely to demonstrate a valuable method of modelling cause and effect 
relationships of components and systems based upon one specific initial component 
failure or no failure. Work involving improving deficiencies in data and the accuracy of 
112 
  
the model can be dealt with in later research. Data and information that is fed into the BN 
model in the form of marginal and conditional probabilities has originated mostly from 
risk assessment projects conducted for the Thistle Alpha Platform, academic papers, risk 
assessment databases and expert judgement.  
To complete the CPTs within a BN, certain data and knowledge is required regarding 
each specific node. For some nodes data is limited or not available. For cases where there 
is an absence of hard data, CPTs must be completed through subjective reasoning or the 
application of expert judgement. This process can be demonstrated by looking at the node 
“Event Escalation”. This node represents the chance of escalation following key 
component failures. The parents of this node are: “Turbine Blades Expelled”, “Exciter 
Detaches”, Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” and “HP Flare Drum Shell Impact”. In order 
to put together an appropriate estimate, experts must judge the situation and provide their 
opinions. This data acquisition can be either qualitative or quantitative in nature. However, 
the child node “Event Escalation” has a CPT which is too large for an expert to simply 
fill with their own judgements and opinions. Therefore, an effective way to gather 
information, to fill these large CPTs, from experts is to apply the use of a Pairwise 
Comparison technique in questionnaires and make use of AHP to analyse the results, 
combined with the symmetric method algorithm to fill the large CPTs (Zhang, et al., 
2014).  
The AHP will produce a weighting for each parent criterion in the Pairwise Comparison 
matrix. These weighting are applied to the symmetric method which is utilised to fill large 
CPTs. The symmetric method provides an input algorithm which consists of a set of 
relative weights that quantify the relative strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes 
on the child-node, and a set of probability distributions the number of which grows only 
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linearly, as opposed to exponentially, with the number of associated parent-nodes (Lin & 
Kou, 2015) (Saaty, 1980).  
Table 4-1 summarises the origins of the data for each node in the initial BN model. There 
were several sources of literature and it is not practical to list them all. For example; node 
1 was determined from historical data sources, such as (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2008) and (Sherlock & Jirinec, 1993), whilst, in comparison, data for node 
9 is from (Atkins, 2008) and (RMRI Plc., 2009). 
Table 4-1 also contains the number of states for each node and the number of permutations 
to demonstrate an idea of how data had to be broken down before being inserted into the 
corresponding CPT. Since the purpose of this study is to produce a functional BN model 
data collection for the Initial BN model was halted at this point. However, further in depth 
data acquisition and analysis is to be conducted once the model is expanded in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4-1: Details of each node and their data origins 
Node Node Name States Parents 
Permutations 
in CPT 
Data Sources 
1 Retaining Ring Failure 2 0 2 Literature (HD1) 
2 Debris Expelled 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
3 
Debris Expelled into 
Turbine 
2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
4 
Debris Expelled towards 
Exciter 
2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
5 Fuel Gas Feed Impact 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
6 Generator Bearings 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
7 Turbine Blades Expelled 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
8 Exciter Detaches 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
9 
Gas Import Riser Piping 
Impact 
2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
10 HP Flare Drum Shell Impact 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
E1 
Debris Contained in 
Alternator 
2 3 16 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
E2 
Debris Escapes Generator 
Housing 
2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
E3 Fuel Gas Fire 2 1 4 Literature (Db2 & RAP3) 
E4 
Debris Remains in Turbine 
Housing 
2 1 4 Expert Opinion 
E5 Event Escalation 2 4 32 Expert Opinion 
E6 Gas Import Riser LOC 4 1 4 Literature (RAP) 
E7 HP Flare Drum LOC 2 1 4 Literature (HD & RAP) 
1Historical Data (HD), 2Databases (Db)such as: OREDA, HSE, OGP, 3Risk Assessment Projects (RAP) for 
Thistle 
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4.6.1 Application of Pairwise Comparison Technique and AHP 
In order to obtain data for nodes in the BN where historical data is not available, a pair-
wise comparison technique was utilised in the form of questionnaires to gather data from 
experts in the offshore industry. Pairwise comparison is required as the experts cannot 
simply analyse the individual nodes and provide their judgements. A specific criterion is 
required in order for the experts to understand the situation and provide the relevant 
information. Furthermore, the BN contains some nodes which are at component level and 
some nodes which are at system level. For example, “Turbine Blades Expelled” refers to 
a specific component, whereas “Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” refers to a gas riser 
system. The pairwise comparison provides a hierarchy for comparisons so the experts can 
see the breakdown of the situation and compare areas that are system related and those 
that are component related (see Appendix F for the data collection questionnaire) (Lin & 
Kou, 2015). Similarly, the Pairwise Comparison and AHP techniques are outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
A set of questionnaires was sent to selected experts in the offshore industry for their 
evaluation. The feedback is investigated according to their judgements on the criteria 
under discussion. The back grounds of the five experts, who shall remain anonymous, is 
as follows: 
Expert 1 is a current member of a national regulatory organisation with over 20 years of 
experience in the offshore industry. This person current holds chartered engineer status. 
Expert 2 is currently in the employment of a leading classification society and holds a 
university qualification at the MSc. Level. This person has 8 years of experience at sea 
and more than 5 years as an offshore safety manager. 
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Expert 3 is currently in the employment of a leading classification society and holds a 
university degree at PhD level. This person has more than 10 years’ experience of 
working in the offshore industry. 
Experts 4 and 5 are both currently colleagues in the employment of a multinational 
energy corporation and have university degrees to MSc level. Both also have more than 
10 years’ experience in the offshore industry. 
Referring to the system level criteria in part A of the questionnaire as an example of the 
AHP method, a 3×3 pairwise comparison matrix is constructed to obtain the weights of 
these criteria. Table 4-3 is a Pairwise Comparison matrix expressing the qualified 
judgement with regard to the relative priority of GIR, HPD and EG. An explanation of 
the abbreviations is given in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Criteria required for comparison at system level 
System Failures  
Electrical Generator failure EG 
Gas Import Riser failure GIR 
High Pressure gas flare Drum failure HPD 
 
Table 4-3: Pairwise Comparison matrix for system level criteria 
  GIR HPD EG 
GIR 1 3.4 6.33 
HPD 0.29 1 5     
EG 0.16 0.20 1 
SUM 1.45 4.61 12.26 
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A standardised matrix is calculated to show the performance ratio of the system level 
criteria. This is done by dividing the importance rating in each cell by the sum of its 
column. From here the relative weights of the criteria can be calculated by averaging the 
rows in the standardised matrix. A measure to know if the data is performing correctly is 
that all of the columns in the standardised matrix must sum to 1.0. The standardised matrix 
with calculated relative weights for the system level criteria is shown in Table 4-4. These 
step by step calculations as a whole represent Equation 3-12. 
Table 4-4: Standardised matrix of system criteria along with their relative weights. 
  Weight 
GIR 0.69 0.74 0.52 64.88% 
HPD 0.20 0.22 0.40 27.31% 
EG 0.11 0.04 0.08 7.81% 
SUM 1 1 1 100.00% 
 
The next phase of AHP is the consistency ratio calculation. Each value in the columns of 
Table 4-3 is multiplied by the weight value of each criterion in Table 4-4. For example 
each value in the column GIR of Table 4-3 is multiplied by the weight of the GIR row in 
Table 4-4. Once these figures have been calculated, they are to be summarised by row, as 
shown in Table 4-5. A Sum Weight is then calculated by dividing the summarised row of 
Table 4-5 by the corresponding weight in Table 4-4. For example ‘Sum Row’ GIR is 
divided by the weight in row GIR in Table 4-4. The full results are shown in Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-5: The product of the Pairwise Comparison matrix values and the calculated weights (columns 2- 4). Along 
with the sum of each row and the sum weight of each criteria. 
  Sum Row Sum Weight 
GIR 0.65 0.93 0.50 2.07 3.20 
HPD 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.85 3.10 
EG 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.24 3.02 
 
The λmax value is then calculated by dividing the sum of the ‘Sum Weights’ by the number 
of criteria, n in the Pairwise Comparison, which in this case is 3. This calculation utilises 
Equation 3-15. Hence, λmax is calculated as: 
λmax =
3.2 + 3.1 + 3.02
3
= 3.11 
Next the CI is computed using Equation 3-14, as follows: 
𝐶𝐼 =
3.11 − 3
3 − 1
= 0.05 
Subsequently the consistency ratio (CR) is calculated using Equation 3-13. There are 3 
criteria in this pairwise comparison under evaluation, so the corresponding Random Index 
(RI) is 0.58, as shown in Table 3-2. The CR of the system level criteria can now be 
calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑅 =
0.05
0.58
= 0.09 
The CR value of the system level criteria is 0.09. This means that the degree of 
consistency within the pairwise comparison is acceptable as the CR value is less than 0.10.  
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Similar calculations were conducted for the other criteria in the pairwise comparison with 
one other CR being calculated as 0.00. This again is acceptable as it is less than 0.10. The 
full pairwise comparison and AHP results are shown in Appendix G. CR calculations are 
not possible for matrices of less than 2×2 as the Saaty RI values for 2×2 matrices is zero. 
4.6.2 Application of Symmetric Method 
To outline the symmetry method outlined in Chapter 3, let us consider part of the initial 
BN model consisting of nodes 7, 8, 9, 10 and E5. as shown in Figure 4-7. 
Also, for ease of explanation, Table 4-6 shows a simple notation for each parent node. 
Table 4-6: Notation for parent nodes in Figure 4-2 
Parent Nodes (from left to right in figure 4-2) Notation  
Gas Import Riser Piping Impact W 
Turbine Blades Expelled X 
Exciter Detaches Y 
HP flare Drum Shell Impact Z 
 
In this example the child node E5 has 24 different parental configurations, as there are 
four parents each with two states (Yes and No). Hence, the CPT will consist of 24 
Figure 4-7: Small BN taken from the initial BN model 
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probability distributions. This large number of distributions demands a considerable 
amount of intensive effort on the part of an expert to generate the CPT. The vexing part 
is that it is not just large but exponentially large. A CPT quantifying the dependency on 
n parents would demand 2n distributions in order to be functional. It is this exponential 
growth with the number of parents that constitutes the essential problem. This symmetric 
method simplifies the problem of exponentially large CPTs. 
For calculation of the CPT for the Child Node (Event E5), assume that the number of 
distributions grows linearly as opposed to exponentially. i.e. with the network shown 
there are 2x4 distributions linearly as opposed to 24 exponentially. If the states of the 
parents have one-to-one capability correspondence (which is an equivalence relation) 
then the number of ‘Questions’ regarding the CPT for the child node is reduced (Das, 
2008). The symmetric method demonstrated in Chapter 3 is utilised to complete the CPT 
and so the theory is altered to accommodate four parent nodes instead of three. Hence the 
compatible parent configuration for is demonstrated by Equation 4-1 
{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑊 = 𝑤𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑋 =  𝑥𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑍 =  𝑧𝑠)} ≡ 
{𝑊 = 𝑤𝑠 , 𝑋 = 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑌 = 𝑦𝑠 , 𝑍 = 𝑧𝑠}                               (4-1) 
Consider the network shown in Figure 4-7 where the 2×4 linear probability distribution 
has been assigned. Starting with parent W and interpreting the compatible parent 
configurations as follows in equation 4-2 (Das, 2008): 
{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑊 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑋 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑠)} ≡ 
{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑍 = 𝑠)} ≡ {𝑊 = 𝑠, 𝑋 = 𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑠, 𝑍 = 𝑠}                 (4-2) 
where the set contains two states. s = Yes, No  
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Hence the probability distribution over the child node E5 will be: 
𝑃(𝐸5|{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑊 = 𝑠)}) = 𝑃(𝐸5|{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑋 = 𝑠)}) = 
𝑃(𝐸5│{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑠)}) = 𝑃(𝐸5│{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑍 = 𝑠)})                   (4-3) 
where the set contains two states s = Yes, No.  
Given the network in Figure 4-7 it is possible to assign the relative weights (w1, ..., wn), 
demonstrated in Table 4-4 and Appendix G, to the parents W, X, Y, Z respectively, to 
quantify the relative strengths of their influences on child node E5.  
The weights are positive and should be in a normalised form, i.e. 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, for i=1, ..., 
n , and w1+ ... +wn = 1. 
The Weighted Sum Algorithm 
If all the information that the expert is willing to give is: 
i) The relative weights w1 , ... , wn , and, 
ii) The k1+ ... +kn probability distributions over E5, of the linear type, for compatible 
parental configurations. 
Given the information provided the following algorithm is used to produce an estimate, 
based upon expert judgements, of the k1 × ... × kn distribution for child node E5 (Das, 
2008). 
 𝑃(𝑥𝑙| 𝑦1
𝑆1 ,  𝑦2
𝑆2 ,  … ,  𝑦𝑛
𝑆𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 𝑃 (𝑥
𝑙  | {𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌𝑗 =  𝑦𝑗
𝑆𝑗)})                   (4-4) 
where: l = 0, 1, ..., m and Sj = 1, 2, ..., kj. 
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This weighted sum algorithm is applied to the distribution over E5 for compatible parental 
configurations. Table 4-7 shows the compatible distributions over child node E5, with 
data obtained from expert judgement through pairwise comparison and AHP.  
Table 4-7: Distribution over E5 for compatible parental configurations {Comp (W = s)} 
Probability Distribution over E5 s = Yes s = No 
P(E5 = Yes|{Comp(W = s)})  0.23 0.77 
P(E5 = No|{Comp(W = s)}) 0.77 0.23 
 
In addition, Table 4-8 shows the relative weights for the parents of event E5, which were 
obtained from expert judgment through pair-wise comparison and AHP. 
Table 4-8: Relative weights of parent nodes of Event E5 
Parent Node Weighting Notation Relative Weights 
Gas Import Riser Piping Impact (W) W1 0.65 
Turbine Blades Expelled (X) W2 0.05 
Exciter Detaches (Y) W3 0.03 
HP flare Drum Shell Impact (Z) W4 0.27 
 Total 1.00 
 
Utilising the data shown in Table 4-7 and Table 4-8, it is possible to calculate all of the 
24 parental distributions required to populate the CPT for event E5. Consider an example 
to demonstrate the algorithm for a specific parental distribution, where the probability of 
E5=Yes is required. One possible distribution is shown in Table 4-9. 
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Table 4-9: Possible parental configuration for parents of Event E5 
Parent Node State: Yes or No 
Gas Import Riser Piping Impact (W) No 
Turbine Blades Expelled (X) Yes 
Exciter Detaches (Y) No 
HP flare Drum Shell Impact (Z) Yes 
 
Given the states of the parents in Table 4-9, the distribution over E5 is to be: 
𝑃(𝐸5 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)                        (4-5) 
Once all of the relevant data is known, according to Equation 4-4, the following 
computation is required: 
𝑃(𝐸5 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 𝑤1. 𝑃(𝐸 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜)}) +
 𝑤2. 𝑃(𝐸 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)}) + 𝑤3. 𝑃(𝐸 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜)}) + 𝑤4. 𝑃(𝐸 =
𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)})                                                                                         (4-6) 
From Equation 4-6 it can be deduced that for the parental configuration shown in Table 
4-9, when the correct compatible probabilities and weights are substituted in, the 
probability of event E5 being in the state “Yes” is to be: 
𝑃(𝐸5 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 0.6                         (4-7) 
Subsequently, according to Axiom 2 shown in Section 3.3, the complement of 4-7 
[P(𝐸5 = 𝑁𝑜)] is to be: 
𝑃(𝐸5 = 𝑁𝑜|𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 
1 − 𝑃(𝐸5 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑊 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑋 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑌 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑍 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 0.4      (4-8) 
124 
  
The relative weight algorithm is applied to all cells within the relevant CPT table to obtain 
the full conditional probability distribution. This process was completed using the 
formula function in Microsoft Excel, which also saves time for calculations. The 
completed CPTs for the Initial BN Model can be found in Appendix H. 
4.7 Model Validation 
Prior to generating the results for the Initial BN model, a series of test were carried out to 
demonstrate that the network operates as intended. This involves examining several 
different combinations and scenarios of events taking place, such as 100% probability of 
failure. This process serves to highlight potential problematic areas that could require 
closer scrutiny and should a certain event occur. Furthermore, the set of axioms outlined 
in Section 3.5.1 should be satisfied by the model. A sensitivity analysis is also carried out 
to demonstrate how responsive or “sensitive” the output of the model is to variations in 
its inputs (Jones, et al., 2010) (Cai, et al., 2013).  
4.7.1 Propagation of Evidence 
4.7.1.1 Retaining Ring Failure 
The propagation of evidence, as previously stated, examines combinations and scenarios 
of events occurring. With regard to this case study the focus of the first analysis shall be 
on the seven final event nodes (E1 to E7) when evidence is inserted to the parent Node 
“Retaining Ring Failure”. 
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From the scenario, illustrated by Figure 4-8, a failure of a retaining ring (100% probability 
of State “Failure”) results in changes in the probabilities of the final event nodes. This 
shows that the nodes closer to the initial event (Retaining Ring Failure) display larger 
changes than nodes further away in the network. The same can be said for evidence 
inserted in the other state of node 1, “No Failure”, as shown by Figure 4-9. However, the 
changes are very small as the prior probability for “No Failure” of a Retaining Ring was 
already very high. Figure 4-10 shows three scenarios: From left to right, A) The 
Marginalized prior probabilities of node 1 and Nodes E1 - E7, B) The posterior 
probabilities of nodes E1 – E7, given that the retaining ring fails, and C) The posterior 
probabilities of nodes E1 – E7, given that the retaining ring doesn’t fail. 
 
Figure 4-8: Scenario showing the effect of evidence in the form of 100% failure of a Retaining Ring 
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Figure 4-10 demonstrates that when evidence is presented in node 1, representing the 
initial component failure, this will have an effect on all of the presented final events. It 
can also be seen that individual node react in the way they would be expected, for example, 
should the retaining ring fail, the likelihood of the being “E5. Event Escalation” increases 
from 25.19% to 25.43%. Similarly, in the same situation the probability of “E1. Debris 
being contained within the Alternator” decreases from 62.49% to 58.70%. This is due to 
the corresponding effects the initial failure has on the parents of event E1, and the 
likelihood of the debris being expelled towards the turbine or towards the exciter are 
increased, as shown by Figure 4-8. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Scenario showing the effect of evidence in the form of 100% no failure of a Retaining Ring 
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4.7.1.2 Event Escalation 
Further analysis is carried out on a specific section of the Initial BN model, shown in 
Figure 4-11, this time concerning the event “E5. Event Escalation” and its parents. This 
analysis involved systematically inserting evidence into each of the parent nodes and 
finally the child node. In addition, nodes 7 and 8 have a parent node “Generator Bearings” 
which has no evidence inserted, and there is no evidence inserted anywhere else within 
the model. However, in this section of the BN model Nodes 7 and 8 are parents of nodes 
9 and 10 respectively, and therefore will alter the posterior probabilities of these nodes 
Figure 4-10: A) Prior probabilities B) Posterior probabilities after 100% failure of retaining ring C) Posterior 
probabilities after 100% no failure of Retaining Ring 
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when evidence is inserted. This relationship has been left in the analysis to give an 
accurate representation of the posterior probabilities of the event E5, which is the focus 
node in this analysis.  
The scenario shown in Figure 4-12 illustrates the gas turbine blades being expelled as 
projectiles from the generator housing. This increases the probability of the events 
escalating from 25.19% to 35.09%. This increase would involve some concern as a 
Figure 4-11: A) Specific section of BN to be analysed. B) Prior probabilities for Event E5 and its parent nodes. 
Figure 4-12: Probability of "Event Escalation" given Turbine Blades are expelled 
129 
  
potential escalation from this is the impact of the turbine blades on the Gas Import Riser. 
This can also be seen in Figure 4-12 where the probability of there being a gas import 
riser impact increases from 6.2% to 25%. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4-13, the expulsion of the turbine blades coupled with a 
gas riser impact, the probability of their being escalation increases from 35.09% to 
61.42%. This is a very large increase as the impact of a gas riser is the largest threat to 
escalation, due to the loss of containment of the gas, this hypothesis was also confirmed 
by expert opinion. It can also be noted that in both Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13 when 
evidence is inserted into nodes 7 and 9, there is no effect on nodes 8 and 10, which is to 
be expected as they should be independent from each other. Should this scenario have the 
potential to occur, immediate action should be taken to prevent a major accident in the 
form of LOC of hydrocarbons and potential explosion & fire. 
Figure 4-13: Probability of "Event Escalation" given both Turbine Blades Expelled and Gas Import Riser 
Impact 
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Figure 4-14 further demonstrates the potential for escalation by showing that the 
generator’s exciter detaches, along with turbine blades expelled and gas riser impact. It 
shows that again the potential for escalation increases from 61.42% to 63.86%. This 
scenario also increases the probability of the HP flare drum being impacted from 1.47% 
to 10% as would be expected.  
Figure 4-15 demonstrates the final influencing factor on the possibility of event escalation, 
whereby the HP flare drum is impacted. This increases the potential for escalation from 
63.86% to 77%.  
The final scenario, shown in Figure 4-16, demonstrates the effect of there being an 
escalated event, for example, observing an explosion or a fire within the area of the 
platform containing the electrical generator, and the effect this has on the influencing 
parameters. This serves to obtain areas that would require closer inspection. This scenario 
has given insight to the possible causes of the event escalation, based upon the data 
presented, here the main influencing factors are: “Turbine Blades Expelled” – Yes, 
Figure 4-14: Probability of "Event Escalation" given Turbine Blades Expelled and Gas Import Riser Impact, together 
with the Exciter Detaching. 
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increases from 0.12% to 0.17%; “Exciter Detaches” –Yes, increases from 0.15% to 0.17%; 
“Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” – Yes, increases from 6.2% to 14.31%; and “HP Flare 
Drum Shell Impact” – Yes, increasing from 0.02% to 0.03%. 
 
Figure 4-16: BN Model illustrating when "Event Escalation" takes place. 
Figure 4-15: Probability of "Event Escalation" given that all influencing factors take place 
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4.7.2 Validation 
In order for the model to be validated, it should satisfy the three axioms stated in Section 
3.5.1. Examination of the model in Figure 4-8, Figure 4-9 & Figure 4-10 shows that when 
evidence is inserted in the form of the initiating component failing or not failing, the 
posterior probabilities for the final events decrease or increase depending on the node in 
question. This analysis also demonstrates that nodes closer to the focus node, in this case 
node 1, will display a larger influence than those which are further away. This can be 
shown as node E1 demonstrates a larger change, 62.49% to 58.70%, when the retaining 
ring fails, as opposed to event E5 which has a small change from 25.19% to 25.43%, as 
it is further from the focus node than event E1. 
Furthermore, examination of a specific part of the model, in Figure 4-12, reveals when 
“turbine Blades Expelled” is set to 100% ‘Yes’, this produces a revised increase in 
probability for “Event Escalation” occurring from 25.19% to 35.09%. Figure 4-13 shows 
both the change in Figure 4-12 and “Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” set at 100% ‘Yes’. 
This resulted in a further increase in the potential for “Event Escalation” occurring. Figure 
4-14 shows the changes in Figure 4-13 plus the “Exciter Detaches” being set to 100% 
‘Yes’, again resulting in an increase for the potential for “Event Escalation” being of the 
state ‘Yes’. Finally, Figure 4-15 shows all of the influencing factors on “Event Escalation” 
being set to 100% ‘Yes’, resulting in yet another increase in the probability of “Event 
Escalation” occurring from 63.86% to 77.00%.  
This exercise of increasing each of the influencing nodes as well as the changes displayed 
when increasing or decreasing the probability of the initial event occurring satisfies the 
three axioms states in the BN methodology, thus giving validation to the BN model.  
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4.7.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is essentially a measure of how responsive or sensitive the 
output of the model is when subject to variations from its inputs. Having the 
understanding of how a model responds to changes in its parameters is important when 
trying to maximise its potential and ensuring correct use of the model. SA provides a 
degree of confidence that the BN model has been built correctly and is working as 
intended. In the context of this research, SA will be used as a demonstration to determine 
how responsive an event node is to variations in other nodes. Knowing the most 
influential nodes can assist in the experimentation and further expansion of the model. 
Similarly, nodes which have very little influence can be altered or discarded (Matellini, 
2012).  
The SA conducted for the Initial BN model focuses on the event E5 and its parent nodes, 
shown in Figure 4-11, to further validate the claims in Section 4.7.2. However, the 
analysis will be conducted using smaller increases and decreases in the probabilities of 
the parent nodes as opposed to inserting 100% occurrence probability into the input node 
CPTs.  
A possible way of undertaking this is to manually insert evidence into the input nodes, 
one by one, and subsequently analyse the effect on the output node via its posterior 
probability. When doing this the input nodes are increased or decreased by equal 
percentages, individually. This allows for clear comparison of their impact upon the 
output node. However, this manual method was not applied to this analysis. Instead a 
parameter sensitivity wizard within the Hugin BN software was used. In this program 
wizard the input node is individually paired with the output node in its desired state. In 
this case that was “E5. Event Escalation” in the state ‘Yes’. A state for each of the input 
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nodes was purposely selected. It should be noted that in this analysis, node 6, “Generator 
bearings” has had evidence input at state – ‘Failure’ to 100%. This input of evidence 
allows for nodes 7, 8, 9 & 10 to remain independent from each other, which allows for 
the values analysed in the sensitivity analysis to remain consistent. Following this the four 
input nodes (Nodes 7, 8, 9 & 10) are all set to state – ‘No’ in the parameter sensitivity 
wizard. In this way a sensitivity value from Hugin was obtained for each input node and 
using Microsoft Excel a graph was constructed to show the results.  
From the graph in Figure 4-17 it can be seen that the most influential factor on “Event 
Escalation” is “Gas import Riser Impact”, whilst the least influential is “Exciter 
Detaches”. If the probability of State - ‘No’, “Gas Riser Impact” increases by 10%, then 
the probability of “Event Escalation” decreases by 2.63%. Whereas, if the probability of 
State - ‘No’, “Exciter Detaches” increases by 10%, then the probability of “Event 
Escalation” only decreases by 0.29%. From the graph it is also apparent that the 
sensitivity function is a straight line which further add to the model validation. The 
sensitivity values computed within Hugin are shown in Table 4-10. 
Figure 4-17: Sensitivity functions for the four input nodes for event "E5. Event Escalation" 
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Table 4-10: Sensitivity values for the four input nodes acting upon event "E5. Event Escalation" 
Input Node Sensitivity Value 
7. Turbine Blades Expelled: No -0.095 
8. Exciter Detaches: No -0.029 
9. Gas Import Riser Impact: No -0.263 
10. HP Flare Drum Shell Impact: No -0.073 
 
It should be noted that the sensitivity values in Table 4-10 are negative as in their current 
states of ‘No’, they have a negative effect on the outcome of “Event Escalation” – ‘Yes’. 
For example; with the probability of “Turbine Blades Expelled” increasingly being ‘No’, 
it is less likely that “Event Escalation” – ‘Yes’ occurs. 
4.8 Further Development of the Initial BN Model 
The initial BN model could be further developed to investigate, in more specific detail, 
addition component failures and their subsequent events within module 2 of the Thistle 
Alpha platform. This allows for a more comprehensive dynamic risk assessment model 
to be included as part of an NUI-Integrity Case.  
One interesting modification is to expand on the area around the event of “Fuel Gas Fire” 
and “Event Escalation” by including possible “Gas Release within Module”, as shown by 
Figure 4-18. The reasoning behind this is to incorporate additional initiating failures to 
the model and explore other causes of the current final events stated in the Initial BN 
model. The reasoning behind the addition of the node “A. Gas Release in Module” is that 
not all fuel fires, or hydrocarbon fires for that matter, are caused my immediate ignition. 
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Therefore, by working back from the node “Fuel Gas Fire”, one can establish other causes 
other than impact of the fuel gas line within the turbine, such as an external gas leak. 
Following the node “Gas Released in Module”, it is important to know where the leak 
has been detected or not. Should the leak be detected, the Turbine Control System (TCS) 
has the potential to shut off the fuel gas supply to prevent further release. Continually, 
should a gas release occur, it is possible for the gas to ignite. The probability of whether 
the fuel gas would ignite is commonly spread between three main states; “Instant”, 
“Delayed” or “None”. Should the leak instantly ignite, a fuel gas fire would occur. If the 
ignition is “delayed”, possibly by the oxygen to gas ratio in the atmosphere not being at 
it optimum for ignition, the gas can continuously release, if not detected. This causes a 
build-up of fuel gas within the confined area and until the optimal gas to oxygen ratio is 
achieved. Ignition at this point could cause an explosion of varying magnitude, and 
severely damage the module and other areas of the offshore platform. If there is no 
ignition of any kind, the gas is either shut off or continuously released into the atmosphere. 
Another possible modification to the model is the addition of instances that induce 
mechanical failures. In a similar way that a retaining ring within an alternator can cause 
damage and failures of an electrical generator, the turbine running overspeed can has a 
similar effect. Figure 4-19 shows the addition of the parent node “Overspeed Excursion” 
to the Initial BN model. A turbine running overspeed has many of its own causes, such 
as loss of load and control system failure, and are not shown here as these are hypotheses 
that can be expanded on.  
“Overspeed Excursion” would potentially have an effect on the mechanical equipment 
related to the rotor on the generator. This is demonstrated in Figure 4-19 as the node could 
potentially have an effect on the retaining ring, the generator bearings, the turbine blades 
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and the exciter, by increasing the stresses on these components that have small 
mechanical tolerances. From the “Overspeed Excursion” it is possible that “Overspeed 
Detection” could occur and potentially shut down the turbine and eliminate the possibility 
of event escalation.  
Figure 4-18: Modified version of the initial BN model, featuring the addition of "Gas Release in Module", "Gas Detection", "TCS 
Shut-off Fuel Supply" and "ignition Type" 
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Further modifications are possible in other aspects. For example, the model is part of 
research into the development of dynamic risk assessment modelling of a NUI. As NUI’s 
have very limited physical human presence, the way in which failures and hazards are 
observed becomes different. In this instance, it would be feasible for future research to 
take into account addition detection methods within the model, whereby, an observer 
onshore, monitoring a section of the installation, can observe failures as though one where 
on board. These future developments are key to the creation of the dynamic risk 
assessment models for an NUI-Integrity case. 
Figure 4-19: Modified version of the initial BN model featuring the addition of "Overspeed Excursion", "Overspeed 
Detection" and "Turbine Shutdown" 
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4.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the Bayesian Network technique that has been used to model 
the cause and effect relationship of a specific component failure within a module of an 
offshore platform. It has been stated that offshore systems can be very complex and when 
coupled with the volume of data required to model failures within these systems, it makes 
BNs a challenge to model effectively. As well as in some cases a lack of reliable data 
means that some risk assessment models cannot always be applied. With this in mind, the 
Initial BN model, which deals with a single component failure within module 2 of the 
Thistle Alpha Platform, demonstrates that BNs can provide an effective and applicable 
method of determining the likelihood of various events under uncertainty. The model can 
be used to investigate various scenarios around the systems and components outlined and 
to show the beginnings of establishing where attention should be focused within the 
objective of preventing offshore incidents, as well as having a clear representation of 
specifically where these accidents can originate from. This method of modelling offshore 
risk assessment is to be improved upon in future research to potential model larger areas 
with several systems and their components to gain a wider understanding of how offshore 
systems interrelate. 
Continuing with the initial BN model, a number of tests were generated to validate the 
hypotheses of model by applying the methodology to a case study (Section 4.7). The BN 
model demonstrated the effect a possible retaining ring failure would have on the 
electrical generation system, and surround area, of an offshore platform. The levels of 
fatalities have been omitted from the analysis as the objective of the research was to 
determine whether it is possible to accurately model equipment failures using BN. This 
is because the BN model is part of the development of NUI-Integrity Cases, whereby 
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there is very limited physical human presence on board. Furthermore, the BN was 
constructed utilising equipment on a manned installation as a further objective of the 
research is to demonstrate whether it is possible to create a dynamic risk assessment 
model that will allow for humans to not be continuously present on a large installation, 
such as the Thistle Alpha platform, but monitor its operations from onshore. Hence, the 
Initial BN model presented in this Chapter provides a base to expand the research and the 
BN model to achieve this goal. 
In relation to the validation of the model a sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine 
how responsive the output of the model is to various modifications in the inputs and 
subsequently validate that the model works as expected. This exercise is vital as it 
provides an indication to what the most important variables. In addition, inputs can be 
ranked or weighted in terms of their importance upon the output or final consequences. 
For example, in the Initial BN model “Gas Import Riser piping Impact” had a much larger 
effect on the possibility of “Event Escalation”. The more advantageous element of 
conducting SA in BNs is that they take into consideration the chain of events below the 
input node leading to the output node, which presents a closer approximation to reality. 
Finally, the section entitled “Further Development of the Initial BN model” shows how 
additional hypotheses could be incorporated into the modelling process and what 
purposes they would serve. There are several interesting and relevant possibilities that 
can be considered and explored with relative ease now that the core structure of an initial 
model has been constructed. However, before expanding the model it is vital to maintain 
that it must remain practical and close to reality from the perspective of gathering data 
and generating results. Continually too many variables which display vague information 
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or increasingly irrelevant effects can diminish the quality of results and findings. The 
further development of the model should add further insight to this. 
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5 CHAPTER 5:  
BAYESIAN NETWORK MODELING OF FUEL GAS 
RELEASE WITH POTENTIAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
CONSEQUENCES 
Summary 
In this chapter, the proposed BN methodology, outlined in Chapter 3, is demonstrated by 
applying it to a case study by focusing on the development of a BN model for modelling 
control system and physical failures of a gas turbine utilised in offshore electrical 
generation. The intention is to model a sequence of events following several component 
failures, under certain conditions and assumptions. These initial failures are defined in 
two categories; control system failures and physical or structural failures. The BN is 
subject to a series of test cases to demonstrate its validity. A sensitivity analysis is also 
applied to a section of the BN. 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the development of a BN model for modelling control system 
and physical failures of a gas turbine utilised in offshore electrical generation. The 
intention is to model a sequence of events following several component failures, under 
certain conditions and assumptions. These initial failures are defined in two categories; 
control system failures and physical or structural failures. This should provide a base with 
which to expand the BN model to facilitate the requirement of having a dynamic risk 
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assessment model that allows for accurate representation of the hazards and consequences 
associated with gas turbine fuel gas releases. 
The research presented within this chapter is an expansion of previous research conducted 
for an electrical generation system of an offshore installation in Chapter 4. The initial 
research focused on creating a dynamic risk assessment model for an electrical generation 
system, based upon one initial component failure in the form of a Rotor Retaining ring 
failure. From the initial research a sequence of events and a BN was produced to 
demonstrate the cause and effect relationships between the safety critical elements of the 
generator. The BN demonstrated a number of potential consequences, such as: Gas Import 
Riser failure, High Pressure Gas Flare Drum failure and Fuel Gas Release & fire. These 
final consequences were not expanded or demonstrated in great detail to keep the initial 
model as less complex as possible while achieving valid results. This is where the research 
presented in this chapter comes into play. The model to be presented here is an expansion 
of the previous model, focused on the consequence Fuel Gas release and Fire. In the initial 
BN this scenario this was represented as one node in the network, this research expands 
by constructing an entire new network to demonstrate the consequence of Fuel Gas 
release in much more detail. 
The underlying theory of BN is provided in Chapter 3, similarly the step by step procedure 
used to construct the BN model is also described in Chapter 3. The model representing 
the potential for fuel gas release from an offshore gas turbine, along with the further 
consequences of fire and explosion, begins at the point of several initiating events. These 
events are the beginning of the sequence of events and continues through the point of 
potential gas release, the barriers involved in preventing the release and the potential 
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consequences should these barriers fail. The sequence of events method was outlined in 
Chapter 4. The same method was applied to construct the fuel gas release BN model. 
5.2 Model Assumptions and Limitations 
There are some underlying assumptions and limitations within the model that must be 
explained for the model to be valid and understood. These limitations are split into two 
groups: space & domain and model data. 
5.2.1 Space and Domain Limitations 
The purpose of the model is to show what the effects of several component failures have 
on a gas turbine which can lead to a fuel gas release. Hence, the consequences of said fuel 
release are analysed, and in order to do this, the boundaries of the model need to be 
defined. These boundaries are concerned with the affected area, the detail of the 
consequences and the ignition types & sources. The outlined assumptions and limitations 
concerned with the model domain are as follows:   
 The model has been built for the situation where the offshore platform does not 
house any crew and hence does not consider fatalities. There are two key reasons 
for this: The first is that the BN model is to be for an NUI (Normally Unattended 
Installation) Integrity Case, where humans are not present on the platform for 
large periods of time, and are monitored from other platforms or onshore. 
Secondly, the BN is part of continual development of an Integrity Case which 
shall focus on maintaining the integrity of the equipment as a priority, as well as 
the effects of incidents on the environment. Hence fatalities are not part of the BN 
model consequences. 
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 The model is designed to demonstrate the hazards and consequences associated 
with the fuel gas release from an offshore gas turbine. Hence, the consequences 
regarding fire and explosion are not concerned with the probability of other 
hydrocarbon releases contributing to fires and explosions.  
 The scope of the model is primarily within the power generation module of a large 
fixed offshore platform. Therefore, the section of the model assigned to the 
probability of equipment damage due to fire and explosion is confined to the 
equipment and machinery located only within the stated module. 
 The model is representative of fuel gas being released into the module and not 
within the gas turbine itself. This is due to the fact that should there be a gas 
release the turbine, it is assumed that the combustion chamber is of sufficient 
temperature to ignite the fuel. However, the presence of an ignition source within 
the confines of the module is not a total certainty. The node “Ignition Source” 
represents this uncertainty and possibility of a source being present. 
 While the level of consequence is confined to the module, and the presence of an 
ignition source is not certain, it is still possible for the gas levels to reach 
dangerous levels. These dangerous levels do not represent a direct threat to human 
personnel as it has been stated that humans are not present in the module. The 
dangerous levels relate to the potential environmental impact of harmful 
substances being released into the atmosphere. This is in conjunction with the 
revised requirement of safety cases for offshore installations to contain 
precautions for potential environmental impact of offshore incidents and accidents 
(HSE, 2015). 
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5.2.2 Model Data Limitations 
It is important that some remarks are made regarding the uniformity of the data within 
the model. Statistics exist in a number of formats and originate from many sources. When 
formulating a model as specific and confined as the one being created, it is almost 
impossible to gather data sets from the same consistent sources.  
It is important to understand that many statistics are not fully representative of reality. 
For instance, there are cases where the full extent of an incident is not reported, such as a 
fuel gas release. For example, from 1992 to 2014, 40% of fuel gas and power turbine gas 
releases were not detected by an automatic sensor, but were detected by human detection. 
The human detection includes smell, visual and a portable detector. In the instances of 
human detection, the recording of information is scarce, with 56% of fuel gas release 
incidents having little to no information regarding the location and cause of the release 
and in some cases, the extent of the dispersion. Furthermore, the majority of the 56% of 
releases with incomplete information and data were regarded as “Significant”, in terms 
of their severity level (HSE, 2014). It is inconsistencies within the data, such as this, that 
provide sound reasoning to limit data to automatic detection and shut down barriers. 
There are some differences in terms of data relating the type of installation operating the 
same type of gas turbine generator. However, the location of the installations is restricted 
to the UKCS (United Kingdom Continental Shelf) and the North Sea. Much of the data 
represented in the model is adapted from gas turbines operating on fixed platforms, yet it 
is not feasible to obtain data from all sources relating to fixed installations. This limitation 
with the data goes back to either the absence of data or the lack of appropriate data 
recording. Hence, data is from fixed installations and FPSOs (Floating, Production, 
Storage and Offloading) which make use of very similar gas turbine machines.  
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There are also differences with the age of the data and the data sources used in the Fuel 
Gas Release model. All data utilised is taken from sources post 2002. Most of the data 
close to 2002 has been obtained from OREDA-2002 as full access to the database at this 
time was available. On the other hand most of the conditional data used to complete the 
CPTs for the nodes, in the BN, has come from risk assessment projects conducted on 
offshore installation for gas turbines, with the main focus of the projects being 
hydrocarbon and fuel gas release. These risk projects were conducted post-2009 by RMRI 
Plc., Petrofac and Maersk.  
Finally, most of the nodes are based upon hard evidence statistics, while two of the nodes 
incorporate subjective judgement by utilising a symmetric algorithm from hard evidence. 
By combining information in this way it allows for situations that have little to no 
information to be overcome. This process does not compromise the validation and 
analysis of the model however it is important to take note of this when interpreting the 
information presented in the results. 
5.3 Structure of the Model and Nodes 
The fuel gas release model (shown in Figure 2.1) is primarily designed to represent key 
initial events of gas turbine failure, in two main areas: the turbine control system and the 
physical structure. Following the initial events and failures the BN model is designed to 
show the possible progression of these failures into fuel gas release and the potential fire 
& explosion consequences that can occur. There are a number of more intimate functions 
that the model provides. Firstly, the initial stages of the model demonstrate which initial 
event or hazard demonstrates the greater probability for potential gas release, as well as 
whether the greatest threat originates from the turbine control system or the physical 
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structure. Secondly, the cause and effect relationships between the barriers is 
demonstrated in terms of the probability of whether a certain barrier operates as expected, 
based upon the operation of the previous barriers. Thirdly, the type of consequence that 
can occur following a fuel gas release. These consequences can be; none, a gas leak only, 
fire, explosion and resulting equipment damage from a fire and/or an explosion. 
There is one transfer node within the fuel gas release BN which links the initial BN 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. This node is “Fuel Gas Feed Impact”. Through this node any 
updates from the initial BN model shall result in updates to the posterior probabilities of 
the fuel gas release BN.  The model contains nineteen chance nodes with either two or 
three states.  
To understand how the model operates and the reasoning behind why it has been 
constructed in the way it has, it is necessary to explain the logic behind each node. It is 
also necessary to explain what each state means (this is mostly applicable to the nodes 
“Immediate/Delayed Ignition” and “Consequences”), the more specific assumptions for 
each node, how the data for the different CPTs has been built, and the relationships of 
each node with their respective parents and child nodes. The nineteen nodes have been 
arranged into five categories; “Initial events/Roots”, “Categorized Initial Events”, 
“Barriers”, “Incidents/Accidents” and “Consequences”. Each node is arranged in the 
following descriptions by category.  
Initial Events/Roots 
1. Exceed System Capability [States: Yes, No] – This is a root node or parentless chance 
node which represents an initiating event whereby the turbine control system incurs a 
failure and operates outside the system’s capabilities. For example, in the event there 
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is a failure within the control system that controls the speed of the turbine, the turbine 
could run at overspeed hence exceeding the 3600 rpm capacity. This would be 
considered as the turbine exceeding the system’s capacity. This node is utilised as a 
collective of a number of failures. More specific failures, such as overspeed or power 
surges are to be conducted in further BN models. 
2. Operational Error [States: Yes, No] – This parentless chance node represents the 
operational errors incurred by the turbine control system. The operational errors 
outlined in this node pertain to pressure, temperature and other electronic sensors and 
detectors. However, it does not include the Gas Detector as this sensor is applicable 
after the potential gas leak. Whereas, the pressure and temperature sensors can fail to 
cause a potential fuel gas release.  
3. System Defects [States: Yes, No] – This parentless chance node represents the 
possibility of there being inherent system defects within the turbine control system. 
The system defects are defined as an error, flaw, failure or fault in the turbines 
computer program and/or control system that causes it to produce an incorrect or 
unexpected result, or to behave in an unintended way. 
4. Structural Support Failure [States: Yes, No] – This parentless chance node represents 
the probability of the main structural supports for the gas turbine experiencing a fault 
or failure. This can result in an unbalanced rotor shaft and turbine blades, which in 
turn has the potential to damage fuel gas feed lines, pumps and valves, hence leading 
to a fuel gas release.  
5. Corrosion [States: Yes, No] – This parentless chance node represents the possibility 
of corrosion being a factor in a potential fuel gas release. Corrosion is a huge factor 
when considering possible failures on board an offshore installation due to the level 
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of salt water in the atmosphere. Most modules on an offshore platform are not closed 
off to the elements, for example, many of the decking sections are steel grating to 
primarily prevent the pooling of hydrocarbons. This prevents pool fires and slipping 
hazards for the crew. As the modules are mostly open and much of the offshore 
equipment is made from steel alloys, corrosion is an ever-present concern unless the 
steel is coated to prevent corrosion. (Roberge, 2000). 
14. Ignition Source [States: Yes, No] – This parentless chance node represents the 
probability of there being an ignition source sufficient enough to cause ignition of the 
fuel gas release. While this node is not an initiating failure, it is a root node. The node 
is a demonstration as to whether the ignition source is present to ignite the fuel gas 
within the electrical generation module. This does not include combustion within the 
turbine itself as the stated scenario of “Normal Operation” dictates that the 
temperature of some of the equipment within the turbine is sufficient enough it ignite 
the fuel gas, should the gas to oxygen mixture is ideal.. It is also important to note 
that the fuel gas has a much higher Auto Ignition Temperature (AIT) than diesel, 
which is approximately 530oC as opposed to 240oC for diesel. Furthermore, it can be 
deemed unlikely that the exterior of the combustion chamber will cause the gas to 
auto ignite as the external temperature of the gas turbine combustion chamber can 
reach approximately 200 – 400oC (HSE, 2008b).  
Categorized Initial Events 
6. Control System Failures [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of there being an overall failure due to the turbine control system given 
the states of its three parents; “Exceed System Capability”, “Operational Error” and 
“System Defects”. The purpose of producing a child node form the three relevant 
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parent nodes is to ease the complexity of the model. Grouping the initial event nodes 
(nodes 1, 2 & 3) together into an intermediate node, the data acquisition becomes less 
challenging and the model, in theory, becomes less complex in terms of the 
complexity levels of some of the CPTs. 
7. Physical/Structural Failures [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of there being an overall failure due to a physical and/or structural failure 
given the states of its three parents. These parents are the two root nodes “Structural 
Support Failure” and “Corrosion” as well as the instance node “Fuel Gas Feed 
Impact”. The reasoning behind this node is the same the “Control System Failures” 
chance node, outlined in the above paragraph. 
Barriers 
9. Gas Detection [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability of a 
potential gas release. The majority of gas turbine enclosures and/or modules have both 
gas and oil mist detection in the exhaust ducting (HSE, 2008b). The data within the 
node focuses on the fire and gas detectors within the electrical generation module. 
While this node can represent the probability of the gas being detected given that fuel 
gas was release, it can also show the probability of the detectors showing the presence 
of gas without a gas release. This can demonstrate the probability that the gas detector 
within the module has malfunctioned.  
10. TCS Shut Off Fuel [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability 
that the Turbine Control System (TCS) will shut off the gas given fuel gas detection. 
The process for the fuel shutting off is split into two nodes as there are two separate 
fail safe systems concerned with the module and the equipment. One is the F&G 
system (outlined as node 11 below) and the other TCS. This node focuses on the 
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TCS’s fuel shut off. This shut off system usually consists of electrical and pneumatic 
shut-off valves within the turbine for fuel shutdown and isolation in the event of a 
detected release (HSE, 2008b).  
11. F&G System Shut Off Fuel [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of the second fuel shut off system operating in the event of a fuel gas 
detection within the electrical generation module. When the turbine in question is gas 
driven, not diesel driven, a venting system removes excess fuel gas and routes to the 
platforms flare system. Diesel is normally routed to a dump tank or hazardous drains. 
Furthermore, the F&G system applies the use of fuel isolation valves as well as 
venting systems, to minimise the risk of fire and explosions (HSE, 2008b). 
13. Fuel Supply Off [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability of 
either of the fuel shut off systems preventing the supply of fuel gas to the turbine, or 
both systems operating or neither system operating. This node acts much like nodes 
6 and 7 whereby it reduces the complexity of the model by reducing the CPTs of three 
nodes; “Continuous Gas Release”, “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” and 
“Consequences”. The CPTs are reduced in complexity as the number of parent nodes 
are reduced without compromising the integrity and purpose of the model. 
Incidents/Accidents 
8. Fuel Gas Release [States: Yes, No] – This node represents the probability of fuel gas 
being released given that there is either a TCS failure or a structural failure or both 
combined. This node is driven by the chance nodes “TCS Failure” and 
“Physical/Structural Failures”. This node is a way of reducing the size of the “Fuel 
Gas Release” node as there are five initial root nodes representing individual failures 
that can occur within a gas turbine. The purpose of this node is to demonstrate a 
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potential fuel gas leak of sufficient volume to trigger a gas detector and potentially 
cause a fire within the electrical generation module. 
12. Continuous Gas Release [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability of the gas continuing to be released given that the success of the fuel shut 
off systems in the event of a gas detection. In the event both systems operate as 
expected and shut off the fuel, the gas is assumed to not continue to be released. This 
is also true in the opposing scenario. If both systems fail to operate, then the gas is 
assumed to continuously be released. However, as one system operates within the 
turbine and the other within the offshore module, the probability of gas continuously 
being released will vary depending on whether only one system operates when both 
are need or whether the gas release is location specific. For example; should the gas 
leak be detected in the module and not the turbine, it makes sense that the modules 
F&G system is responsible for the fuel shut off and not the TCS and vice versa. 
15. Immediate/Delayed Ignition [States: Yes - Immediate, Yes – Delayed, None] – This 
chance node represents the probability of the fuel gas within the module being ignited. 
The ignition of the gas is dependent on a couple of key points: i) there must be an 
ignition source present and ii) the oxygen to flammable gas mixture must be at an 
ideal mixture. This leads to three possible states of possible ignition. The first of these 
is “none”, representing the absence of either an ignition source, ideal mixture or both. 
The second is “Yes – Immediate”, which is the probability that there is an ignition 
source present and the gas to oxygen mixture is ideal igniting the gas at the point of 
release. The third and final state is “Yes – Delayed” whereby an ignition source is not 
present at the moment the gas is released and the volume of gas within the module is 
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able to increase. The gas builds to a large volume in the module and given an ignition 
source, along with the ideal gas to oxygen mixture, delayed ignition can occur.  
16. Fire [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability of a fire occurring 
within the electrical generation module. The probabilities of the node are determined 
by three prior nodes: “Fuel Supply off”, “Ignition Source” and “immediate/Delayed 
Ignition”. All outcomes from the three prior nodes have an impact on the occurrence 
probability of a fire in the module.. In this instance it is assumed that given any 
situation that results in a fire, the fire type is deemed to be a jet fire due to the 
hydrocarbon in question being fuel gas (OGP, 2010) (Lloyd's Register, 2008). 
17. Explosion [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the probability of an 
explosion occurring due to fuel gas release. The probabilities of this node are 
determined by the “Fuel Supply off”, “Ignition Source” and “immediate/Delayed 
Ignition” nodes. Based upon testing and previous incidents on offshore installations, 
it is concluded that an immediate ignition has a very unlikely chance to produce an 
explosion. Delayed ignition is the result of the build-up of a flammable vapour cloud 
which is assumed to result in explosions (OGP, 2010).   
Consequences 
18. Consequences [States: Yes – Ignition, Yes – Gas Leak, None] – This chance node 
generically represents the consequences that can experienced from a fuel gas leak. 
This node is primarily influenced by two parent nodes; “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” 
and “Fuel Supply Off”. The occurrence probability of the states within this 
“Consequence” node are determined by the probabilities of the states within the parent 
nodes. Firstly, the state “Yes – Ignition” is heavily influenced by the “Immediate” and 
“Delayed” states of the ignition node and the “No” state of the “Fuel Supply Off” 
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node. This arrangement is due to the fact that if the fuel is shut off, there would be a 
very unlikely chance that ignition would occur. Secondly, the “Yes – Gas Leak” state 
is more influenced by the “Fuel Supply Off” node and the state “None” in the 
“Immediate/Delayed Ignition” node. Finally, the consequence state “None” is 
dependent on the Fuel supply being shut off and their being no ignition. 
19. Damage due to Fire and Explosion [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents 
the probability of machinery and equipment being damaged by possible fires and/or 
explosions within the electrical generation module. The machinery and equipment in 
question are the two, gas turbine driven electrical generators, the exhausts for the 
generators and the control panels for the generators. It is assumed that the 
fire/explosion has the potential to damage the generators and surrounding equipment 
(RMRI Plc., 2009).   
20. Damage to Adjacent Areas [States: Yes, No] – This chance node represents the 
probability that in the event of an explosion occurring, it has the potential to affect 
adjacent modules to the electrical generation module. In this event, it is assumed that 
the walls of the module are that of H60 rating due to the hydrocarbon inventories 
located adjacent to the electrical generation module. The H60 rating ensures the wall 
can maintain integrity for 60 minutes and insulation for 30 minutes in the event of a 
jet fire. Hence a fire is unlikely affect an adjacent module. However, there is the 
possibility that an explosion has the potential to damage the H60 wall enough to then 
damage equipment in an adjacent area. The probability of the escalation to adjacent 
areas is based upon the likelihood of an explosion being of more than 1 bar 
overpressure (HSE, 2012).  
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The BN model for a potential fuel gas release is demonstrated by Figure 5-1. The 
graphical structure of the model is designed to keep the nodes that fall under the same 
group together and organised in a “top down” manner. The five root nodes and the 
inference node (node located within the square) are close together at the top. Then the 
categorised nodes are next in the top down sequence. The Inference node is the input 
connection from the BN outlined in Chapter 4, with the node outlined in grey representing 
the output node from the inference node. Continuing from the failures there is a potential 
Figure 5-1: BN model demonstrating the cause and effect of a potential fuel gas leak from a gas driven electrical 
generation system. 
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incident, which then leads to the barrier nodes. Pending the probability of success or 
failure of the barriers there is potentially another incident (“Continuous Gas Release”). 
Following from the barriers there are further incidents, accidents and consequence nodes 
which are systematically introduced. One node does remain slightly anomalous from this 
organisation. The “ignition Source” node is grouped along with the incidents, accidents 
and consequences as it directly affect one of the incidents. 
Furthermore, there are certain parameters that have been excluded from the model. These 
parameters have been excluded to prevent the model from becoming overly complex. An 
example of one such parameter is the level ventilation in the offshore module and the 
subsequent gas dispersion. This issue of ventilation and dispersion would bring in further 
parameters such as: automated ventilation systems, i.e. HVAC (Heating Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning) and natural ventilation and dispersion, i.e. varying types of weather 
(i.e., wind, rain). As well as the time taken for the gas to disperse which is dependent on 
the volume of gas released.  
These parameters would allow the model to be much more intricate and complete. 
However, there are many specific parameters that are time based or rely on further 
specific parameters which exponentially increases the complexity of the model. This in 
turn can hinder the accuracy of the model due to the large amount of subjective data 
required. Hence, the initial parameters selected for the BN and the analysis are all internal 
failures within the gas turbine that can be measured accurately in terms of their reliability 
and integrity. 
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5.4 Data for the Fuel Gas Release Model 
The BN model for fuel gas release has been kept as simple as possible while still 
maintaining a coherent, accurate and logical pathway from the initial root nodes to the 
final consequences. This level of complexity has allowed CPTs to be manageable when 
it comes to gathering data. While the majority of the connections in the model are simple 
converging and diverging connections, consisting mostly of two arc connections in each 
connection type, there are two node which are the result of triple converging connections. 
In terms of the size of the CPTs, this is not a huge issue. However, due to the subject of 
these nodes (“Control System Failure” and “Physical/Structural Failures”) there is little 
to no hard data available to complete their CPTs. It is possible to compile data for the rest 
of the nodes based upon current literature, databases (primarily for the root nodes) and 
actual risk assessment project data.  
As it is not possible to utilise hard data sources to complete the CPTs of nodes 6 and 7 
while still maintaining a high degree of accuracy, other techniques must be used. In this 
case a variation of the Symmetric Method (outlined in Chapter 3 and demonstrated in 
Chapter 4) shall be applied to the CPTs of nodes 6 and 7. 
5.4.1 Establishing the Conditional Probabilities 
When constructing a BN the prior probabilities are required to be assigned locally to the 
probability link, P(Parent(Ai)) → P(Child(Bi)), as a conditional probability, P(Bi|Ai). 
Where i is the number of possible states of the parent node and the child node. However, 
it is not always a straightforward process to obtain the relevant data. In principle, the 
majority of the data can be acquired through failure databases or experimentation. 
However, designing and conducting experiments can prove difficult and historical data 
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does not always satisfy the scope of certain nodes and CPTs within a BN. Therefore, in 
practice, it is necessary to rely on subjective probabilities provided by expert judgement 
as an expression of an individual’s degree of belief. However, since subjective 
probabilities are based on informed guesses, it is possible for deviation to occur when the 
data is expressed as precise numbers.  
It can be seen in Chapter 4 that a fully subjective approach has been applied to construct 
certain CPTs in the BN. This involved experts providing their judgement through a 
Pairwise Comparison (PC) method. The data from the PC is further analysed using AHP 
and relative importance weights were determined from this for each parent node in 
question. These weights are then applied to an algorithm that allows a large child CPT to 
be constructed cell by cell. This method of compiling data for large CPTs proved simple 
to implement and produced accurate results for the BN. However, it was found that a time 
consuming part was the gathering of data from experts through PC in questionnaires.  
As the process of creating PC questionnaires, distributing them and waiting for feedback 
can be time consuming, this process to be amended by utilising hard data from risk 
assessment experimentation and historical data. This entails utilising hard data from the 
parent nodes and sections of the child node CPT to create relative weights for the parent 
nodes and apply those to the symmetric method algorithm.  
5.4.2 Symmetric Method utilising hard data 
The symmetric method (outlined in Chapter 3 and demonstrated in Chapter 4) provides 
an input algorithm which consists of a set of relative weights that quantify the relative 
strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes on the child-node, and a set of probability 
distributions the number of which grows only linearly, as opposed to exponentially, with 
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the number of associated parent-nodes. Yet the most common method of gathering the 
required data for the algorithm is to use expert judgements. This method has been applied 
in Chapter 4. However, it is also possible to utilise the symmetric method with historic 
data and experimentation. This method is outlined in Chapter 3, specifically Section 3.6.2. 
While it is very difficult or not possible to complete a large CPT in a BN using hard data, 
it is possible to obtain key conditional probabilities for a node. For example, node 6, the 
chance node representing “Control System Failure”, has three parent nodes each with two 
states. This produces a parental distribution in the order of 23. While this does not seem a 
large CPT, the nature of the node’s scope limits the level of available data, and hence 
cannot be completed fully with hard data. However, it is possible to obtain key conditional 
probabilities and apply them to the symmetric method to complete the CPT. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 and Figure 5-2 demonstrate the situation in the BN of nodes 1, 2, 3 & 6 (see 
Figure 5-1) with the notation A, B, C & D respectively. While it is not possible to 
accurately obtain P(D|A, B, C) or even P(D|A, B) through historical or experimental data. 
It is possible to obtain the conditional probability of event Z given the individual parents. 
A C 
D 
B 
Figure 5-2: Sample BN representing 3 parents and 1 child 
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i.e.; P(D|A), P(D|B) and P(D|C).  These conditional probabilities can be used to develop 
normalised weights for the parent nodes. 
5.4.2.1 Demonstration of Symmetric Method utilising hard data 
To outline the symmetric method using hard data, let us consider part of the fuel gas 
release BN model consisting of nodes 1, 2, 3 & 6 (see Figure 5-1) as shown in Figure 5-3.  
 
Also for ease of explanation, the notation applied in Figure 3-9 shall be applied to the 
section of the BN in Figure 5-3, as shown by Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Notation for nodes in Figure 3-2 
Parent Nodes shown in Figure 3-2 Notation 
Exceed System Capability A 
Operational Error B 
System Defects C 
Control System Failure D 
 
In this example, node D has 23 different parental configurations, as there are three parents 
with two states each (Yes and No). Hence the CPT will consist of 23 probability 
Figure 5-3: Small section of the Fuel Gas Release BN 
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distributions. The scale and scope of the CPT and node provides considerable difficulty 
when attempting to gather data to complete the CPT. Even if one were to utilise expert 
judgements to complete the CPT, it would demand a considerable amount of intensive 
effort on the part of the expert. An additional issue is that the CPT grows exponentially 
given the number of parents and states. A CPT quantifying the dependency on n parents 
would demand 2n distributions in order to be functional. It is this exponential growth with 
the number of parents that constitutes the essential problem. This symmetry method 
simplifies the problem of exponentially large CPTs.  
Calculating the relative weights 
As mentioned previously, in the symmetric model the individual local conditional 
probabilities of the parent to child can be distributed by relative importance for the 
associated child node, i.e. the normalised weight.  
In order to demonstrate the calculation of relative weights, for parent nodes A, B and C, 
in the network shown in Figure 5-3 shall be used as an example. Table 5-2 shows the 
local conditional probabilities for the child node “Control System Failure” given each 
individual child node. The notation outlined in Table 5-1 is also applied for simplicity. 
Table 5-2: Individual conditional probabilities for Control System failure 
Control 
System 
Failure 
Exceed System 
Capability 
Operational 
Error 
System Defects Sum  
D A B C  
  Yes Yes Yes   
Yes 0.0584 0.0610 0.1330 0.2524 
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The information presented in Table 5-2 can be represented as follows: 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.0584 = 𝑃(𝑋𝐴) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐵 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.0610 = 𝑃(𝑋𝐵) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐶 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.1330 = 𝑃(𝑋𝐶) 
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
𝑛
𝑛=𝐴
= 0.2524 
Hence, with the individual conditional probabilities, the relative weights of the parent 
nodes can be calculated utilising Equation 3-16. 
𝑃(?̂?𝐴) =
𝑃(𝑋𝐴)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
𝑛
𝑛=𝐴
=
0.0584
0.2524
= 0.2314 = 𝑤1 
𝑃(?̂?𝐵) =
𝑃(𝑋𝐵)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
𝑛
𝑛=𝐴
=
0.0610
0.2524
= 0.2417 = 𝑤2 
𝑃(?̂?𝐶) =
𝑃(𝑋𝐶)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
𝑛
𝑛=𝐴
=
0.1330
0.2524
= 0.5269 = 𝑤3 
Following from this, Equation 3-17 shows that the summation of the relative weights 
should be equal to 1, as follows: 
∑ 𝑤𝑛 =
𝑛
𝑛=1
𝑤1 + 𝑤2 + 𝑤3 = 0.2314 + 0.2417 + 0.5269 = 1 
As the relative weights for parent nodes A, B and C have been calculated and assigned 
accordingly, they can be applied to the weighted sum algorithm. Along with the linear 
compatible parental configuration to produce complete the CPT. 
The Weighted Sum Algorithm 
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It is possible to apply the weighted sum algorithm as the following information has been 
identified: 
iii) The relative weights of the parent nodes w1 , ... , wn , and, 
iv) The k1+ ... +kn probability distributions over event “D”, of the linear type, for 
compatible parental configurations. 
Given the information provided Equation 3-20 is used to produce an estimate, based 
information from historical data sources, of the k1 × ... × kn distribution for child node “D” 
(Das, 2008). 
 𝑃(𝑥𝑙| 𝑦1
𝑆1 ,  𝑦2
𝑆2 ,  … ,  𝑦𝑛
𝑆𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 𝑃 (𝑥
𝑙  | {𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑌𝑗 =  𝑦𝑗
𝑆𝑗)})      (3-20)               
where: l = 0, 1, ..., m and Sj = 1, 2, ..., kj. 
This weighted sum algorithm is applied to the distribution over child node “D” for 
compatible parental configurations. Table 5-3 demonstrates the compatible distributions 
over child node “D” (“Control System Failure”), with data obtained from historical 
databases and offshore risk assessment projects. 
Table 5-3: Distribution over D for compatible parental configurations {Comp(A = s)} 
Probability Distribution over “D” s = Yes s = No 
P(D = Yes|{Comp(A = s)})  0.936 0.064 
P(D = No|{Comp(A = s)}) 0.064 0.936 
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In addition, Table 5-4 shows the relative weights for the parents of event “D”, which 
were obtained from Equations 3-4 and 3-5 as well as historical data and risk assessment 
projects. 
Table 5-4: Relative weight for the parent nodes of child node "D" (Control System failure) 
Parent Node Weighting Notation Relative Weights 
Exceed System Capability (A) W1 0.2314 
Operational Error (B) W2 0.2417 
System Defects (C) W3 0.5269 
 Total 1.00 
 
Utilising the data shown in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4, it is possible to calculate all of the 
23 parental distributions required to populate the CPT for event “D”. Consider an example 
to demonstrate the algorithm for a specific parental distribution, where P(D=“Yes”) is 
required. One possible distribution is shown in Table 5-5. 
 
 
Table 5-5: Possible parental distribution for parents of child "D" 
Parent Node State: Yes or No 
Exceed System Capability (A) Yes 
Operational Error (B) No 
System Defects (C) Yes 
 
Given the states of the parents in Table 5-5, the distribution over “D” is to be: 
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𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)    (5-1) 
Once all of the relevant data is known, according to Equation 5-1, the following 
computation is required: 
𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 𝑤1. 𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)}) +  
𝑤2. 𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜)}) + 𝑤3. 𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |{𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)})                     (5-2) 
From Equation 5-2 it can be deduced that for the parental configuration shown in Table 
5-5, when the correct compatible probabilities and weights are substituted in, the 
probability of event “D” being in the state “Yes” is to be: 
𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 0.725                         (5-3) 
Subsequently, the complement of Equation 5-3 is to be: 
𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 
1 − 𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 0.275      (5-4) 
The relative weight algorithm is applied to all cells within the relevant CPT table to obtain 
the full conditional probability distribution. This process was completed using the 
formula function in Microsoft Excel, which also saves time for calculations. The 
completed CPTs for the Fuel Gas Release model in Figure 5-1 can be found in Appendix 
I. 
Continuing on from the data acquisition and analysis process which consists of gathering 
data from historical failure databases, risk assessment projects and experiments as well 
as utilising the symmetric method to complete larger CPTs. It is possible to complete the 
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BN by completing the CPTs and ascertaining the marginal probabilities for the nodes and 
conduct several test cases to validate the BN model. 
Table 5-6 summarises the origins of the data for each node in the initial BN model. There 
were several sources of literature. For example, node 10 was determined from historical 
data sources, such as (OREDA 2002) and the HSE databases. Whilst, in comparison, data 
for node 17 is from (Atkins, 2008), (RMRI Plc. 2009) and (Lloyd's Register, 2008). Table 
5-6 also contains the number of states for each node and the number of permutations to 
demonstrate an idea of how data had to be broken down before being inserted into the 
corresponding CPT. Similarly, Figure 5-4 shows the marginal probabilities for each node 
in the BN.  
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Table 5-6: Details of each nodes CPT and their data sources. 
Node Node Name States Parents 
Permutations in 
probability table 
Data Sources 
Transfer node from Initial BN 
0 
Fuel Gas Feed 
Impact 
2 1 4 Literature 
Initial Events/Roots 
1 
Exceed System 
Capability 
2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
2 Operational Error 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
3 System Defects 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
4 
Structural Support 
Failure 
2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
5 Corrosion 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
14 Ignition Source 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
Categorized Initial Events 
6 
Control System 
Failure 
2 3 16 
Literature with subjective 
analysis 
7 
Physical/Structural 
Failures 
2 3 16 
Literature with subjective 
analysis 
Barriers 
9 Gas Detection 2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
10 TCS Shut Off Fuel 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
11 
F&G System Shut 
Off Fuel 
2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
13 Fuel Supply Off 2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
Incidents/Accidents 
8 Fuel Gas Release 2 2 8 Literature (HD2) 
12 
Continuous Gas 
Release 
2 2 8 Literature (HD2) 
15 
Immediate/Delayed 
ignition 
3 2 12 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
16 Fire 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
17 Explosion 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
Consequences 
18 Consequences 3 2 18 Literature (HD2) 
19 
Damage due to Fire 
& Explosion 
2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
20 
Damage to 
Adjacent areas 
2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
1DB: Data has been utilised form Failure Databases, such as OREDA and OGP. 
2HD: Data has been utilised from Historical Data in literature, such as: Journals, and HSE reports,. 
3RA: Data has been utilised from Risk Assessment projects conducted by RMRI Plc., Petrofac, Maersk, 
and Lloyd’s Register. 
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5.5 Fuel Gas Release Model Test Cases and Sensitivity 
Analysis 
As demonstrated in Appendices F and G, case studies are important for showing how 
research can be put into practice. The Fuel Gas Release model is now used to analyse a 
series of possible real-world scenarios. All variables from external BNs, i.e. the transfer 
node “Fuel Gas Feed Impact”, are to remain unchanged and only those directly linked to 
the study for Fuel Gas Release shall be altered using the Hugin software. The Hugin 
software allows for evidence to be inserted to all nodes within the network in its “Run 
Figure 5-4: Marginal probabilities for each node within the Fuel Gas Release BN 
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Mode” function. This evidence is to the degree of 100% in a given state of a node. It is 
the posterior probabilities that are of interest and are computed given particular evidence 
of specific nodes. 
The focus of the Fuel Gas Release model is on the effects of the initial failures on the 
likelihood of a gas release. As well as the possible performance of the barriers designed 
to mitigate against the escalation of a release to further, more severe incidents. 
Furthermore, the model analysis shall demonstrate the probability of possible 
consequences that may arise given that these barriers do not perform their required 
function. As well as the potential further escalation given other external factors, such as 
the presence of an ignition source. The model also allows for the comparison of combined 
effects of various, simultaneous failures and their combined effect on the probability of 
events. There are a number of test cases which shall demonstrate the effects of different 
scenarios on the potential of a gas release and the possibility of fire and/or explosions. 
Similarly, to add to the validation of the model through these test cases, the effect of 
initially observing a consequence, such as: a leak or an ignition, is demonstrated through 
the change in the probability of the prior nodes. This is a potential route to identifying the 
main unknown cause of a consequence.  
It is important to note that before any evidence is inserted into the model, the probability 
of a there being a “Continuous Release” and the sate “Y-Leak” in the “Consequence” 
node are quite high. This is because they are directly affected by the “Gas Detection” 
node. Before evidence is inserted, the “Gas Detection” node shows a low probability of 
detection, and hence the model assumes a higher probability of a release. It can be seen 
in the test cases that once the probability of detection inadvertently increases because of 
the presence of fuel gas, the probability of a leak as a consequence reduces. The effects 
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of the detection system failing is demonstrated in the test cases to ascertain the severity 
of the probability changes to the potential consequences. 
The primary purpose of Test Case 1 is to demonstrate partial validation of the model by 
demonstrating the behaviour of the probabilities is akin to a real-world scenario. Test 
Case 2 shall demonstrate the effects, on the BN, of a barrier failure along with the 
presence of an ignition source. Furthermore, Test Case 3 shall demonstrate the effects on 
prior probabilities given evidence inserted in the consequence node. Finally, a sensitivity 
analysis shall provide further validation utilising the Parameter Sensitivity Wizard in the 
Hugin software. 
5.5.1 Test Case 1: Control System and Physical/Structural Failures 
This case study demonstrates the effects of individual and combined control system 
failures within the fuel gas release model. This case study is split into four test cases: 1A) 
is a demonstration of the effects of control system failures on the network, 1B) is a 
demonstration of the control system failures with the presence of an ignition source, 1C) 
is a demonstration of the effects of Physical/Structural failures on the network, and 1D) 
is a demonstration of the effects of Physical/Structural failures on the network with the 
presence of an ignition source. 
5.5.1.1 Test 1A: Control System Failures without Ignition 
In the context of the presented model, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas 
turbine due to the turbines control system, is mostly dependent on three key events; 
“Exceeding System Capability” (ESC), “Operational Error” (OE) and “System Defects” 
(SD). These events can occur either individually or in conjunction with each other. The 
effect on the likelihood of a gas release is demonstrated along with the effects on the fuel 
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shut off system. The consequences from these likelihoods is also demonstrated. In this 
case the likelihood of a continuous fuel release is analysed as well as the probability of 
the “Consequence” node being in states “Y-Leak” and “None”. It is not key to analyse 
the “Y-Ignition” state as this test does not include the possibility of an ignition source.  
The results are presented by means of a bar chart shown in Figure 5-5, which 
demonstrates the probability of gas release, fuel shut off, continuous release, the 
consequences and the effect on the overall control system failure, on the y-axis. The x-
axis shows which individual event is presumed to be occurring. From the results, it is 
evident that a major system defect would have the greatest effect on the probability of the 
gas release, as shown by the increase in probability from 57.85% without evidence, to 
69.5% when a potential system defect causes a failure. It can be seen that the effects of a 
Figure 5-5: Effects of the turbine control system failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", "Fuel Shut Off", 
"Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
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system defect in the control system produces the more significant changes in in the 
likelihood of there not being a consequence due to the increase in the probability in gas 
release. The key information to be taken is the significance in the change of posterior 
probability’s given the evidence inserted. This method provides a basic sensitivity 
analysis along with probability interpretation. Furthermore, the likelihood of 
consequences and continuous release decreases with the inserted evidence in control 
system failures as it is assumed in the model that the gas detection system has no reason 
to not function correctly at this stage. Therefore, the increase in the probability and level 
of gas release will increase the probability of gas detection and hence the probability that 
the fuel will be shut off. This is a scenario that would be expected in a real-world situation. 
 
  
Figure 5-6: Cumulative effects of the turbine control system failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", 
"Fuel Shut Off", "Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
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Figure 5-6 shows the cumulative effect of the control system failures. As with the 
individual failures, the cumulative failures demonstrates that when the gas detection 
system is assumed to function as normal, the likelihood of the fuel being shut off and 
there being no consequences increases. Adversely, the probability of there being a 
continuous release and a leak consequence decreases. 
5.5.1.2 Test 1B: Control System Failures with Ignition 
As stated in Test 1A, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine due to the 
turbines control system, is dependent on three key initial events; “Exceeding System 
Capability”, “Operational Error” and “System Defects”. Test 1A then demonstrated the 
effects of each failure on the BN model as both individual effects and the cumulative 
effects. This test expands upon the findings in Test 1A by again demonstrating the 
individual and cumulative effects of the control system failure, except in this test there is 
assumed to be an Ignition Source (IS) present. This will illustrate the effect the initial 
failures has on the accident and consequence nodes. The results are again presented in a 
bar chart (Figure 5-7) which shows the probability of gas detection, immediate or delayed 
ignition, explosion, fire, the potential damage incurred and the overall consequences on 
the y-axis. The x-axis shows the nodes where evidence has been input. The first column 
in the table in Figure 5-7 shows posterior probabilities of several nodes given that there 
are no control system failures but there is evidence of an IS.  
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From the graph, it can be seen that the probability of there being a gas release, given any 
of the initial failures, is the same as Test 1A despite there being an ignition source present. 
This provides some partial validation to the model as it indicates the nodes that should be 
independent from each other, such as: “Ignition Source” and “Gas Release”. Furthermore, 
as with test 1A, the initial event “System Defects” demonstrates the largest effects on the 
model. It can also be seen that the probability of gas detection increases proportionally to 
the probability of gas release. This affects the relationship between the probability of 
detection and the probability of accidents and consequence. For example, in the event that 
there is only an ignition source present the probability of there being either fire or an 
explosion increases from 0.0113% to 13.56% and 0.0187% to 22.51% respectively (for 
marginal probabilities refer to Figure 5-4). This shows how the significant the presence 
of an ignition source is to the probability of fire and explosion before any other evidence 
is inserted. Continually, when evidence is then inserted into the “System Defects” node, 
the posterior probabilities for fire and explosion decrease from 13.56% to 12.12% and 
Figure 5-7: Effects of Turbine Control System failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior probabilities of "Gas 
Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to Fire & Explosion" 
176 
  
22.51% to 20.12%. This is because the probability of the gas detection increases with the 
probability of the gas release, as it is assumed that the gas detectors function as expected. 
Furthermore, this in turn has an effect on the fuel gas shut off by increasing the probability 
that fuel gas will be shut off. Hence the probability that a fire or explosion will occur 
decreases. 
Figure 5-8 shows the cumulative effect of the control system failures while there is an 
assumed IS present. As with the individual failures, the cumulative failures demonstrate 
that when the gas detection system is assumed to function as normal, the likelihood of the 
fuel being shut off again decreases. It is also poignant to notice that given the presence of 
an ignition source, the probability that there will be fire or explosion significantly 
increases before any evidence is present for the initial failures. Adversely, the probability 
of there being a fire or explosion given evidence for the initial failures decreases. This is 
Figure 5-8: Cumulative effects of Turbine Control System failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior 
probabilities of "Gas Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to 
Fire & Explosion" 
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due to the probability of a gas release increasing, hence increasing the probability of the 
gas being detected, and further increasing the probability that the fuel gas will be shut off. 
5.5.1.3 Test 1C: Physical/Structural Failures without Ignition 
Test Cases 1C and 1D are similar to the previous cases, 1A and 1B, in that they 
demonstrate the effects of initial failures on the BN model both with and without an 
ignition source present. However, tests 1C and 1D are concerned with the effects that 
Physical and Structural failures potentially have on the BN model. It is important to 
specify that the analysis in the Hugin BN software is applied to only discrete chance nodes 
and therefore the inference node “Fuel Gas Feed Impact” is not included in the analysis. 
Figure 5-9 shows the effects of the individual initial events, “Structural Support Failure” 
(SSF) and “Corrosion” (Cor.), on the posterior probabilities of gas release, fuel shut off, 
continuous release, the consequences (states “Y-leak” and “None”) and the effect on the 
Figure 5-9: Effects of the physical and structural failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", "Fuel Shut 
Off", "Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
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overall physical failure, on the y-axis. The x-axis shows the individual event which is 
assumed to be occurring.  
From the graph in Figure 5-9 it can be seen that of the two events, represented as chance 
nodes, corrosion demonstrates the largest effect on a potential fuel gas release. It is 
evident that a failure caused by corrosion would have the greatest effect on the probability 
of the gas release, as shown by the increase in probability from 57.85% without evidence, 
to 70.01% when corrosion potentially causes a failure. Similarly, a failure caused by 
corrosion also produces the largest percentage change in the likelihood that a consequence 
will not occur. The effects that a failure due to corrosion has on the posterior probabilities 
in the model also represents the largest percentage change out of the five initial events.  
As with the previous test cases, the probability of there being a leak consequence and 
continuous gas release decreases with the insertion of evidence at the root nodes, due to 
Figure 5-10: Cumulative effects of the physical and structural failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas 
Release", "Fuel Shut Off", "Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
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the probability of a release being detected given an increase in the probability that a 
release will occur. Furthermore, as with Test Case 1A the key information be taken is the 
significance in the change of posterior probability’s given the evidence inserted. This 
method provides a basic sensitivity analysis along with probability interpretation, as well 
as partial validation to the BN model. 
Figure 5-10 shows the cumulative effect of the physical and structural failures. As with 
the individual failures, the cumulative failures demonstrate that when the gas detection 
system is assumed to function as normal, the likelihood of the fuel being shut off and the 
probability of there being no consequences increases. Alternatively, the probability of 
there being a continuous release and a leak consequence decreases. 
5.5.1.4 Test 1D: Physical/Structural Failures with Ignition 
As stated in Test 1C, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine due to the 
physical and structural failures, is dependent on key initial events; “Structural Support 
Failures”, and “Corrosion”. Test 1C then demonstrated the effects of each failure on the 
BN model as both individual effects and the cumulative effects. This test expands upon 
the findings in Test 1C by again demonstrating the individual and cumulative effects of 
the physical and structural failures, except in this test there is assumed to be an IS present. 
This will illustrate the effect the initial failures has on the accident and consequence nodes. 
The results are again presented in a bar chart as shown in Figure 5-11 which shows the 
probability of gas detection, immediate or delayed ignition, explosion, fire, the potential 
damage incurred and the overall consequences on the y-axis. The x-axis shows the nodes 
where evidence has been input. The first column in the table in Figure 5-11 shows the 
probability of there being no evidence inserted in the control system nodes but does 
indicate that there is an ignition source. 
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From the graph it can be seen that the probability of there being a gas release, given any 
of the initial failures, is the same as Test Case 1C despite there being an ignition source 
present. This again provides some partial validation to the model as it indicates the nodes 
that should be independent from each other, such as: “Ignition Source” and “Gas Release”. 
This has previously been demonstrated in Test Case 1B. Furthermore, as with Test Case 
1C, the initial event “Corrosion” demonstrates the largest effects on the model. It can also 
be seen, as with Test 1B, that the probability of gas detection increases proportionally to 
the probability of gas release. This affects the relationship between the probability of 
detection and the probability of accidents and consequence. For example, in the event that 
there is only an ignition source present the probability of there being either fire or an 
explosion increases from 0.0113% to 13.56% and 0.0187% to 22.51% respectively (for 
marginal probabilities refer to Figure 5-4). It is important to note that this percentage 
Figure 5-11: Effects of Physical and Structural failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior probabilities of 
"Gas Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to Fire & 
Explosion" 
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increase is identical to the increase demonstrated in Test Cases 1C when only an ignition 
source is present. Continually, when evidence is then inserted into the “Corrosion” node, 
the posterior probabilities for fire and explosion decrease from 13.56% to 12.06% and 
22.51% to 20.01%. This is because the probability of the gas detection increases with the 
probability of the gas release, as it is assumed that the gas detectors function as expected. 
Furthermore, this in turn has an effect on the fuel gas shut off by increasing the probability 
that fuel gas will be shut off. Hence the probability that a fire or explosion will occur 
decreases. The percentages changes demonstrated in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11 show 
that the event “Corrosion” has the greatest effect on posterior probabilities in the BN 
model of all of the initial events. 
Figure 5-12 shows the cumulative effect of the physical and structural failures while there 
is an assumed ignition source present. As with the previous Test Cases, the cumulative 
failures demonstrate that when the gas detection system is assumed to function as normal, 
Figure 5-12: Cumulative effects of Turbine Control System failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior 
probabilities of "Gas Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage 
due to “Fire & Explosion" 
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the likelihood of the fuel being shut off again decreases. Adversely, the probability of 
there being a fire or explosion given evidence for the initial failures decreases.  
Test Cases 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D demonstrate the cause and effect relationship that the five 
initial events have on the posterior probabilities in the BN model. The sixth root node, 
“ignition Source”, is also applied to the analysis to demonstrate the combined effects of 
the initial events with an ignition source present. This established some partial validation 
to the model as the posterior probabilities are increased and decreased as one would 
expect given evidence inserted at the root nodes. One key element demonstrated in the 
four test cases is that of the relationship between gas release and gas detection. As the 
probability of there being gas released increases, the probability of gas detection 
proportionally increases. This is because in a real scenario, it is assumed that when gas is 
present in the offshore module, the gas detectors would sense it and hence the gas would 
be shut off, either by the Turbine Control System (TCS) or the Fire & Gas system (F&G). 
This, as demonstrated by the Test Cases, decreases the probability of and accident or 
sever consequences. However, it is important to demonstrate the effects a dysfunctional 
barrier, such as the gas detection system, has on the posterior probabilities of the BN 
model. Test Case 2 outlines this type of scenario. 
5.5.2 Test Case 2: Gas Release and No Detection with and without an 
Ignition Source 
This case study demonstrates the effects of the probability of a gas release being 100% 
“Yes” on the BN model. Along with the gas release, the effect of the gas detection not 
functioning, i.e. Gas Detection being 100% “No” will also be analysed. Therefore, this 
case study is split into two test cases: 2A) is a demonstration of the effects of a gas release 
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and no gas detection without an ignition source, 2B) is a demonstration of the effects of 
no gas detection combined with an ignition source being present. 
5.5.2.1 Test 2A: Gas Release, no Gas Detection, no Ignition Source 
In the context of the presented model, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas 
turbine due to the turbines control system, is dependent on five key events; “Exceeding 
System Capability”, “Operational Error”, “System Defects”, “Structural Support Failure” 
and “Corrosion”. As demonstrated in Test Case 1 these events can occur either 
individually or in conjunction with each other. In test 2A is assumed that one or more of 
these events have occurred and a Gas Release (GR) is observed. In this case the likelihood 
of a continuous fuel release is analysed as well as the probability of the “Consequence” 
node being in states “Y-Leak” and “None”. It is not key to analyse the “Y-Ignition” state 
as this test does not include the possibility of an ignition source. The analysis is presented 
in Figure 5-13.  
Figure 5-13: Effects of “Gas Release” being “Yes=100%” and “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” on “Consequences”, 
“Continuous Gas Release”, “Fuel Shut Off” (TCS, F&G and Fuel Off) and “Gas Detection” 
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From the graph in Figure 5-13 it can be seen that when there is 100% chance of a fuel gas 
release, the probability of gas detection increases from 43.4% to 74.87%. This is due to 
the assumption that the gas detection system functions as expected, i.e. in the event of a 
gas release it is assumed, with some confidence, that the gas detection system will detect 
the gas in the atmosphere and the fuel will be shut off. This is also demonstrated by the 
posterior probability of the three fuel shut off nodes: “TCS”, “F&G” and “Fuel Shut Off”. 
Given a 100% probability of a gas release and hence a 74.87% probability of gas detection, 
the posterior probabilities of the fuel being shut off is as follows: i) TCS shuts off fuel 
increases from 27.76% to 47.47%, ii) F&G system shuts off fuel increases from 20.37% 
to 34.7%, and iii) the probability that the fuel will be shut off by either or both systems 
increases from 35.37% to 60.19%. Similarly, the posterior probabilities of a continuous 
release and the consequence of a severe leak decrease from 58.81% to 29.26% and 
64.56% to 39.78% respectively. This shows that the BN model can represent the 
behaviour of safety barriers in the event of a fuel gas leak. Furthermore, while the 
posterior probabilities of a consequence and continuous release still seem substantial, it 
is the significance of the change in probability that is of importance. These significant 
changes demonstrate that the barriers have a large effect on the mitigating of accidents 
and consequences regarding offshore systems. However, the importance of these barriers 
can also be demonstrated by assuming that they do not function or are simply not present. 
From the graph in Figure 5-13 it can be seen that the right most column shows the 
posterior probabilities given that the Gas Detection (GD) has a 100% of failing or not 
functioning. The graph and data table show that in the event that there is a gas release and 
the gas detectors do not function then there is a very high probability of there being a gas 
leak as a consequence as well as a continuous leak from the system. The continuous leak 
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would occur because the fuel shut off systems would not react to the gas detection. This 
effect can be seen in the posterior probabilities of the fuel shut off systems. In the event 
that gas detection is in state “No=100%” then the probability that the fuel will be shut off 
by either the TCS or the F&G system are as follows; i) the probability that the TCS shuts 
off the fuel decreases from 27.76% to 0.58%, ii) the probability that the F&G system 
shuts off the fuel decreases from 20.37% to 0.61%, and iii) the probability that the fuel 
will be shut off by either or both systems decreases from 35.37% to 1.18%. This illustrates 
the dependency that the fuel shut off systems have on the operational of the gas detection 
system. Furthermore, given a gas release and no gas detection, it can be seen that the 
probability of a continuous gas release increases from 58.81% to 99.57%, and the 
probability of a gas leak as a consequence increases from 64.56% to 98.74%. These 
significance of these percentage increases in the posterior probabilities indicates that the 
gas detection system is a vital barrier in the mitigation of accidents resulting from fuel 
gas releases.  
However, this analysis considerers only the repercussions of a fuel gas release without 
the possibility of an ignition source being present. In the event that there is a gas release 
and the gas detection system fails to operate as required, the fuel has a high probability 
to continue to be released and accumulate in the offshore module. This poses a huge issue 
should the gas release not be discovered by means other than the gas detection system. In 
the event that an ignition source is present, there is potential to cause a fire or an explosion. 
It is understood that should the gas be allowed to continuously release and accumulate, 
there is an ever increasing probability that an explosion will occur. Hence, it is vital that 
this scenario be analysed to show the potential, significant alterations to the probabilities 
186 
  
that accidents and severe consequences will occur. Test Case 2B shall analyse the effects 
of an ignition source given that a fuel gas release is not detected. 
5.5.2.2 Test 2B: Gas Release, no Gas Detection, with an Ignition Source  
As demonstrated in Test Case 2A, it is assumed that one or more events has led to a gas 
release being observed. In this case the likelihood of a continuous fuel release was 
analysed as well as the probability of the “Consequence” node being in states “Y-Leak” 
and “None”. However in this Test Case, the emphasis shall be on a gas release not being 
detected and the effects that an ignition source has on the posterior probabilities of several 
nodes. The nodes in question are; “Consequences” (States “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), 
“Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), “Explosion”, “Fire”, 
“Damage due to Fire & Explosion” and “Explosion Damage to Adjacent Areas”. The 
effects of the analysis are to be analysed both as individual occurrences and a cumulative 
Figure 5-14: Effects of “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” and “Ignition Source” being “Yes=100%” on “Consequences” 
(States “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), “Explosion”, 
“Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & Explosion” and “Explosion Damage to Adjacent Areas” 
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occurrence. Figure 5-14 shows the individual effects of an undetected gas leak (NGD) 
and the presence of an IS.  
The emphasis in this analysis is on the more severe accidents and consequences in terms 
of fire, explosion and the damage that they can cause. From the graph in Figure 5-14 it 
can be seen that in the event of a 100% failure of the gas detection system, the probability 
of there being any accidents or consequences related to ignition remain virtually 
negligible. It can been seen that the probability of there being a gas leak as a consequence, 
however, increases from 64.56% to 98.74%. This first stage of the test demonstrates that 
the ignition related accidents and consequences have a very unlikely occurrence 
probability, according to the BN model, unless there are both a fuel source and an ignition 
source present.  
The second column in Figure 5-14 demonstrates the effects on the fire & explosion 
consequences given only an ignition source present, assuming that the probability of a 
gas release is at the marginal probability of 57.85%. The purpose of this is to show how 
sensitive the fire & explosion consequences are given an ignition source and a likely 
chance of a gas release. It can be seen that the posterior probabilities increase drastically 
when an ignition source is present. The probability that there will be a delayed ignition 
demonstrates the largest percentage change to the posterior probability as it increases 
from 0.03% to 44.67%, with the probability of an immediate ignition increasing from 
0.02% to 23.13%. Furthermore, the second largest percentage change to the posterior 
probabilities is the likelihood of there being ignition as a consequence, as it increases 
from 0.02% to 44.88%. Figure 5-14 also shows that the probability of there being only a 
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gas leak as a consequence decreases from 64.56% to 9.29% due to the increase probability 
of there being an immediate or delayed ignition.  
The second stage of Test Case 2B is to demonstrate the cumulative effects of the fuel gas 
not being detected and the presence of an ignition source, as shown by Figure 5-15. It can 
be seen that the second column in Figure 5-15 that the probabilities are only the posterior 
probabilities given no gas detection. This is the same as Figure 5-14 to demonstrate the 
percentage changes when an ignition source is also present. The third column shows the 
cumulative effects of a failed gas detector and an ignition source. The posterior 
probabilities display a very similar pattern to the posterior probabilities when there is only 
an ignition source present as shown in Figure 5-14. However, in this case (the cumulative 
effects) the posterior probabilities are much greater, i.e. the probability of there being an 
ignition as a consequence (“Y-Leak”) given an ignition source only is 29.34% when 
Figure 5-15: Cumulative effects of “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” and “Ignition Source” being “Yes=100%” on 
“Consequences” (States “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), 
“Explosion”, “Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & Explosion” 
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compared to the cumulative effects of NGD + IS which increases the probability to 
44.88%. This shows large percentage increases in the probabilities of potential ignition 
accidents and consequences. Furthermore, it is important to state that even though there 
is a gas detection failure and an ignition source present, the probability of there being an 
ignition accident or consequence is not 100%. This is because the relationships between 
the nodes in the BN takes into account the fact that for an ignition to occur there must be 
an ideal air to fuel mixture. This ideal mixture is approximately 5 – 15% of fuel in the air 
(HSE, 2008b). The data for the CPTs in the BN was analysed to accommodate for the 
ideal mixture variable. 
5.5.3 Test Case 3: Effects of Observed Consequences on Prior 
Probabilities 
In order to provide further verification of the BN model it is important to demonstrate the 
effects of inserting evidence as a consequence and observing the effects on prior nodes. 
The focus node in this test case is the “Consequence” node, with attention being focused 
on inserting 100% evidence to states “Y-Leak” and “Y-Ignition”. The effects of 100% “Y-
Leak” focuses on the changes in the probabilities of the gas release barriers and 
continuous release. Whereas, 100% “Y-Ignition” focuses on the probability changes of 
the ignition, fire and explosion accident and consequence nodes. The “Y-Ignition” 
analysis does not focus on the barriers as the prior probabilities would be the same as the 
effects demonstrated by 100% “Y-Leak”.  
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Figure 5-16 demonstrates the effects of 100% “Y-Leak” on the prior probabilities of "Fuel 
Supply off", "TCS Fuel Shut off", "F&G Fuel Shut off", "Continuous Gas Release" and 
“Gas Detection". The graph shows that given 100% probability of “Y-Leak”, the prior 
probabilities concerned with the fuel shut off system nodes, all being State “Yes”, greatly 
decrease to almost zero. Similarly, the probability of the gas being detected also decreases. 
However, not to the extent of the fuel shut off systems. The probability of gas detection 
decreases from 43.4% to 13.44%. This shows that in the event of a gas leak the most 
likely barrier to fail would be the fuel shut off system. However, the barrier that displays 
the most significant change in probability is the gas detection system. Where the TCS and 
F&G show decreases of 27.66% and 20.35% respectively, the gas detection system 
demonstrates a total decrease of 29.96%. This indicates that while the fuel shut off system 
is the most likely barrier to fail in the event of a gas leak, the gas detection system 
demonstrates the most significant effect on a gas release. Finally, the probability of a 
continuous gas release increases 62.48% to 96.19%. This significant increase is to be 
Figure 5-16: Effects of 100% "Y-Leak" on the prior probabilities of "Fuel Supply off", "TCS Fuel Shut off", "F&G 
Fuel Shut off", "Continuous Gas Release" and “Gas Detection" 
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expected as there is a 100% probability of a leak. The probability of a continuous release 
is not 100% as there is 13.44% that the gas may be detected.  
Figure 5-17 shows the effects on the prior probabilities of “Ignition Source”, 
“Immediate/Delayed Ignition”, “Fire” and “Explosion” given 100% probability of the 
consequence state “Y-Ignition”. The graph in Figure 5-17 indicates that prior to a 100% 
consequence of ignition, the likelihood of any ignition, fire and explosion accidents or 
consequences are almost negligible. However, when evidence is inserted into the state 
“Y-Ignition” in the consequence node, the prior probabilities greatly increase. The most 
obvious increase is the probability of an ignition source being present, which increases to 
100%. This is due to an ignition source being required along with the fuel gas in order to 
have an ignition take place. Continually, the probability of there being and immediate or 
a delayed ignition increase from 0.019% and 0.027% to 78.82% and 21.18% respectively. 
The immediate ignition is determined to be the more likely source of the ignition 
consequence as the delayed ignition is more dependent on the ideal gas mixture variable. 
Figure 5-17: Effects of 100% "Y-Ignition" on the prior probabilities of “Ignition Source”, “Immediate/Delayed Ignition”, 
“Fire” and “Explosion” 
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This is also reflected on the probability of fire or explosion. As the probability of a 
delayed ignition is lower that of an immediate ignition, the probability of a fuel gas fire 
is greater than the probability of an explosion. The probability of there being a fire 
increases from 0.011% to 31.69% when compared to the increase from 0.019% to 14.8%. 
This shows that the accident type that contributes the most to the ignition consequence, 
given that there is a fuel gas ignition consequence, is a fuel gas fire.  
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is essentially a measure of how responsive or sensitive the 
output of the model is when subject to variations from its inputs. Having the 
understanding of how a model responds to changes in its parameters is important when 
trying to maximise its potential and ensuring correct use of the model. SA provides a 
degree of confidence that the BN model has been built correctly and is working as 
intended. In the context of this research, SA will be used as a demonstration to determine 
how responsive an event node is to variations in other nodes. Knowing the most 
influential nodes can assist in the experimentation and further expansion of the model. 
Similarly, nodes which have very little influence can be altered or discarded (Matellini, 
2012) (Loughney, et al., 2016).  
The SA conducted for the fuel gas release model focuses on the node “Consequences”, 
more specifically, its state “Y-Leak” and the nodes representing the barriers for fuel gas 
release. However, the analysis will be conducted using smaller increases and decreases 
in the probabilities of the parent nodes as opposed to inserting 100% occurrence 
probability into the input node CPTs, as demonstrates in Test Cases 1, 2 and 3.  
193 
  
A possible way of undertaking this is to manually insert evidence into the input nodes, 
one by one, and subsequently analyse the effect on the output node via its posterior 
probability. When doing this the input nodes are increased or decreased by equal 
percentages, individually. This allows for clear comparison of their impact upon the 
output node. However, this manual method was not applied to this analysis. Instead a 
parameter sensitivity wizard within the Hugin BN software was used. In this program 
wizard the input node is individually paired with the output node in its desired state. In 
this case that was “Consequence” in the state “Y-Leak”. A state for each of the input nodes 
was purposely selected. The input nodes for the SA are the barrier nodes; “Gas Detection”, 
“TCS Fuel Shut off”, “F&G System Fuel Shut off” and “Fuel Supply off”. All nodes are 
set to state “Yes” in the parameter sensitivity wizard, with the exception of “Fuel Supply 
off” as this node is the child of “TCS Fuel Shut off” and “F&G Fuel Shut off”. Therefore, 
this node has been set to states “Yes – TCS: Yes, F&G: No” and “Yes – TCS: No, F&G: 
Yes”. This allows for the sensitivity of this node to be determined given the output of its 
parent nodes. This method is also necessary as in the event both the parent nodes are in 
states “Yes” or “No”, the probability of “Fuel Supply off” is either 1 or 0 and therefore 
cannot be analysed in the sensitivity parameter wizard in the Hugin Software. Following 
this a sensitivity value from Hugin was obtained for each input node and using Microsoft 
Excel a graph was constructed to show the results.  
From the graph in Figure 5-18 it can be seen that the most influential factor on 
“Consequence: Y-Leak” is “Gas Detection”, whilst the least influential is “Fuel Supply 
off: TCS=No, F&G=Yes”. This concurs with the graph as “F&G System Shut off Fuel” 
has a smaller effect on the consequence that “TCS Shut off Fuel”. Continually, if the 
probability of “Gas Detection: State - Yes” increases by 10%, then the probability of 
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“Consequence: State – Y-Leak” decreases by 4.6%. Whereas, if the probability of “Fuel 
Supply off: State - TCS=No, F&G=Yes” increases by 10%, then the probability of 
“Consequence: State – Y-Leak” decreases by 0.8%. From the graph, it is also apparent 
that the sensitivity function is a straight line which further adds to the model validation. 
The sensitivity values computed within Hugin are shown in Table 5-7. 
It is important to state that the sensitivity values are negative as they have a negative 
effect on the focus node “consequence”. In other words, as the probability of gas detection, 
for example, increases, then the probability that there will be a gas leak decreases. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Sensitivity Functions for the Input Nodes for Event "Consequence" 
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Table 5-7: Sensitivity Values for the Input Nodes for Event "Consequence" 
Input Node Sensitivity Value 
F&G System Shut off Fuel -0.16 
TCS Shut off Fuel -0.23 
Fuel Supply off: “TCS=Yes, F&G=No” -0.15 
Fuel Supply off: “TCS=No, F&G=Yes” -0.08 
Gas Detection -0.46 
5.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a Bayesian Network model which demonstrates the cause and 
effect relationships that several initial failures can have on an offshore electrical 
generation system. In particular, the potential for a fuel gas release from the gas turbine 
which drives the electrical generation system. The research presented here expanded upon 
the work presented in Chapter 4, which illustrates the cause effect relationship of one 
component failure within an electrical generator and the general consequences that can 
result. The BN model presented in this research expands on this by incorporating part of 
the model in Chapter 4 along with several initial failures to analyse a specific consequence 
in further detail. This consequence concerns itself with a possible fuel gas release and the 
potential fire and explosion hazards that can occur. However, while it is easier to 
demonstrate the effects of accidents involving fire and explosion, it is not easy to 
demonstrate the consequences of a leak without an ignition source. These consequences 
are equally important for offshore platform operators due to the improved HSE 
regulations within Safety Cases regarding hazards to the environment in any instance. 
Therefore, in the event that there is a fuel gas leak without ignition, it poses a large issue 
for operators and duty holders given that the release is undetected. While it is not as severe 
as a hydrocarbon release into the sea, it is still vital as it is the ejection of natural gas into 
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the atmosphere which can have severe consequences depending on the weather conditions. 
The BN model also clearly demonstrates that it can provide an effective and applicable 
method of determining the likelihood of various events under uncertainty, and more 
importantly show increased uses as a dynamic risk assessment tool. Given the research 
presented it is now much clearer to see the advantages for Bayesian Networks and 
Bayesian Theory being applied to create dynamic risk assessment tools to work in 
conjunction with Safety Cases and in an Integrity Case. 
Continuing with the Fuel Gas Release model, three Test Cases were used to demonstrate 
the models validity and to demonstrate its effectiveness to provide clear cause and effect 
relationships between initial failures, mitigating barriers, accidents and consequences. 
Similarly, given the specific scenario of fuel gas release, it is clearly demonstrated in the 
test cases how severe the consequences can be given that the initial failures occur or the 
mitigating barriers do not function as intended. The first Test Cases (1A, 1B, 1C and 1D) 
were designed to demonstrate that the model functioned as expected and provided some 
partial validation before the conducting Test Cases 2 and 3. Test Case 1 focused on the 
initial failures and their impact on the potential and severity of a fuel gas release as well 
as the impact on the model with the presence of an ignition source. This established some 
partial validation to the model as the posterior probabilities are increased and decreased 
as one would expect given evidence inserted at the root nodes. A key element 
demonstrated in Test Case 1 is the vital relationship between a gas release and the 
probability of the release being detected. Test Case 2 expanded upon Test Case 1 by 
demonstrating the level of consequences that can occur, through probabilities, given that 
a specific barrier failed to operate. In this case the failed barrier was the gas detection 
system. The consequences of this were demonstrated with and without an ignition source 
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present. The effects on the BN showed that the gas detection system is vital in the 
mitigation of a fuel gas release and the fire and explosion consequences. This is due to 
the Fuel Shut off systems being linked to the detection system. If a gas release is not 
detected then the fuel system cannot shut the release off. Finally, Test Case 3 illustrated 
the effects of inserting evidence in the “Consequence” node and analysing the effects on 
the prior probabilities. It was concluded that in the event of a gas leak (100% state: “Y-
Leak”) the probability that either the TCS or the F&G system would shut off the fuel was 
negligible. However, the probability of the gas not being detected showed the most 
significant change in probability. Furthermore, given that the probability of “Y-Ignition” 
is 100%, it was determined that the most significant type of ignition was “immediate” and 
hence a fire was the most likely cause. 
In relation to the validation of the model a sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine 
how responsive the output of the model is to various modifications in the inputs and 
subsequently validate that the model works as expected. This exercise is vital as it 
provides an indication to what the most important variables. In addition, inputs can be 
ranked or weighted in terms of their importance upon the output or final consequences. 
For example, in the Fuel Gas Release model, “Gas Detection” had a much larger effect 
on the possibility of “Consequence: Y-Leak”. The more advantageous element of 
conducting SA in BNs is that they take into consideration the chain of events below the 
input node leading to the output node, which presents a closer approximation to reality 
(Loughney, et al., 2016). 
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6 CHAPTER 6:  
DECISION MAKING ANALYSIS FOR OFFSHORE 
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK DESIGN 
Summary 
In this chapter, the development of a WSN for an offshore system is presented. The system 
in question is the electrical generation units. The intention is to design the structure of a 
number of WSNs within the electrical generation system with varying connection types 
and methods of relaying data. The research is concerned only with the design of the WSNs, 
i.e. the hardware and orientation of the sensor nodes and not the software, programming 
or data protection. This should provide a good base, once an ideal WSN design is 
determined, to expand the network further incorporating more attributes and develop the 
necessary software to complete the WSN. Sensitivity Analysis and validation are provided 
for the analysis. 
6.1 Wireless Sensor Network Designs  
6.1.1 WSN Design Outline 
The problem considers a region of an offshore platform to be covered by wireless sensor 
nodes. The number of sensors is determined by the requirements of the application. 
Typically, each sensor node has a sensing radius and it is required that the sensor provides 
coverage of the specified region with a high probability. The sensing and transmitting 
radius of the node depends on the phenomenon that is being sensed as well as the sensing 
hardware of the node. Hence, in general, the number of sensor nodes is dictated by the 
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application. In this research, the application is known and so the problem of where to 
deploy the sensor nodes is an easy one to solve. The application here is the integrity of 
the electrical generation equipment on board an offshore platform. More specifically the 
Thistle Alpha Platform located in the North Sea. The WSNs to be proposed will focus on 
the key areas where integrity of the electrical generation equipment must be maintained. 
These key areas are outlined by Meggitt: Gas Turbine Sensing and Monitoring.  
In order to first develop the WSNs topology, one must know the domain in which the 
sensors will be deployed. In this problem, the sensors will be distributed within the 
electrical generators located within the electrical generation module of the Thistle Alpha 
platform. There are a number of steps involved in the generation of the domain. 
1. Domain – The domain must first be established in order to definitively and 
accurately place the sensor nodes. 
2. Dimensions – The dimensions of the domain must be specified in order to 
determine the size of the sensor field, as well as to determine the worst-case 
battery life and in the case of multi-hop connectivity, determine the average size 
of each nodes transmitting radius. 
3. Sensor placement – Once the dimensions of the domain are known the sensor 
nodes can theoretically be placed to begin forming the network. The nodes are 
placed based upon the phenomenon that they are going to be detecting.  
4. Data Transmission – Once the sensors nodes have been appropriately placed, a 
decision is made as to whether the network should be single-hop or multi-hop 
based upon a given set of criteria.  
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The WSN designs proposed in this research are only part of the initial stages of 
developing the Asset Integrity Case or NUI-Installations. The WSNs are not to be 
considered as complete models for real-time application at this moment in time. 
6.1.2 Establishing the Domain and Dimensions 
The domain has already been identified as the electrical generation module on the Thistle 
Alpha Platform. As stated in Chapter 4, the Thistle Alpha Platform, located in the North 
Sea, has three gas turbine driven electrical generators, (termed Unit A, Unit B & Unit C), 
each of which is capable of providing 100% of the platform power requirements. The 
platform is currently part of the Thistle Late Life Extension (LLX) strategy, which aims 
to recover over 35 million barrels of oil through to 2025 from the Thistle and Deveron oil 
fields. In order for the platform to be operable to 2025 and beyond, the LLX strategy 
incorporates a series of major initiatives to improve structural and topside integrity, 
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upgrade safety and control systems, improve the oil production and water treatment 
process and provide reliable power. This make this platform the perfect candidate to base 
the Asset Integrity Case development around, as previously stated in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Figure 6-1 shows the generic outline of the main electrical generation module, which 
houses generator unit’s A and B (Cresswell, 2010).  
While Figure 6-1 gives a good overview of the generic layout and location of equipment, 
it is not enough to accurately create a size model of the generator module (Module 2). 
However, it is possible to determine the dimensions of the module and the equipment 
from the plot plans of the Thistle Alpha platform (see Appendix E). From these more 
detailed plans, the dimensions of module 2, the electrical generators and the orientation 
of equipment in the space can be determined. Table 6-1 gives an outline of the key 
dimensions. All equipment dimensions, i.e. turbine and alternator are external 
measurements. 
Table 6-1: Dimensions of module 2 and electrical generation equipment 
Item Measurement 
Module Length 27m 
Module Width 13.8m 
Module height 10m 
Height to Mezzanine 6m 
Total Generator Length 17m 
Alternator Length 7.8m 
Alternator Width 4.3m 
Alternator Height 4.3m 
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Gas Turbine Length 9.2m 
Gas Turbine Width 2.9m 
Gas Turbine Height  3.5m 
Spacing between Alternators 0.9m 
Distance of Unit A from the Module Wall 1.4m 
 
From these dimensions, it is possible to produce a much more accurate and scale depiction 
of module 2 on the Thistle Alpha Platform. Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3 show the module 2 
deck level and side elevation respectively.  These figures are adapted from the Thistle 
Alpha platform plot plans in Appendix E. 
203 
  
 
 
  
Scale: 1:100 
Dimensions: 
Module Length: 27m 
Module Width: 13.8m 
Generator Length: 17m 
Alternator Length: 7.8m 
Alternator Width: 4.3m 
Turbine Length: 9.2m 
Turbine Width: 2.9m 
Alternator Spacing: 0.9m 
Alternator A from wall: 1.4m 
 Origin: (13.5, 6.9) 
NORTH 
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Figure 6-2: Module 2 schematic with dimensions (Deck View) 
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Scale: 1:100 
(13.5, 6.9, 10) 
Dimensions: 
Module Length: 27m                      Alternator Height: 4.3m 
Module Height: 10m                      Turbine Length: 9.2m 
Generator Length: 17m                  Turbine height: 3.5m 
Alternator Length: 7.8m                 Mezzanine Height: 5m 
 
NORTH 
Drilling Deck 
Mezzanine 
Deck 
Production Deck 
Compressor Blades Turbine 
Blades 
Combustion Chambers 
Bearings 
Bearings 
Bearings 
Rotor 
Stator 
Figure 6-3: Module 2 schematic with dimensions (Side Elevation) 
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6.1.3 Sensor Placement 
Now that the domain and dimensions of said domain have been identified, it is possible 
to place the sensor nodes and determine the size of the sensor field and determine battery 
power given the type of communication. The nodes are dependent entirely on what they 
are detecting and are placed accordingly. In this research the focus is on the integrity of 
the gas turbine generator as well as developing the Asset Integrity Case, and so a finite 
number of nodes will be proposed to keep the initial WSNs simple at these initial stages.  
It is necessary to identify where the sensor nodes should best be deployed in order to 
accurately maintain integrity. A key place to begin is to currently identify where gas 
turbines and alternators already have wired sensors in place to monitor the integrity of 
equipment. Meggitt Sensing systems currently identifies a number of key areas where 
wired sensing and condition monitoring takes place within an electrical generation unit 
(Meggitt, 2016). These are outlined as follows: 
1. Absolute vibration – The sensors here determine the seismic vibration of the 
system relative to the Earth (Zargar, 2014).  
2. Shaft vibration – These sensors monitor the levels of vibration incurred by the 
main generator shaft that runs through the gas turbine and the alternator. The 
sensor here provides data on the vibration of the shaft against the bearings (Zargar, 
2014). 
3. Shaft Displacement – Sensors and probes here are used to measure the movement 
of the shaft in the vicinity of the probe. They cannot measure the bending of the 
shaft away from the probe. Displacement probes indicate problems such as 
unbalance, misalignment, and oil whirl (Zargar, 2014). 
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4. Static oil pressure – Sensors here measure the force per unit area exerted on the 
walls of a container by the stationary fluid. In this case the stationary fluid is the 
bearing oil (Kiameh, 2003). 
5. Temperature – The sensors here simply measure the temperature of various areas 
of the generator such as: temperature of the combustion, the exhaust gases and the 
bearing lube oil (Kiameh, 2003). 
6. Speed – This sensor measures the speed of the main shaft at the bearings in-
between the gas turbine and the alternator. This node indicates as to whether the 
turbine is in danger of running overspeed or not at the required speed. Typically, 
the gas turbines on the Thistle Alpha platform run at 3,600 rpm (RMRI Plc., 2009). 
7. Combustion pressure - The combustion section has the difficult task of controlling 
the burning of large amounts of fuel and air. It must release the heat in a manner 
that the air is expanded and accelerated to give a smooth stream of uniformly-
heated gas at all starting and operating conditions. This must be accomplished 
with minimum pressure loss and maximum heat release. Therefore, monitoring 
the combustion pressure is vital for the operation of the turbine (Kiameh, 2003). 
8. Blade health - Heavy duty industrial gas turbines are widely used in power 
generation plants worldwide. Axial flow compressor and expansion turbine are 
key subsystems of the gas turbine. Due to inlet air flow aero dynamic load and 
rotor rotation, various mode displacement and vibration on the turbine blades are 
excited. Excessive vibration may accumulate high cycle fatigue and thermal 
mechanical stress on a rotor blade, and cracks may initiate and propagate over 
time. Having sensors here to detect and monitor blade cracks and provide early 
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warning before material liberation is the main focus for any blade health 
monitoring system (Yu & Shrivastava, 2016). 
9. Emissions – The purpose of sensors here is to detect the quality of the exhaust 
emissions from the gas turbine. There are strict regulations in place that regulate 
the levels of NOx and CO2 in turbine emissions. Most air pollution NOx 
measurements are done on a volumetric concentration basis, in parts per million 
by volume (ppmv) or in some cases in a weight/volume fraction such as mg/m3. 
Uncontrolled gas turbine NOx emissions are in the 150–300 ppmv range (about 
300–600 mg/m3) (Klein, 2012). 
Alternator discharge – Sensors here measure the level of partial electrical discharge from 
the alternator. Partial discharge is an electrical discharge that occurs across a localised 
area of the insulation between two conducting electrodes, without completely bridging 
the gap. It can be caused by discontinuities or imperfections in the insulation system. 
Discharge monitoring thus gives an indication of deterioration of the insulation and is an 
indicator of incipient faults (HVPD, 2016) 
As these key areas have been identified and outlined, the locations of the sensors can be 
assigned. Figure 6-4 shows the prime locations for the wireless sensor nodes within the 
gas turbine and the alternator. 
As shown in Figure 6-4, there are 31 proposed sensor nodes within each generator unit.  
As the module consists of two generators, the sensor field is comprised of 62 sensor nodes 
at this initial stage. Starting from the left of Figure 6-4, it can be seen that there are 3 
nodes on the first bearing set monitoring the absolute vibration, the static oil pressure and 
the temperature. This arrangement at the first bearing is consistent with the application of 
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probes and sensors at this position (Meggitt, 2016). Following this to the compressor 
turbine, there are eight nodes monitoring the blade health, as is the case with the power 
turbine. There are combustion pressure sensors monitoring the combustion chambers due 
to the small margins of pressure loss available. Continuing through the generator to the 
exhaust of the power turbine and the bearings between the turbine and the alternator. 
There are two nodes monitoring the emissions of the turbine as well as six nodes on the 
bearing. There are more nodes here due to it being a midpoint location on the main shaft. 
Therefore, along with the absolute vibration, oil pressure and temperature sensors, there 
are also nodes monitoring the speed of the shaft at the exit of the power turbine, the 
relative vibration of the shaft to the middle bearing and the displacement of the shaft. 
Monitoring the displacement and relative vibration of the shaft here are key as it is a 
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Figure 6-4: Proposed locations of the wireless sensor nodes within the electrical generator 
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potential vibration node point of the shaft, due to its locating from the two end bearings 
(Kiameh, 2003). Moving through the alternator, there are four nodes monitoring the 
partial discharge. Finally, there are four further nodes on the final bearing after the 
alternator. The nodes here again include absolute vibration, static pressure and 
temperature nodes, just as the first bearing. However, there is also a relative shaft 
vibration sensor due to there being an exciter after the alternator, which does not form 
part of the analysis but must still be treated as though it is there in relation to the operation 
of the generator (RMRI Plc., 2009) (Kiameh, 2003). 
6.1.4 Data Transmission 
Now that there are a proposed number of sensors with a stated purpose, it is possible to 
determine the method of data transmissions. There are two main data transmission types; 
single-hop and multi-hop, as outlined in Chapter 2. However, it is possible to split these 
further. It is possible to have single-hop routing directly to the gateway node and single-
hop transmission via cluster heads. Similarly, it is possible to have multi-hop connectivity 
based upon the size of each sensors average radius of connectivity, i.e. multi-hop with a 
large radius, R, and multi-hop with a small radius, R.  
In this research four types of data transmission are to be analysed and compared against 
a set criteria to determine the most applicable for use in integrity monitoring an offshore 
environment. It is important to note that the gateway node is assumed to be at the origin 
point as shown in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3 and any cluster head nodes are assumed to 
be on the mezzanine deck in Figure 6-3. These four forms of transmission are outlined as 
follows: 
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A. Single-hop - Nodes connect directly to the Gateway node. Due to congestion, 
Nodes transmit data in sequence. i.e. Node 1 transmits data, Node 2 cannot 
transmit until the gateway has received information from Node 1, and so on. 
Complexity is not applicable to the Single-hop design as all nodes send data 
to the same destination and do not relay data, as shown in Chapter 2. 
B. Single-hop with Cluster nodes - Nodes transmit data to the nearest cluster 
node in sequence. Hence, several nodes can transmit simultaneously to 
different cluster nodes. This requires less battery power than Single-hop as 
there are two short connections from the node to the cluster and from the 
cluster to the gateway, as opposed to one connection over a longer distance. 
However, the battery power in this instance is also dependent on the number 
packets from other nodes being relayed to the gateway. 
C. Multi-hop with a smallest sensor node radius - Nodes relay (transmit/ 
receive) information from each other to achieve the best route from the source 
node to the cluster node. The small radius denotes the smallest transmittable 
distance of the node. i.e. it would require more connections to reach the cluster 
node. This requires more battery than Single-hop as the nodes must transmit 
and receive data.  
D. Multi-hop with a largest sensor node radius - The theory is the same for the 
Multi-hop (Small R), however, nodes have a larger sensor radius and can 
transmit/receive data from nodes further away. Meaning fewer connections to 
the cluster node. Requires much increased battery power to transmit/receive 
over a large area. Due to the large area, the network can almost act as a single-
hop cluster network. 
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Even with the four types of data transmission outlined, further information would be 
required to even attempt to determine the most suitable configuration. This information 
would be the specification of specific components, such as, the individual sensor nodes, 
the battery life, and transceiver electronics. This would involve further research into the 
most suitable components for use offshore and would begin to incorporate the software 
of the WSN. Hence the selection of the most suitable WSN is to be determined through 
the use of linguistic terms to outline the most important attributes and criteria for 
application of a WSN to an offshore electrical generation module for integrity monitoring. 
Given the dimensions adapted from the Thistle plot plans (see Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3) 
and the proposed location of the sensor nodes (see Figure 6-4) it would be possible to 
determine the node furthest from the gateway node at the top and centre of module 2. This 
would be the beginnings of the calculation to determine the maximum battery life of the 
network. However, too many assumptions are required and further information is needed 
to complete the calculations. Furthermore, this would only demonstrate which WSN 
would be the most suitable based upon on criteria of Battery Power. This would not be 
sufficient to produce logical decision for WSN application. there are other attributes that 
contribute to the design of the WSNs.  Hence, a decision-making methodology shall be 
utilised, based upon a set of criteria and attributes to determine the most suitable WSN. 
6.2 Numerical Study and Assessment 
The decision-making methodology outlined in Chapter 3 shall be applied to the problem 
of determining the most suitable WSN design for use in offshore asset integrity 
monitoring. The fundamental part of developing a coherent decision-making method, 
with the ability to deliver coherent results, lies in its evaluation hierarchy and the 
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allocation the belief degrees and weights. As the domain, definition and objective of the 
problem have been determined, the evaluation hierarchy can be developed. From there 
the data acquisition and analysis can be conducted to utilise the ER algorithm outlined in 
Chapter 3. Finally, the WSNs can be ranked in terms of their suitability and a sensitivity 
analysis and validation can be carried out. 
The first three steps of the decision-making methodology have been followed and 
identified by Section 6.1. The remaining sections in Chapter 6 shall identify step 4 and 
onwards in the decision-making methodology. 
6.2.1 Evaluation Hierarchy 
In order to apply the ER algorithm to the decision of the most suitable WSN design for 
use in an offshore system, a set of variables and a hierarchical structure of general and 
basic attributes must first be defined. The variables and hierarchical structure are based 
upon the hardware requirements for a WSN and for application on an offshore platform. 
In this analysis, there are three general attributes outlined and eight basic attributes. The 
hierarchical structure is demonstrated by Figure 6-5. 
Figure 6-5 shows the three general attributes to be Complexity, Resilience and 
Maintainability. The General and Basic attributes of the evaluation hierarchy have been 
developed from a number of sources that consistently outline these attributes as being the 
key factors in the generation of a WSN, in terms of the topology and hardware selection 
(Chong & Kumar, 2003) (Carlsen, et al., 2008) (Akhondi, et al., 2010) (Fischione, 2014) 
(IEC, 2014).  These general attributes are outlined as follows: 
 Complexity is defined as the intricacy of the WSN. Usually, this would be the 
number of nodes and their location, however, this is already bounded by the 
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scenario on board an offshore platform. Hence, the complexity is defined by three 
basic attributes relating to the design and hardware: 
o Transmission over the shortest possible route: The ability of the network 
to transmit information over the shortest possible route from one sensor 
node to the Gateway node. 
o Transmission over the longest possible route: The ability of the network 
to relay information over the longest possible distance to the Gateway 
given that one or more nodes fail to transmit/receive data. 
o Large number of cluster head nodes: The necessity of the network to have 
many cluster nodes in order to reliably transmit data to the Gateway. 
 Resilience is defined as the WSNs ability to deal with faults to the system. As this 
research does not include any software analysis, the issue of cyber-attacks cannot 
be fully analysed therefore, the resilience of the WSNs is determined by two basic 
attributes. 
o Battery power: This has already been outlined in some detail, and in this 
analysis, it is defined as: The ability of the network to have a substantial 
source of battery power for the longevity of the network life and reduced 
time between maintenance. Battery power must be sufficient to power the 
sensors, initially, for several months. 
o Relaying data: This is a key attribute as it deals with the ability of the 
network to relay information between nodes in the event of sensor node 
failures and/or network disruptions. 
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 Maintainability: This focuses on the capability of the WSN design to be easy to 
maintain, its self-sustainability and the costs incurred by installation and 
maintenance. It is outlined by three basic attributes: 
o Ease of Maintenance: This is dependent on the Complexity of the nodes, 
i.e. the number of components within the nodes (sensor, transmitter, 
receiver, battery size). Location is not a factor as all nodes in this study are 
located within the electrical power generator. 
o Auto-Configuration: The ability of the network to auto configure on start-
up and after maintenance. Nodes that can relay information can ease this 
issue, however, it is easier to program networks to auto-configure with less 
complex and fewer connections.  
o Cost: The cost of the network is determined by the number of nodes 
required (including cluster nodes), the sophistication of the nodes (battery 
size, transmitters, receivers and sensors) and the cost of maintenance.
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Figure 6-5: Evaluation Hierarchy for the four WSN designs 
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It can be seen from Figure 6-5 that WSN 1 (Single-Hop) is not associated with the first 
two general attributes Complexity and Resilience. This is due to a number of reasons; 
firstly, as the network is single-hop, the issue of transmitting over the shortest or longest 
route is not applicable. As previously outlined, the single-hop transmission has each node 
transmit their data one after another in sequence, directly to the gateway. Hence there is 
only one possible transmission route that each node can transmit data. Secondly, there 
aren’t any cluster heads associated with this transmission type, therefore it is not possible 
to associate WSN 1 with any number of cluster heads, and subsequently cannot relate it 
to the general attribute, Complexity. Thirdly, as the data is theoretically transmitted over 
only one possible route for each node, there is no ability or need for WSN 1 to relay data. 
Similarly, as the general attribute, Resilience has only two basic attributes, it cannot 
possibly be included in the analysis for Resilience. However, it can be included in the 
analysis for Maintainability as all basic attributes are relatable to WSN 1. 
6.2.2 WSN Assessment Problem 
In this section, the ER algorithm is applied to analyse the suitability of four different WSN 
designs for use in asset integrity monitoring of an offshore electrical power generator. 
The four WSN designs are based around the type of data transmission, they are as follows: 
Single-hop transmission, Single-hop transmission with cluster head nodes, Multi-hop 
transmission with a small sensor node radius and multi-hop transmission with a large 
sensor node radius. The four WSNs shall be denoted as WSN 1, WSN 2, WSN 3 and 
WSN 4 respectively.  
Before the analysis can be conducted the weights of each attribute, both general and basic 
(outlined in Figure 6-5), must be determined and the belief degrees of the basic attributes 
must be determined based upon a set of evaluation grades. Initially, the weights of the 
attributes are assumed to be normalised, with further analysis demonstrating the weights 
217 
  
through pairwise comparison and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). These weights 
through AHP and the belief degrees are determined by qualitative assessment from expert 
judgement through the use of questionnaires. This questionnaire is demonstrated in 
Appendix J. 
As outlined previously, three general suitability attributes are considered, which are 
Complexity, Resilience and Maintainability. These attributes are generic and difficult to 
assess directly. Therefore, lower level attributes are required. The attribute hierarchy is 
shown in Table 6-2 along with the notation for each attribute and their weights (ωi and 
ωij). Initially these weights are to be normalized, i.e. each attribute is to be the same 
weight with their sum equal to 1. As shown by Equation 6-1a, b, c & d: 
𝜔1 = 𝜔2 = 𝜔3 = 1/3    (6-1a) 
𝜔11 = 𝜔12 = 𝜔13 = 1/3    (6-1b) 
𝜔21 = 𝜔22 = 1/2     (6-1c) 
𝜔31 = 𝜔32 = 𝜔33 = 1/3    (6-1d) 
However, the belief degrees must be determined against the evaluation grades for each 
basic attribute. This is done through part b of the questionnaire demonstrated in Appendix 
J. Five experts and their judgements were used to complete the qualitative questionnaire 
across disciplines of offshore engineering and computer science. This allowed for a more 
comprehensive view point as the designs of the WSN are to be used on-board an offshore 
platform. The five experts are to remain anonymous, however, their expertise are outlined 
as follows: 
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Expert 1 is currently in the employment of a leading classification society and holds a 
university qualification at the MSc. Level. This person has 8 years of experience at sea 
and more than 5 years as an offshore safety manager. 
Expert 2 is currently in the employ of a leading provider of risk management services 
and holds a university qualification at Ph.D. level. This person has 10 years of experience 
as an offshore technical director.  
Expert 3 is currently a CEO of a leading energy service and holds a university 
qualification at Ph.D. level. 
Expert 4 is currently in the employ of a UK university as a senior lecturer and researcher. 
This person has 10 years’ experience in research areas involving the progression of the 
Internet of Things and interdisciplinary technologies. This person also holds a university 
qualification at Ph.D. level. 
Expert 5 is currently in the employ of a UK university as a senior lecturer and researcher. 
This person has 10 years’ experience in research areas involving the progression of the 
Internet of Things and Computer, communication and control technologies. This person 
also holds a university qualification at Ph.D. level. 
Each of the five experts completed the questionnaire in Appendix J. This allowed for the 
completion of the belief degrees for the basic attributes. The belief degrees are generated 
by taking the average for each attribute given what evaluation grade each expert has 
highlighted. The hierarchy and normalised weights of all attributes is demonstrated in 
Table 6-2, as well as the completed belief degrees for each basic attribute.  
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Table 6-2: Generalised decision matrix for WSN suitability assessment with normalised weights and belief degrees 
General 
Attributes 
  WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
Evaluation 
Grades Basic Attributes 
Single-
Hop 
Single 
Hop 
(Cluster) 
Multi-Hop 
(Small 
Radius) 
Multi-Hop 
(Large 
Radius) 
Complexity (x) 
(ω1 = 0.333)  
Transmission over 
the shortest route 
(e1) (ω11 = 0.333)  
 
0.6 0.2 0.2 H1 Poor 
 0 0.2 0  H2 Indifferent 
0.4 0.6 0.2 H3 Average 
 0  0  0 H4 Good 
 0  0 0.6 H5 Excellent 
Transmission over 
the longest route (e2) 
(ω12 = 0.333)  
   
 0 0.4 0.8 H1   
 0 0.2  0 H2   
0.6 0.4 0.2 H3   
 0  0  0 H4   
0.4  0  0 H5   
Large number of 
Cluster nodes (e3) 
(ω13 = 0.333)  
  
0.6 0.2 0.6 H1   
 0  0 0 H2   
 0 0.2 0.3 H3   
0.2 0.2 0.1 H4   
0.2 0.4  0 H5   
Resilience (y) (ω2 
= 0.333) 
Battery Power (e4) 
(ω21 = 0.5)  
  
 0  0 0.2 H1   
0.2 0.2  0 H2   
0.2  0  0 H3   
0.4 0.2 0.2 H4   
0.2 0.6 0.6 H5   
Relaying Data (e5) 
(ω22 = 0.5)  
  
0.2  0  0 H1   
 0  0  0 H2   
 0 0.2 0.4 H3   
0.2  0  0 H4   
0.6 0.8 0.6 H5   
Maintainability 
(z) (ω3 = 0.333) 
Ease of Maintenance 
(e6) (ω31 = 0.333)  
 0  0 0.2 0.4 H1   
 0 0.4  0  0 H2   
 0 0.2 0.4  0 H3   
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 H4   
0.5  0  0 0.2 H5   
Auto-Configuration 
(e7) (ω32 = 0.333)  
 0 0  0.2 0.4 H1   
0.2 0.2  0  0 H2   
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 H3   
0.2 0.4 0.2  0 H4   
0.4  0 0.2 0.2 H5   
Cost (e8) (ω33 = 
0.333)  
0.2  0 0.4 0.4 H1   
 0 0.4  0  0 H2   
0.2 0.4  0  0 H3   
0.6  0 0.6 0.2 H4   
 0 0.2  0 0.4 H5   
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6.2.3 Normalized Weight Aggregation Assessment Utilising the ER 
Algorithm 
The problem is how the judgements in Table 6-2 can be aggregated to arrive at an 
assessment as to the best suited WSN for asset integrity monitoring on and offshore 
platform. The weight assessment for the attributes has already been outlined as being 
hypothetical by assuming normalised weights for each attribute.  
To demonstrate the procedure of the ER algorithm the detailed steps of the calculation 
shall be shown for generating the assessment for the WSN 3’s Complexity (y), by 
aggregating the three basic attributes Transmission over shortest route (e1), Transmission 
over the longest route (e2) and large number of cluster nodes (e3). The evaluation grades 
have been defined in Equation 3-21. From Table 6-2 and Equation 3-25 the following can 
be stated: 
𝛽1,1 = 0.2, 𝛽2,1 = 0.2, 𝛽3,1 = 0.6, 𝛽4,1 = 0, 𝛽5,1 = 0  
𝛽1,2 = 0.4, 𝛽2,2 = 0.2, 𝛽3,2 = 0.4, 𝛽4,2 = 0, 𝛽5,2 = 0  
𝛽1,3 = 0.2, 𝛽2,3 = 0, 𝛽3,3 = 0.2, 𝛽4,3 = 0.2, 𝛽5,3 = 0.4  
As stated previously, it is assumed initially that all three weights are of equal importance. 
So, from Equation 6-1b the weights are, 𝜔11 = 𝜔12 = 𝜔13 = 1/3. From Equations 3-26 
and 3-27 the basic probability masses can be calculated: 
𝑚1,1 = 0.2/3, 𝑚2,1 = 0.2/3, 𝑚3,1 = 0.6/3, 𝑚4,1 = 0, 𝑚5,1 = 0,
∑ 𝑚𝑛,1
𝑁
𝑛=1
= 0.333, ∴ 𝑚𝐻,1 = 0.667 
𝑚1,2 = 0.4/3, 𝑚2,2 = 0.2/3, 𝑚3,2 = 0.4/3, 𝑚4,2 = 0, 𝑚5,2 = 0,
∑ 𝑚𝑛,2
𝑁
𝑛=1
= 0.333, ∴ 𝑚𝐻,2 = 0.667  
221 
  
𝑚1,3 = 0.2/3, 𝑚2,3 = 0, 𝑚3,3 = 0.2/3, 𝑚4,3 = 0.2/3, 𝑚5,3 = 0.4/3,
∑ 𝑚𝑛,3
𝑁
𝑛=1
= 0.333, ∴ 𝑚𝐻,3 = 0.667 
It is now possible to use Equations 3-29, 3-30 and 3-31 to calculate the combined 
probability masses. Firstly, attributes e1 and e2 are to be aggregated. As stated by Equation 
3-31: 
𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1) =
[
 
 
 
 
1 − ∑∑𝑚𝑡,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑗,𝑖+1
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
]
 
 
 
 
−1
 
𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐿 − 1 
Equation 3-31 is solved in stages to determine 𝐾𝐼(2), as follows: 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(1)𝑚𝑗,2
5
𝑡=1
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚1,1𝑚2,2) + (𝑚1,1𝑚3,2) + (𝑚1,1𝑚4,2) + (𝑚1,1𝑚5,2)
= (
0.2
3
.
0.2
3
) + (
0.2
3
.
0.4
3
) + (0) + (0) = 0.0133 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(1)𝑚𝑗,2
5
𝑡=2
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚2,1𝑚1,2) + (𝑚2,1𝑚3,2) + (𝑚2,1𝑚4,2) + (𝑚2,1𝑚5,2)
= (
0.2
3
.
0.4
3
) + (
0.2
3
.
0.4
3
) + (0) + (0) = 0.0178 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(1)𝑚𝑗,2
5
𝑡=3
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚3,1𝑚1,2) + (𝑚3,1𝑚2,2) + (𝑚3,1𝑚4,2) + (𝑚3,1𝑚5,2)
= (
0.6
3
.
0.4
3
) + (
0.6
3
.
0.2
3
) + (0) + (0) = 0.04 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(1)𝑚𝑗,2
5
𝑡=4
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚4,1𝑚1,2) + (𝑚4,1𝑚2,2) + (𝑚4,1𝑚3,2) + (𝑚4,1𝑚5,2)
= (0) + (0) + (0) + (0) = 0 
222 
  
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(1)𝑚𝑗,2
5
𝑡=5
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚5,1𝑚1,2) + (𝑚5,1𝑚2,2) + (𝑚5,1𝑚3,2) + (𝑚5,1𝑚4,2)
= (0) + (0) + (0) + (0) = 0 
𝐾𝐼(2) = [1 − (0.0133 + 0.0178 + 0.04)]
−1 = 1.077 
Given that the value of 𝐾𝐼(2) has been determined, Equations 3-29 and 3-30 can now be 
utilised, along with the basic probability masses, as follows: 
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1) (
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1 + 𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝐻,𝑖+1
+𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝑛,𝑖+1
)       𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖+1) = 𝐾𝐼(𝑖+1)𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝑖)𝑚𝐻,𝑖+1 
𝑚1,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)(𝑚1,1𝑚1,2 + 𝑚1,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚1,2) = 0.1531 
𝑚2,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)(𝑚2,1𝑚2,2 + 𝑚2,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚2,2) = 0.1004 
𝑚3,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)(𝑚3,1𝑚3,2 + 𝑚3,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚3,2) = 0.2679 
𝑚4,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)(𝑚4,1𝑚4,2 + 𝑚4,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚4,2) = 0 
𝑚5,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)(𝑚5,1𝑚5,2 + 𝑚5,1𝑚𝐻,2 + 𝑚𝐻,1𝑚5,2) = 0 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,1𝑚𝐻,2 = 0.4785 
As the first two basic attributes, e1 and e2, have been aggregated, it is possible to combine 
the above results with the third attribute e3 as follows: 
Equation 3-31 is again solved in stages to find 𝐾𝐼(3), as follows: 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(2)𝑚𝑗,3
5
𝑡=1
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3) + (𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3) + (𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3) + (𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3)
= 0.0408 
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∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(2)𝑚𝑗,3
5
𝑡=2
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3) + (𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3) + (𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3) + (𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3)
= 0.0335 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(2)𝑚𝑗,3
5
𝑡=3
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3) + (𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3) + (𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3) + (𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3)
= 0.0715 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(2)𝑚𝑗,3
5
𝑡=4
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3) + (𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3) + (𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3) + (𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3)
= 0 
∑ 𝑚𝑡,𝐼(2)𝑚𝑗,3
5
𝑡=5
𝑗≠𝑡
= (𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3) + (𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3) + (𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3) + (𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3)
= 0 
𝐾𝐼(3) = [1 − (0.0408 + 0.0335 + 0.0715)]
−1 = 1.1707 
Given that the value of 𝐾𝐼(3) has been determined, Equations 3-29 and 3-30 can now be 
utilised, along with the basic probability masses, as follows: 
𝑚1,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)(𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3 + 𝑚1,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚1,3) = 0.1688 
𝑚2,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)(𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3 + 𝑚2,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚2,3) = 0.0784 
𝑚3,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)(𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3 + 𝑚3,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚3,3) = 0.2674 
𝑚4,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)(𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3 + 𝑚4,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚4,3) = 0.0373 
𝑚5,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)(𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3 + 𝑚5,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 + 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚5,3) = 0.0747 
𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3) = 𝐾𝐼(3)𝑚𝐻,𝐼(2)𝑚𝐻,3 = 0.3734 
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As the basic attributes e1, e2 and e3 have been aggregated, the combined belief degrees 
are calculated using Equation 3-32: 
𝛽𝑛 =
𝑚𝑛,𝐼(𝐿)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(𝐿)
,         𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐿 
𝛽𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝛽1 =
𝑚1,𝐼(3)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3)
=
0.1688
1 − 0.3734
= 0.2694 
𝛽2 =
𝑚2,𝐼(3)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3)
=
0.07848
1 − 0.3734
= 0.1251 
𝛽3 =
𝑚3,𝐼(3)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3)
=
0.2674
1 − 0.3734
= 0.4267 
𝛽4 =
𝑚4,𝐼(3)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3)
=
0.0373
1 − 0.3734
= 0.0596 
𝛽5 =
𝑚5,𝐼(3)
1 − 𝑚𝐻,𝐼(3)
=
0.0747
1 − 0.3734
= 0.1192 
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
= 1, ∴    𝛽𝐻 = 0 
Therefore, the assessment for the Complexity of WSN 3 by aggregating Transmission 
over the shortest route (e1), Transmission over the longest route (e2) and large number of 
cluster heads (e3), is given by: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝑆(𝑒1⨁𝑒2⨁𝑒3)
= {(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟, 0.2694), (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0.1251), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.4267), 
 (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.0596), (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0.1192)} 
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It is important to note that changing the aggregation order does not change the final results 
in any way.  
6.2.3.1 Results and Analysis of Normalized Weight Aggregation 
The calculations demonstrated in Section 6.2 for the assessment of WSN 3 in terms of its 
Complexity were repeated for the other basic attributes for each of the WSNs proposed. 
The results were then aggregated further to give the overall beliefs for the general 
attributes for each of the WSNs. All of the calculations were completed using Microsoft 
Excel as it provided a simple way of inputting the ER algorithm and displaying the results 
clearly. Given the information demonstrated in Table 6-2 the assessment for the general 
attributes for each WSN were calculated. Table 6-3 shows the aggregated assessment for 
the general attributes for each WSN design. 
Table 6-3: Aggregated assessment for the general attributes for each WSN design 
General 
Attributes 
WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
Evaluation 
Grades Single-Hop 
Single 
Hop 
(Cluster) 
Multi-
Hop 
(Small 
Radius) 
Multi-
Hop 
(Large 
Radius) 
Complexity 
(ω1 - = 1/3) 
  0.413 0.269 0.575 H1 Poor 
  0.000 0.125 0.000 H2 Indifferent 
    0.335 0.427 0.225 H3 Average 
    0.060 0.060 0.029 H4 Good 
    0.192 0.119 0.172 H5 Excellent 
Resilience (ω2 
= 1/3) 
  0.091 0.000 0.085 H1   
  0.091 0.081 0.000 H2   
    0.091 0.081 0.169 H3   
    0.309 0.081 0.085 H4   
    0.418 0.758 0.661 H5   
Maintainability 
(ω3 = 1/3) 
0.059 0.000 0.265 0.428 H1   
0.059 0.342 0.000 0.000 H2   
  0.124 0.342 0.258 0.118 H3   
  0.464 0.258 0.419 0.188 H4   
  0.295 0.059 0.059 0.266 H5   
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Similarly Figure 6-6, Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 show the graphical representation of each 
of the aggregated assessment of the general attributes for each WSN.  
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Figure 6-6: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Complexity of WSNs 2, 3, and 4 
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Figure 6-7: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Resilience of WSNs 2, 3, and 4 
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From the graphs in Figure 6-6, Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 it is possible to distinguish some 
of the differences between the WSNs and rank them, however, this can be very difficult. 
For example, it would seem that WSN 3 fairs better in terms of resilience than WSN 2 or 
4. Similarly, in the only case where WSN 1 is assessed, maintainability, it also seems to 
be the best performing WSN design. However, WSN 1 cannot be assessed in complexity 
or resilience as it is a very simple design in terms of its data transmission. It therefore 
makes sense that WSN 1 performs better than the other WSNs in terms of maintainability.  
Continuing on the procedure of ranking the WSNs, it is necessary to determine their 
overall performance and suitability for offshore use. This is done by aggregating the 
general attributes still further using the ER algorithm. This demonstrates the overall 
suitability of WSNs 2, 3 and 4. Table 6-4 and Figure 6-9 demonstrate overall suitability 
beliefs for the WSNs. In Table 6-4 the beliefs relating to the overall suitability of the 
WSNs are shown as a percentage. 
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Figure 6-8: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Maintainability of each of the WSNs 
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Table 6-4: Overall suitability of the WSNs to be applied to asset integrity monitoring in offshore installations 
  
  Evaluation Grades 
OVERALL SUITABILITY 
WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN4 
1 Poor 16.13% 17.63% 36.99% 
2 Indifferent 13.83% 6.52% 0.00 % 
3 Average 26.49% 26.30% 16.32% 
4 Good 21.11% 18.32% 9.22% 
5 Excellent 22.43% 31.20% 37.46% 
    1 1 1 
 
 
Again, it is difficult to accurately rank the WSNs performance based on the graph and 
data in Figure 6-9 and Table 6-4. It can be seen that WSN 3 may be the most suitable 
design as it scores consistently high from Average to Good to Excellent. However, this is 
by no means a clear indicator of which WSN performs the best. Therefore, as stated in 
Section 3.7.1.2, each WSN must be ranked by estimating their utility grades.  
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Figure 6-9: graph showing the overall aggregated assessment for the WSNs 
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The WSN designs can be ranked based upon their aggregated belief degrees from the ER 
algorithm. This can be done through utility assessment. Suppose the utility of an 
evaluation grade, Hn, is denoted by u(Hn). The utility of the evaluation grade must be 
determined beforehand, with u(H1) = 0 and u(H5)=1 assuming there are five evaluation 
grades (Yang, 2001). If there is not preference information available then the values of 
u(Hn) can be assumed to be equidistant, as shown by Equation 3-33: 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = {𝑢(𝐻1) = 0, 𝑢(𝐻2) = 0.25, 𝑢(𝐻3) = 0.5, 𝑢(𝐻4) = 0.75, 𝑢(𝐻5) = 1}      
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = {𝑢(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟) = 0, 𝑢(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 0.25, 𝑢(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 0.5,
𝑢(𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑) = 0.75, 𝑢(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1} 
 The estimated utility for the general and basic attributes, S(z(ei)), given the set of 
evaluation grades is given by Equation 3-34: 
𝑢 (𝑆(𝑧(𝑒𝑖))) = ∑ 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
(𝑒𝑖) 
Equation 3-34 can be used as the belief degrees sum to 1, therefore there can be no upper 
or lower bound limit on the utility estimation, just one utility value for each WSN. Each 
WSN can be ranked both in terms of each general attribute and the overall suitability of 
the WSNs. By applying Equation 3-34 and the data in Table 6-3 to the general attribute 
Complexity for WSN 3, its utility score can be determined.  
𝑢(𝑆(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦))
= (𝑢(𝐻1)𝛽1) + (𝑢(𝐻2)𝛽2) + (𝑢(𝐻3)𝛽3) + (𝑢(𝐻4)𝛽4) + (𝑢(𝐻5)𝛽6)
= (0 × 0.269) + (0.25 × 0.125) + (0.5 × 0.427) + (0.75 × 0.06)
+ (1 × 0.119) = 0.409 
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The utility estimation is calculated the same was for each general attribute for each WSN 
and for the overall suitability for each WSN. These results are tabulated and the WSNs 
can be ranked accordingly. 
Table 6-5 shows the utility values for the general attribute complexity for WSNs 2, 3 and 
4. It can be seen that WSN 3 has the greatest ability to deal complex data transmissions, 
with WSN 2 performing better than WSN 4. In other words, in terms of their complexity: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 
Table 6-5: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Complexity 
Complexity (x) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.413 0.269 0.575 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.000 0.125 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.335 0.427 0.225 
H4 Good 0.75 0.060 0.060 0.029 
H5 Excellent 1 0.192 0.119 0.172 
            
    u(Total) 0.404 0.409 0.306 
    Ranking 2 1 3 
 
Similarly, Table 6-6 shows the utility values for the general attribute resilience. Here 
WSN 3 again scores higher than the other WSNs. This is concurrent with the statement 
made regarding the best performing WSN based upon the graph in Figure 6-7. The order 
of ranking for Resilience is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 
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Table 6-6: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Resilience 
Resilience (y) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.091 0.000 0.085 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.091 0.081 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.091 0.081 0.169 
H4 Good 0.75 0.309 0.081 0.085 
H5 Excellent 1 0.418 0.758 0.661 
            
    u(Total) 0.718 0.879 0.809 
    Ranking 3 1 2 
 
Continually, Table 6-7 demonstrates the utility values for the general attribute 
Maintainability for all WSNs. Here it can be seen that WSN 1 fairs the best, as was stated 
when analysing the graph in Figure 6-8. The WSNs rank in order from 1 to 4 in terms of 
their maintainability. This would make sense as the transmission types of each WSN also 
become more complex from WSN 1 to WSN 4. The order of ranking for maintainability 
is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 1 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 
Table 6-7: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Maintainability 
Maintainability (z) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.059 0.000 0.265 0.428 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.059 0.342 0.000 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.124 0.342 0.258 0.118 
H4 Good 0.75 0.464 0.258 0.419 0.188 
H5 Excellent 1 0.295 0.059 0.059 0.266 
              
    u(Total) 0.719 0.508 0.502 0.466 
     Ranking 1 2 3 4 
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Finally, the WSNs are ranked based upon their overall performance and suitability for 
application in asset integrity monitoring of an offshore electrical power generator, 
utilising data from Table 6-4. Table 6-8 outlines the overall suitability belief for WSNs 2, 
3 and 4. WSN 1 cannot be included as it was not assessed against general attributes 
Complexity and Resilience. It can be seen that WSN 3 would appear to be the most 
suitable design and data transmission choice for offshore applications. This is concurrent 
with the claim made previously following the analysis of Figure 6-9. The ranking for 
overall suitability is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 
Table 6-8: Overall utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4  
Overall Suitability Belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.161 0.176 0.370 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.138 0.065 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.265 0.263 0.163 
H4 Good 0.75 0.211 0.183 0.092 
H5 Excellent 1 0.224 0.312 0.375 
            
    u(Total) 0.550 0.597 0.525 
    Ranking 2 1 3 
 
The rankings demonstrated are conclusive given the expert judgements presented in Table 
6-2. However, these rankings are generated based upon the assumption that all of the 
attributes are of equal weighting. In general, one would utilise a variety of weights to 
more accurately determine the most suitable WSN for offshore asset integrity monitoring 
and whether the rankings generated are reliable. Furthermore, it is possible or even 
necessary to improve the quality of original information to achieve reliable rankings. This 
improvement in information can potentially come from utilising more experts to gain 
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more coherent and accurate basic attribute beliefs. Similarly, it is also possible to utilise 
an increased number of evaluation grades. However, this drastically increases the 
complexity of the ER algorithm and could potential produce some unforced errors.  
Following the analysis presented in Section 6.2, Section 6.3 shall demonstrate the 
outcomes of the ER algorithm with the same basic attribute beliefs. However, a pairwise 
and AHP analysis shall be employed to more accurately determine the weights of each 
attribute. This should strengthen the accuracy of the post analysis rankings and 
comparisons can be made as to the differences between the rankings when utilising 
normalised weights and calculated weights. 
6.3 Numerical Study and Analysis with Calculated Weights 
Utilising the ER Algorithm 
The numerical analysis in Section 6.2 has dealt with the selection problem of the most 
suitable WSN design for use on board an offshore installation. The purpose of which is 
to monitor the asset integrity of the electrical power generator, as outlined in Section 6.1. 
It demonstrated that the ER algorithm can be utilised in this decision-making process. 
However, the analysis presented in Section 6.2 relied on normalised weighting for the 
basic and general attributes, with the beliefs for the basic attributes determined by expert 
judgement through part B of the questionnaire outlined in Appendix J. This section 
focuses on conducting the decision-making analysis again but by determining the relative 
weights of the attributes through Pairwise Comparison and AHP methods. This was done 
through part A of the questionnaire sent to experts.  
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6.3.1 Determining Relative Weights of the Attributes 
The Pairwise Comparison and AHP methods have been outlined in Chapter 3 and a 
numerical demonstration was given in Chapter 4. The same methodology is applied and 
a numerical assessment is included for completeness.  
Referring to the general attributes in part A of the questionnaire in Appendix J, and the 
evaluation hierarchy in Figure 6-5, a numerical assessment of the AHP method is 
demonstrated, utilising a 3×3 pairwise comparison matrix. Table 6-10 is a pairwise 
comparison matrix expressing the qualified judgement regarding the relative priority of 
x, y and z. An explanation of the abbreviations is given in Table 6-9. 
Table 6-9: Criteria required for the general attributes in the evaluation hierarchy 
General Attributes 
Complexity x 
Resilience y 
Maintainability z 
 
Table 6-10: Pairwise Comparison matrix for the general attributes 
  x y z 
x 1.00 0.48 0.66 
y 2.09 1.00 1.95 
z 1.52 0.51 1.00 
SUM 4.61 1.99 3.61 
 
A standardised matrix is calculated to show the performance ratio of the general attributes. 
This is done by dividing the importance rating in each cell by the sum of its column. From 
here the relative weights of the criteria can be calculated by averaging the rows in the 
standardised matrix. A measure to know if the data is performing correctly is that all of 
the columns in the standardised matrix must sum to 1.0. The standardised matrix with 
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calculated relative weights for the general attributes is shown in Table 6-11. These step 
by step calculations, as a whole, represent Equation 3-12. 
Table 6-11: Standardised Matrix of system criteria along with their relative weights. 
  x y z Weight 
x 0.22 0.24 0.18 21.34% 
y 0.45 0.50 0.54 49.86% 
z 0.33 0.26 0.28 28.80% 
SUM 1 1 1 100.00% 
 
The next phase of AHP is the consistency ratio calculation. Each value in the columns of 
Table 6-10 is multiplied by the weight value of each criterion in Table 6-11. For example, 
each value in the column ‘x’ of Table 6-10 is multiplied by the weight of the ‘x’ row in 
Table 6-11. Once these figures have been calculated, they are to be summarised by row, 
as shown in Table 6-12. A Sum Weight is then calculated by dividing the summarised 
row of Table 6-12 by the corresponding weight in Table 6-11. For example, ‘Sum Row’ 
‘x’ is divided by the weight in row ‘x’ in Table 6-11. The full results are shown in Table 
6-12. 
Table 6-12: The product of the Pairwise Comparison matrix values and the calculated weights (columns 2- 4). Along 
with the sum of each row and the sum weight of each criteria. 
  x y z 
Sum 
Row 
Sum 
Weight 
x 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.64 3.01 
y 0.45 0.50 0.56 1.51 3.02 
z 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.87 3.01 
 
The λmax value is then calculated by dividing the sum of the ‘Sum Weights’ by the number 
of criteria, ‘n’ in the pairwise comparison, which in this case is 3. Hence, λmax is calculated 
as: 
λmax =
3.008 + 3.02 + 3.012
3
= 3.013 
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Next the CI is computed using Equation 3-14: 
𝐶𝐼 =
3.013 − 3
3 − 1
= 0.007 
Subsequently the CR is calculated using Equation 3-13. There are 3 criteria in this 
pairwise comparison under evaluation, so the corresponding RI is 0.58, as shown in Table 
3-2. The CR of the system level criteria can now be calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑅 =
0.007
0.58
= 0.011 
The CR value of the system level criteria is 0.011. This means that the degree of 
consistency within the pairwise comparison is acceptable as the CR value is less than 0.10.  
Similar calculations were conducted for the other criteria in the pairwise comparison with 
the other CRs being 0.01, 0.01 and 0.06. These again are acceptable as it is less than 0.10. 
The full pairwise comparison and AHP results are shown in Appendix K. CR calculations 
are not possible for matrices of less than 2×2 as the Saaty RI values for 2×2 matrices are 
zero. 
Utilising the Pairwise Comparison and AHP methods, the weights for all of the basic and 
general attributes are calculated. These weights are shown in Table 6-13. It can already 
be seen that the weights are far from equal. For example, In the first analysis, the weights 
for x were outlined as  𝜔1 = 𝜔2 = 𝜔3 = 1 3⁄ , however, they have now been calculated 
as, 𝜔1 = 0.5309, 𝜔2 = 0.1618, 𝜔3 = 0.3075.  
Table 6-13: Calculated weights for the general and basic attribute for use in the ER algorithm 
x y z SUM 
21.34% 49.86% 28.80% 100.00% 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8   
53.09% 16.16% 30.75% 65.08% 34.92% 53.62% 20.46% 25.92%   
SUM SUM SUM   
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   
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6.3.2 Calculated Weight Aggregation Assessment and Analysis 
Utilising the ER Algorithm 
The problem now is aggregating the judgements in Table 6-2 to arrive at an assessment 
as to the best suited WSN for asset integrity monitoring on and offshore platform. The 
weight assessment for the attributes has been outlined through Pairwise Comparison and 
AHP analysis, with the relative weights demonstrated in Table 6-13. The method of 
applying the ER algorithm is the same as in Section 6.2, with the exception of substituting 
the normalised weights for calculated weights. In theory, this is deemed to be step towards 
more accurate rankings of the WSNs (Yang & Xu, 2002). Therefore, the calculation shall 
not be demonstrated again. The focus here is the comparison of the rankings between the 
normalised weights and calculated weights.  
By applying the beliefs in Table 6-2, the weights in Table 6-13 and the ER algorithm 
calculation demonstrated in Section 6.2, it is possible to determine the belief structure for 
the General attributes and rank the WSNs in accordance with the performance with each 
attribute. Table 6-14 shows the new calculated belief structure for the general attributes.  
Similarly, Figure 6-10, Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12 show the graphical representation of 
each of the aggregated assessment of the general attributes for each WSN. 
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Table 6-14: Belief structure for the general attribute using calculated weights through AHP 
General 
Attributes 
WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
Evaluation 
Grades Single-Hop 
Single Hop 
(Cluster) 
Multi-
Hop 
(Small 
Radius) 
Multi-Hop 
(Large 
Radius) 
Complexity 
(ω1 - 21.34%) 
  0.561 0.225 0.405 H1 Poor 
  0.000 0.141 0.000 H2 Indifferent 
    0.309 0.498 0.226 H3 Average 
    0.044 0.046 0.123 H4 Good 
    0.086 0.091 0.342 H5 Excellent 
Resilience (ω2 
- 49.86%) 
  0.041 0.000 0.135 H1   
  0.143 0.129 0.000 H2   
    0.143 0.037 0.078 H3   
    0.359 0.129 0.135 H4   
    0.313 0.704 0.652 H5   
Maintainability 
(ω3 - 28.80%) 
0.035 0.000 0.238 0.423 H1   
0.026 0.380 0.000 0.000 H2   
  0.063 0.276 0.306 0.052 H3   
  0.505 0.309 0.430 0.285 H4   
  0.371 0.035 0.026 0.240 H5   
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Figure 6-10: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Complexity of WSNs 2, 3, and 4 from calculated 
weights 
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From the graphs in Figure 6-10, Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12 it is again possible to 
distinguish some of the differences between the WSNs and rank them. However, this can 
be very difficult, for example, it is difficult to determine the most suitable WSN in terms 
of the complexity of the WSNs. Similarly, in the only case where WSN 1 is assessed, 
maintainability, it also seems to be the best performing WSN design as its highest-ranking 
beliefs are across the evaluation grades of good and excellent. However, WSN 1 cannot 
be assessed in complexity or resilience as it is a very simple design in terms of its data 
transmission. It therefore makes sense that WSN 1 performs better than the other WSNs 
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Resilience
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Figure 6-11: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Resilience of WSNs 2, 3, and 4 from calculated 
weights 
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Figure 6-12: Graph showing the aggregated assessment for the Maintainability of WSNs 1, 2, 3, and 4 from 
calculated weights 
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in terms of maintainability. This is also in accordance with the assessment made when 
the weights were normalised in the initial analysis. Furthermore, it can be seen in Figure 
6-11 that both WSNs 3 and 4 outperform WSN 2. However, it is difficult to determine 
which of the two WSN designs fair better in terms of their resilience.  
Continuing the procedure of ranking the WSNs, it is necessary to determine their overall 
performance and suitability for offshore use with the new calculated weights. This is done 
by aggregating the general attributes still further using the ER algorithm. This 
demonstrates the overall suitability of WSNs 2, 3 and 4. Table 6-15 and Figure 6-13 
demonstrate overall suitability beliefs for the WSNs. In Table 6-15 the beliefs are shown 
as a percentage. 
Table 6-15: Overall suitability of the WSNs to be applied to asset integrity monitoring in offshore installations 
Evaluation Grades 
OVERALL SUITABILITY 
WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN4 
1 Poor 11.085% 9.270% 25.047% 
2 Indifferent 17.660% 9.760% 0.000% 
3 Average 20.927% 18.360% 8.850% 
4 Good 30.254% 19.410% 14.407% 
5 Excellent 20.073% 43.200% 51.697% 
    1 1 1 
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Figure 6-13: Graph showing the overall aggregated assessment for the WSNs from the calculated weights 
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It can be seen by Figure 6-13 that it is difficult to ascertain the most suitable WSN 
configuration for use offshore for asset integrity monitoring. However, what can be said 
is that WSNs 3 and 4 just out perform WSN 2 as they both have their highest beliefs at 
the top evaluation grade, excellent. Furthermore, when comparing the overall suitability 
graph from the normalised weights in Figure 6-9 with the graph in Figure 6-13, it can be 
seen that the aggregated assessment is much more coherent when the weights are 
calculated instead of normalised. This partially reinforces the claims by Yang & Xu, 
(2002) and Fu & Yang (2012) that applying calculated weights over normalised weights 
should present a more accurate analysis and results. In order to more accurately rank the 
WSNs in terms of their performance and suitability the utility estimation analysis 
demonstrated in Section 6.2.3.1 shall be applied further to determine the ranking of each 
WSN and to compare the results with the ranking with normalised weights. 
6.3.3 Utility Ranking Based on ER Analysis with Calculated Weights 
The WSN designs can be ranked based upon their aggregated belief degrees from the ER 
algorithm. This can be done through utility assessment. Suppose the utility of an 
evaluation grade, Hn, is denoted by u(Hn). The utility of the evaluation grade must be 
determined beforehand, with u(H1) = 0 and u(H5)=1 assuming there are five evaluation 
grades (Yang, 2001). If there is not preference information available then the values of 
u(Hn) can be assumed to be equidistant, as shown by Equation 3-33: 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = {𝑢(𝐻1) = 0, 𝑢(𝐻2) = 0.25, 𝑢(𝐻3) = 0.5, 𝑢(𝐻4) = 0.75, 𝑢(𝐻5) = 1}      
𝑢(𝐻𝑛) = {𝑢(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟) = 0, 𝑢(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 0.25, 𝑢(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 0.5,
𝑢(𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑) = 0.75, 𝑢(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1} 
The estimated utility for the general and basic attributes, S(z(ei)), given the set of 
evaluation grades is given by Equation 3-34: 
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𝑢 (𝑆(𝑧(𝑒𝑖))) = ∑ 𝑢(𝐻𝑛)𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
(𝑒𝑖) 
Equation 3-34 can be used as it is because the belief degrees sum to equal 1, therefore 
there can be no upper or lower bound limit on the utility estimation, just one utility value 
for each WSN. Each WSN can be ranked both in terms of each general attribute and the 
overall suitability of the WSNs. By applying Equation 3-34 and the data in Table 6-14 to 
the general attribute Complexity for WSN 3, its utility score can be determined.  
𝑢(𝑆(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦))
= (𝑢(𝐻1)𝛽1) + (𝑢(𝐻2)𝛽2) + (𝑢(𝐻3)𝛽3) + (𝑢(𝐻4)𝛽4) + (𝑢(𝐻5)𝛽6)
= (0 × 0.2225) + (0.25 × 0.141) + (0.5 × 0.498) + (0.75 × 0.046)
+ (1 × 0.91) = 0.409 
The utility estimation is calculated the same was for each general attribute for each WSN 
and for the overall suitability for each WSN. These results are tabulated and the WSNs 
can be ranked accordingly. 
Table 6-16 shows that WSN 4 performs better it terms of the networks ability to deal with 
complex transmissions and connection, with WSN 3 fairing much better than WSN 2. In 
terms of their ability to deal with complex transmission s and connections the WSNs are 
ranked as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 
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Table 6-16: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Complexity from calculated weights 
Complexity (x) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.561 0.225 0.405 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.000 0.141 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.309 0.498 0.226 
H4 Good 0.75 0.044 0.046 0.023 
H5 Excellent 1 0.086 0.091 0.347 
            
    u(Total) 0.274 0.409 0.477 
    Ranking 3 2 1 
 
As stated previously when analysing Figure 6-11, it was clear that WSNs 3 and 4 clearly 
outperformed WSN 2, however, it was not possible to distinguish the performances of 
WSN 3 and WSN 4. Based on the rankings calculated in Table 6-17 it is clear that WSN 
3 out performs WSN 4 in terms of its resilience. Hence the ranking order of the WSNs 
for the attribute resilience is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 
Table 6-17: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Resilience from calculated weights 
Resilience (y) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.041 0.000 0.135 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.143 0.129 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.143 0.037 0.078 
H4 Good 0.75 0.359 0.129 0.135 
H5 Excellent 1 0.313 0.704 0.652 
            
    u(Total) 0.690 0.852 0.792 
    Ranking 3 1 2 
 
Continuing in with the ranking of the WSNs based on their performance against each 
general attribute, Table 6-18 shows the ranking of each WSN for Maintainability. It can 
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be seen that WSN 1 drastically out performs WSNs 2, 3 and 4 in terms of their capabilities 
as an easily maintainable network. Hence the ranking of the WSN is as follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 1 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 
Table 6-18: Utility values and ranking of WSNs, 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the general attribute Maintainability from 
calculated weights 
Maintainability (z) belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.035 0.000 0.238 0.423 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.026 0.380 0.000 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.063 0.276 0.306 0.052 
H4 Good 0.75 0.505 0.309 0.430 0.285 
H5 Excellent 1 0.371 0.035 0.026 0.240 
              
    u(Total) 0.788 0.500 0.501 0.480 
    Ranking 1 3 2 4 
 
Finally, the WSNs are ranked based upon their overall performance from the ER 
algorithm with calculated weights utilising information provided in Table 6-15. Table 
6-19 outlines the overall suitability belief for WSNs 2, 3 and 4. WSN 1 cannot be included 
as it was not assessed against general attributes Complexity and Resilience. It can be seen 
that WSN 3 would appear to be the most suitable design and data transmission choice for 
offshore applications. This provides some clarity to the analysis of Figure 6-13 where it 
could be seen that either WSN 3 or WSN 4 would be the most suitable configuration 
based upon the analysis with calculated weights. The ranking for overall suitability is as 
follows: 
𝑊𝑆𝑁 3 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 4 > 𝑊𝑆𝑁 2 
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Table 6-19: Overall utility values and ranking of WSNs, 2, 3 and 4 based on calculated weights 
Overall Suitability Belief 
Grades u(Grades) WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
H1 Poor 0 0.111 0.093 0.250 
H2 Indifferent 0.25 0.177 0.098 0.000 
H3 Average 0.5 0.209 0.184 0.089 
H4 Good 0.75 0.303 0.194 0.144 
H5 Excellent 1 0.201 0.432 0.517 
            
    u(Total) 0.576 0.694 0.669 
    Ranking 3 1 2 
 
The rankings demonstrated are conclusive given the expert judgements presented in Table 
6-2 and the relative weights established in Table 6-13. It is clear from the data presented 
in the graphs and tables that utilising calculated weights as opposed to normalised weights 
organises the aggregated belief structures much more coherently. This allows for a more 
accurate estimation of the rankings by simply analysing the data without calculating the 
utility estimations for absolute rankings. However, the rankings of the WSNs for the 
general attributes and the overall assessment must be compared in terms of the results for 
normalised weights and calculated weights.  
6.4 Comparison of Results given Normalised Weights and 
Calculated Weights 
In theory, the application of calculated weights through expert judgement and AHP 
analysis should prove to be more accurate than the method of normalising the relative 
weights of attributes. To determine the validity of this statement, Table 6-20 shows the 
utility values and rankings of each WSN against the general attributes and the final overall 
assessment.  
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Table 6-20: Utility estimations and ranks of each WSN for the general attributes and overall assessment for 
normalised weights and calculated weights 
  WSN 1 WSN 2 WSN 3 WSN 4 
Complexity (x) 
Normalised 
u(Total)   0.404 0.409 0.306 
Ranking   2 1 3 
Calculated 
u(Total)   0.274 0.409 0.477 
Ranking   3 2 1 
Resilience (x) 
Normalised 
u(Total)   0.718 0.879 0.809 
Ranking   3 1 2 
Calculated 
u(Total)   0.690 0.852 0.792 
Ranking   3 1 2 
Maintainability (x) 
Normalised 
u(Total) 0.719 0.508 0.502 0.466 
Ranking 1 2 3 4 
Calculated 
u(Total) 0.788 0.500 0.501 0.480 
Ranking 1 3 2 4 
Overall 
Normalised 
u(Total)   0.550 0.597 0.525 
Ranking   2 1 3 
Calculated 
u(Total)   0.576 0.694 0.669 
Ranking   3 1 2 
 
It is immediately apparent from Table 6-20 that the utility values and ranks of the WSNs 
are not completely the same for normalised weights as they are for calculated weights. In 
terms of complexity the ranks are slightly different in that for the normalised weighting 
system WSN 3 performs the best with WSN 4 performing the worst. However, when the 
calculated weights method is used, WSN 4 is apparently the most preferred method of 
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data transmission. Furthermore, the utility values for the normalised weight method show 
very little difference in terms of the actual values, 0.404, 0.409 and 0.306 for WSNs 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. However, when the calculated weights are used, the utility values 
differ much more drastically with 0.274, 0.409 and 0.477 for WSNs 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. This shows that the equal assignment of weights has a large effect on the 
outcomes of the ranking estimations. Typically, one would expect WSNs 3 and 4 to be 
able to cope with more complex data transmission than WSN 2 (Mhatre & Rosenberg, 
2004) (Fischione, 2014). This would lead one to suggest that the ranking generated from 
utilising calculated weights is more accurate than normalising the weights.  
When the rankings for the resilience attribute are analysed it can be seen that the ranks of 
each WSN are identical for both normalised and calculated weights. However, what can 
be seen is greater differences between the utility values. Where, WSNs 2, 3 and 4 for 
normalised weights show utility values of 0.718, 0.879 and 0.809 respectively. These 
values are rather similar when compared to the values generated when using calculated 
weights, where, WSN 2, 3 and 4 show utility values of 0.69, 0.852 and 0.792 respectively. 
The ranking order of both methods follow the literature in terms of the type of WSN that 
would be more resilient in terms of battery power and the ability to relay data. It stands 
to reason that WSN 2 would not have performed well in terms of relaying data, whereas 
WSN 3 and 4 would have predictably performed much better in their ability to relay data 
as well have a substantial battery life (Fischione, 2014) (IEC, 2014).  
Furthermore, in the analysis of Maintainability, where all four WSNs were able to be 
analysed, it is WSN 1, in both cases, that demonstrates that it is the best performing WSN 
in terms of maintainability. This would be logical as it is in theory the least complex of 
all the WSN designs. Similarly, the utility values for the normalised weight method and 
the calculated weight method do not differ very much. In both instances WSN 1 ranks 
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first and WSN 4 ranks second, with WSNs 2 and 3 in the middle with very similar utility 
estimations. The utility estimations for normalised weights read as, 0.719, 0.508, 0.502 
and 0.466 for WSNs 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. These do not change much when compared 
to the calculated weights utility intervals of, 0.788, 0.5, 0.501 and 0.48 for WSNs 1, 2 ,3 
and 4 respectively. These out comes seem very much driven by the belief structure for 
the basic attributes as the calculated weights for the basic attributes do differ from the 
normalised weights. The calculated weights for attributes e6, e7 and e8 are calculated as 
53.62%, 20.46% and 25.92% respectively which are much different from the 33.33% for 
each attribute. Whereas in the belief structure of the basic attributes it is clear that for 
maintainability WSN 1 has high degrees of belief in the high evaluation grades of good, 
and excellent. Whereas, the belief degrees of the basic attributes for WSNs 2, 3 and 4 are 
generally aimed towards the grade average. Nevertheless, the assessment that WSN 1 is 
the more maintainable of the four WSN is backed up by the literature as it is by far the 
least complex WSN configuration. It would also make a fine selection for use as an asset 
integrity monitoring tool, on-board offshore platforms, where it not for the network 
lacking the ability to relay data and alter the transmission route of its transmitted 
information and data (Mhatre & Rosenberg, 2004) (Fischione, 2014). 
Finally, the overall assessment grades for WSNs 2, 3 and 4 for normalised weights and 
calculated weights both show that WSN 3 is the most suited overall to be utilised as an 
asset integrity monitoring tool. As WSN 3 is a multi-hop configuration with the smallest 
possible sensor node radius and WSN 4 is identical except it incorporates the largest 
sensor node radius, it would stand to reason that is WSN 3 is preferred then WSN 4 would 
rank second. This can be seen in the calculated weight assessment where the WSNs are 
ranked WSN 3 > WSN 4 > WSN 2. However, in the normalised weight assessment, 
WSNs 2 and 4 are reversed in their ranking. This would suggest that the calculation of 
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the weights for the general attributes and hence the overall assessment is more accurate 
that normalising the weights. Furthermore, it is clear that in some cases in the basic 
attribute analysis that a number of the results are driven by the basic attribute belief 
degrees much more than others.  
Based upon the analysis presented in this research and the results generated, it is evident 
that should a WSN be applied to monitor the asset integrity of an offshore electrical power 
generation system, then a multi-hop configuration with a small sensor node radius would 
be the preferred option. 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is essentially a measure of how responsive or sensitive the 
output of the model is when subject to variations from its inputs. Having the 
understanding of how a model responds to changes in its parameters is important when 
trying to maximise its potential and ensuring correct use of the ER algorithm. In the 
context of this research, SA will be used as a demonstration to determine how 
deterministic the relative weights of the general attributes are in the calculation of the 
overall belief degrees. Knowing the most influential attributes can assist in the 
experimentation and further expansion of the evaluation hierarchy. Similarly, attributes 
which have very little influence can be altered or discarded (Matellini, 2012) (Loughney, 
et al., 2016).  
The SA conducted for the ER algorithm calculation focuses on WSN 3 (multi-hop with a 
small radius, R), specifically, the general attributes, Complexity, Resilience and 
Maintainability. The analysis will be conducted using small increases and decreases in 
the calculated weights of the attributes as opposed to just demonstrating the difference 
between normalised weights and calculated weights.  
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The method used to undertake the SA is to manually insert evidence into the weights of 
the attributes, one by one, and subsequently analyse the effect on the overall belief degree 
of WSN 3. This method involves individually increasing one attributes weight by 5% and 
10% and decreeing the weight by -5% and -10%. However, this results in the final sum 
of the weights not being equal to 1.0 or 100%. Therefore, the remaining attribute weights 
are altered by the same amount as the focus attribute. In other words, if the node 
Complexity (x) is increased by 10%, the attributes Resilience and Maintainability are 
decreased by that 10% difference. i.e. when attribute x is increased by 10%, attributes Y 
and z are each decreased by 5% of x. This allows for the sum of the weights to remain 
equal to 1. Table 6-21, Table 6-22 and  
Table 6-23 show the increase and decrease of the weights when a specific attribute is the 
focus of the SA 
Table 6-21:  Calculated Sensitivity Analysis weights when the general attribute Complexity is the focus 
Complexity (x) Resilience (y) Maintainability (z) SUM 
10% 2.13% 23.47% -5% of X 48.79% -5% of X 27.73% 100.00% 
5% 1.07% 22.41% -2.5% of X 49.33% -2.5% of X 28.27% 100.00% 
0%   21.34% 0% 49.86% 0% 28.80% 100.00% 
-5% 1.07% 20.27% 2.5% of X 50.39% 2.5% of X 29.33% 100.00% 
-10% 2.13% 19.21% 5% of X 50.93% 5% of X 29.87% 100.00% 
 
Table 6-22: Calculated Sensitivity Analysis weights when the general attribute Resilience is the focus 
Resilience (y) Complexity (x) Maintainability (z) SUM 
10% 4.99% 54.85% -5% of Y 18.85% -5% of Y 26.31% 100.00% 
5% 2.49% 52.35% -2.5% of Y 20.09% -2.5% of Y 27.55% 100.00% 
0%   49.86% 0% 21.34% 0% 28.80% 100.00% 
-5% 2.49% 47.37% 2.5% of Y 22.59% 2.5% of Y 30.05% 100.00% 
-10% 4.99% 44.87% 5% of Y 23.83% 5% of Y 31.29% 100.00% 
 
Table 6-23: Calculated Sensitivity Analysis weights when the general attribute Maintainability is the focus 
Maintainability (z) Complexity (x) Resilience (y) SUM 
10% 2.88% 31.68% -5% of Z 19.90% -5% of Z 48.42% 100.00% 
5% 1.44% 30.24% -2.5% of Z 20.62% -2.5% of Z 49.14% 100.00% 
0%   28.80% 0% 21.34% 0% 49.86% 100.00% 
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-5% 1.44% 27.36% 2.5% of Z 22.06% 2.5% of Z 50.58% 100.00% 
-10% 2.88% 25.92% 5% of Z 22.78% 5% of Z 51.30% 100.00% 
The sensitivity analysis weights calculated in Table 6-21, Table 6-22 and  
Table 6-23 are applied to the ER algorithm to demonstrate the effects of small changes 
on the overall belief degrees. Each belief degree is analysed against the effect each general 
attribute. Figure 6-14, Figure 6-15, Figure 6-16, Figure 6-17 and Figure 6-18 demonstrate 
the sensitivity results for each individual evaluation grade belief (poor, indifferent, 
average, good and excellent). 
 
It can be seen from Figure 6-14 that the belief that the performance of WSN 3 is poor is 
affected much more by the weight of the attribute resilience than the other attributes. This 
is most likely due to the fact that the original weight of the resilience attribute is much 
larger than that of the other two attributes, hence would have a larger effect on the final 
belief degree. Furthermore, when the weight of the resilience attribute is decreased, the 
belief that WSN 3 is poor increases. This would concur with the beliefs aggregated from 
the basic attributes, where the overall resilience belief degree for WSN 3 was more 
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Figure 6-14: Sensitivity functions for the general attributes and their effect on the belief of the grade 'poor' 
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inclined to good and excellent. Hence if the influence of the resilience attribute decreases 
then the belief that WSN 3 is poor increases. 
Figure 6-15 show the sensitivity of the belief degree of the grade indifferent given the SA 
weights of the general attributes for WSN 3.  It can be seen that the grade indifferent is 
more sensitive to the weights of Resilience and Maintainability. The attribute Complexity 
has very negligible effect on the outcome of the grade indifferent as the belief aggregated 
from the basic attributes shows that the belief for Complexity tends more to average. 
Similarly, Resilience has a large effect again as it has the much larger weight than the 
other general attributes. Furthermore, as the weight of Maintainability decreases the belief 
degree increases. This is due to the aggregated belief degree generated from the basic 
attributes for WSN 3 for maintainability is 0. Hence, reducing the weight will increase 
the belief degree. 
Figure 6-16 shows the sensitivity function for the for the belief degree of the grade 
average. It can be seen again that the weight of Resilience has the greatest effect on the 
belief degree. This can again be attributed to the fact that resilience has the largest weight 
and the largest effect. Similarly, the aggregated belief degree for resilience being average 
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Figure 6-15: Sensitivity functions for the general attributes and their effect on the belief of the grade 'indifferent' 
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is very small, hence as the weight decreases the belief degree increases. On the other hand, 
the belief degree does not vary much with the weights of complexity and maintainability. 
This stems from the fact that their weights are much lower than that of resilience and that 
they are similar. Furthermore, the aggregated belief degrees for the grade average are also 
substantial at 0.49 and 0.3 for complexity and maintainability respectively. Therefore, 
there is minor change in the belief degree. Complexity just has slightly more effect on the 
belief degree as its aggregated belief is larger than that of maintainability, but the original 
weight of complexity is slightly smaller than that of maintainability, 0.21 when compared 
to 0.28 
Figure 6-17 shows the sensitivity functions for the overall belief degree of the grade good. 
It can be seen that the general attribute, maintainability, has the greatest effect on the 
outcome of the belief degree. This is due to the fact that the aggregated belief degree from 
the basic attributes is much greater, at 0.43, than that of 0.045, for complexity, and 0.12, 
for resilience. 
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Figure 6-16: Sensitivity functions for the general attributes and their effect on the belief of the grade 'average’ 
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Finally, Figure 6-18 shows the sensitivity functions of the belief degree for the grade 
excellent. The graph demonstrates that the attribute resilience has great effect on the belief 
degree. This is for two key reasons; firstly, the weight of the attribute is the greatest and 
secondly the aggregated belief of the basic attributes shows that that resilience heavily 
tends to the grade excellent, with the belief at 0.7. This is a substantial value when 
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Figure 6-17: Sensitivity functions for the general attributes and their effect on the belief of the grade 'good’ 
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Figure 6-18: Sensitivity functions for the general attributes and their effect on the belief of the grade 'excellent’ 
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compared to the aggregated beliefs of complexity and maintainability for the grade 
excellent which are 0.09 and 0.02 respectively. 
6.6 Validation 
In order for partial validation of the method of applying the ER algorithm to the decision-
making process, it must first satisfy the four axioms stated in the decision-making 
methodology in Section 3.7. Examination of the analysis and results shows that when the 
weights are altered either drastically or by a small margin, then the belief degrees are also 
altered by similar margins. Similarly, the overall belief degrees and the general attribute 
beliefs are also very much reliant on the magnitude of the belief degrees of the basic 
attributes.  Each axiom shall be identified and cross examined individually. 
 The independence axiom: where a general attribute must not be assessed to an 
evaluation grade, Hn, if none of the basic attributes in E are assessed to Hn.. This 
axiom can be said to be satisfied because when the aggregation of the general 
attribute maintainability is analysed, for WSN 2, it can be seen that none of the 
basic attributes are assessed to the grade poor, i.e. βn, i = 0 for i = 1, …, L. because 
of this, the belief degree of the evaluation grade, indifferent, for the general 
attribute, maintainability, should also be equal to 0, i.e. βn, = 0, and it is. Hence, 
in this instance the independence axiom is satisfied. Furthermore, when Table 
6-2, showing the belief degrees for the basic attributes, is examined and compared 
with the aggregated belief degree of the general attributes (Table 6-3and Table 
6-14) it can be seen that when all basic attributes have a belief degree of zero, for 
a given evaluation grade, then the general attribute belief is also zero. 
  The consensus axiom: where the general attributes should be precisely assessed 
to a grade Hn, if all of the basic attributes in E are assessed to Hn. This axiom can 
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be said to be satisfied by the example of the aggregation of the basic attributes of 
maintainability for WSN 2. The initial belief degrees for the evaluation grades, 
indifferent and average, of the basic attributes e1, e2 and e3 are Indifferent(0.4, 
0.2, 0.4) and average(0.2, 0.4, 0.4,) respectively. For the three basic attributes, 
there are similar values of belief degree. When the general attribute weights are 
equal, the axiom is satisfied, in this case, by the aggregated belief degree of the 
basic attributes for the grades indifferent and average, which are 0.342 for both. 
This demonstrates that when βk, i = 1 and βn, i = 0  for i = 1, …,L  and n = 1, …, 
N, n ≠ k,  then βk, = 1 and βn, = 0 (n = 1, …, N, n ≠ k). This trend can be seen 
across all of the data aggregation for all of the attributes. Hence, the ER analysis 
satisfies the consensus axiom.  
 The completeness axiom: where all basic attributes in E are completely assessed 
to a subset of evaluation grades, hence the general attributes should be completely 
assessed to the same subset of grades. This is true throughout the entire analysis 
whereby all attributes are assessed to the same set of evaluation grades of: poor, 
indifferent, average, good and excellent. Therefore, this axiom can be said to be 
satisfied. 
 The incompleteness axiom: where if an assessment for any basic attribute in E is 
incomplete, then the assessment for the general attribute should be incomplete to 
a certain degree. This is consistent throughout the analysis as there aren’t any 
incomplete belief degrees, all belief degrees sum to equal one for each attribute. 
This can be seen throughout the entire analysis. The initial belief degrees for the 
basic attributes sum to one for each attribute. Subsequently, the aggregated belief 
degrees for the general attributes also sum to equal one, and finally, the overall 
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assessment beliefs for each WSN also sum to equal one. Therefore, there are no 
incomplete assessments and the axiom can be said to be satisfied. 
Having satisfied the four outlined axioms for the ER algorithm, it can be said that the 
methodology and process are reasonably validated. 
6.7 Discussion 
While the analysis presented in this research proved to be conclusive, there is still room 
for improvement. The initial designs of the wireless sensor networks are only concerned 
with hardware and transmission configurations and not any software at all. Immediately 
this is an area for improvement. The software plays a key role in the operation and 
resilience of a WSN, in terms of the data that can be detected and transmitted and the 
issue of cyber-protection. Further study is need in the area of software design and 
selection, in relation to the designs and assessment outlined in this research. 
Similarly, in terms of the decision-making algorithm, there are a number of areas that 
would benefit from further work and improvement. Initially the assessment contains eight 
basic attributes and three general attributes, which can be extended given the application 
of software analysis. This would inevitably make the analysis and results much more 
coherent, by covering the comparison of a number of WSN designs based upon the 
application of software. It is also possible to apply a larger selection of evaluation grades. 
In this work five evaluation grades were used to reduce complexity in the decision-
making algorithm, but more grades can be utilised. For example, Ren, J. et al. (2014) 
apply the use of three different evaluation grading systems for three risk assessment areas. 
Each evaluation grading system contains seven evaluation grades. This provides a much 
more accurate generation of the basic attribute belief degrees. However, utilising an 
258 
  
increased number of evaluation grades requires further aggregation through the use of 
fuzzy reasoning. 
Similarly, it is possible to improve the analysis at the point of utility estimation through 
the use of the probability method. This involves calculating the utilities of the evaluation 
grades as opposed to estimating them, as was done in this research (Yang & Xu, 2002). 
The probability method is initially the same as estimating the utilities for the extreme 
evaluation grades, i.e. Poor = 0 and Excellent = 1. However, the remaining grades are no 
estimated they are determined by experts who are given a choice of two upper and lower 
bound situations. As outlined by Yang J. (2001), the expert is given two “tickets” or 
situations, in Yang’s work the two tickets are probability of a chance to win a car with 
top performance, p, and probability of a chance to win a car with the worst performance, 
1-p. The decision-maker is asked to identify a probability value, p, at which the two 
tickets are equivalent. The decision-maker determines what value the probability holds at 
for a given evaluation grade, at which point an upper and lower bound utility is produced 
for the evaluation grade. This is repeated similarly for the other evaluation grades. This 
method provides a more accurate way of determining ranks as it provides an upper and 
lower bound utility value. 
Finally, a further path to expand upon the decision-making within this research is to apply 
extended ER algorithms to the outline situation. One unique ER rule in particular has 
been developed by Yang & Xu (2013). Their research establishes a unique ER rule to 
combine multiple pieces of independent evidence conjunctively with weights and 
reliabilities. They propose the novel concept of Weighted Belief Distribution (WBD) 
extended to WBD with Reliability (WBDR) to characterise evidence in complement of 
Belief Distribution (BD) introduced in the D–S theory of evidence. Hence, the new ER 
rule constitutes a generic conjunctive probabilistic reasoning process, which is applicable 
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to combine multiple pieces of independent evidence with different weights and 
reliabilities in a wide range of areas such as multiple criteria decision analysis. 
Application of this ER rule could improve the analysis as it can determine if there is 
conflict between subjective information sources, and hence one may be reliable. in the 
event that two pieces of evidence conflict, the weighted average rule is applied to the 
belief degrees and in theory increases the reliability of the belief degrees (Yang & Xu, 
2013).  
6.8 Conclusion 
Real world decision problems and assessments are often complex and involve multiple 
attributes with high uncertainty. Hence, it is essential to conduct a coherent, rational, 
reliable, and transparent decision analysis. This research investigated the possible 
configurations and designs of Wireless Sensor Networks that could feasibly operate 
within an offshore electrical power generator for the purpose of asset integrity monitoring. 
While initially, attempts were made to distinguish the most suitable WSN based upon 
their required battery energy, it was found that this, while informative, was not a feasible 
method of determining the best suited WSN. Therefore, a set of qualitative criteria and 
attributes was outlined to assist with the decision. Similarly, the Evidential Reasoning 
approach was investigated and utilised for the purpose of determining the most suitable 
WSN design by aggregating the multiple attributes.  
The ER approach establishes a nonlinear relationship between an aggregated assessment 
for general attributes and an original assessment of basic attributes. The numerical 
analysis of the research dealt with the design selection problem outlined previously with 
key information and data taken from literature and expert judgements. It demonstrated 
that the ER approach could accurately be used as a viable decision -making tool in the 
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design selection of WSN. Furthermore, the application of estimated weights and 
calculated weights demonstrates how sensitive the Evidential Reasoning algorithm is to 
changes initial data entries. From the analysis, it is clear that the ER approach can be 
applied to a number of Multi Attribute Decision Analysis problems with or without 
uncertainty. 
This research set out to outline a number of WSN configurations for use in the offshore 
industry and determine the most suitable based upon a set of design criteria. Four WSN 
configurations were drawn up: i) WSN 1 – Single-hop, ii) WSN 2 – Single-hop with 
cluster nodes, iii) WSN 3 – Multi-hop with a small sensor radius and iv) WSN 4 – Multi-
hop with a large sensor radius. Following this a qualitative evaluation hierarchy was 
established to further solve the decision-making problem, i.e. which WSN would me most 
suitable for application within an electrical power generation module. The ER approach 
and algorithm was applied to each of the WSNs based upon the outlined attribute 
hierarchy. The subsequent analysis determined that a multi-hop configuration with a 
small sensor radius would be the ideal solution to asset integrity monitoring of an offshore 
electrical generator. 
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7 CHAPTER 7:  
DISCUSSION & FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summary 
This chapter discusses the research and analysis provided in this thesis, with particular 
emphasis on the applicability of the work and its application to offshore oil and gas 
platforms. The ability of the dynamic risk assessment methodology and BN techniques to 
adapt to various areas of an offshore platform has been demonstrated through the case 
studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Similarly, the initial development of the topology 
of a WSN and flexibility of the decision-making methodology has been analysed in detail 
in Chapter 6. Additional research limitations are addressed as well as proposals for 
further research.  
7.1 Development and Applicability of the Research 
This thesis develops two risk assessment models in the form of BNs (Chapters 4 and 5) 
and a suitable WSN for asset integrity monitoring (Chapter 6), all applied to the electrical 
power generator of a fixed offshore platform in the North Sea. These BN models and 
WSN facilitate the key requirements for the development of an NUI-Asset Integrity Case. 
The rationale for this research originates from the growing need for a dynamic risk 
assessment framework to operate in conjunction with safety cases to assist with the 
correct enforcement of offshore safety case regulations. While certain offshore incident 
data suggests that the numbers of incidents has gradually decreased since the introduction 
of safety case regulations in 1992, and subsequent amendments, there still remains an 
issue of potential under-reporting and fluctuation of incidents within the offshore industry 
(see Chapter 2 and Appendix D).  
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The BNs lie at the core of the research as they form the basis for the dynamic risk 
assessment required for the Asset Integrity Case to be a success. These BNs have been 
constructed in order to assess two key factors: 
1. Initially, a BN has been developed, in Chapter 4, and used to model the cause and 
effect relationship of a specific component failure within a module of an offshore 
platform. It has been stated that offshore systems can be very complex and when 
coupled with the volume of data required to model failures within these systems, it 
makes BNs a challenge to model effectively. As well as in some cases a lack of 
reliable data means that some risk assessment models cannot always be applied. With 
this in mind, the Initial BN model, which deals with a single component failure within 
module 2 of the Thistle Alpha Platform, demonstrates that BNs can provide an 
effective and applicable method of determining the likelihood of various events under 
uncertainty. The model can be used to investigate various scenarios around the 
systems and components outlined and to show the beginnings of establishing where 
attention should be focused within the objective of preventing offshore incidents, as 
well as having a clear representation of specifically where these accidents can 
originate from.  
2. A BN model was developed, in Chapter 5, which demonstrated the cause and effect 
relationships that several initial failures can have on an offshore electrical generation 
system. In particular, the potential for a fuel gas release from the gas turbine which 
drives the electrical generation system. The research presented in Chapter 5 here 
expanded upon the work presented in Chapter 4, which illustrates the cause effect 
relationship of one component failure within an electrical generator and the general 
consequences that can result. The BN model presented Chapter 5 expands on this by 
incorporating part of the model in Chapter 4 along with several initial failures to 
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analyse a specific consequence in further detail. This consequence concerns itself with 
a possible fuel gas release and the potential fire and explosion hazards that can occur. 
However, while it is easier to demonstrate the effects of accidents involving fire and 
explosion, it is not easy to demonstrate the consequences of a leak without an ignition 
source. These consequences are equally important for offshore platform operators due 
to the improved HSE regulations within Safety Cases regarding hazards to the 
environment in any instance. Therefore, in the event that there is a fuel gas leak 
without ignition, it poses a large issue for operators and duty holders given that the 
release is undetected. While it is not as severe as a hydrocarbon release into the sea, 
it is still vital as it is the ejection of natural gas into the atmosphere which can have 
severe consequences depending on the weather conditions. 
The purpose of both BN models, more so the model in Chapter 4, was to demonstrate that 
the BN modelling theory and techniques could be applied to dynamic risk assessment for 
asset integrity monitoring of offshore equipment. However, there can often be gaps 
between research and practice. Many useful research theories and ideas can go unused 
and wasted. In this thesis a number of case studies and test cases are used to demonstrate 
the real world applicability of the dynamic BN risk assessment models, particularly in 
Chapter 5. This is key as it is an attempt to bridge the gap between the research and 
practical issues in the offshore industry. This is achieved and demonstrated in Chapter 4 
by showing how severe the consequences can be when a single component, in a rotor 
retaining ring, suffers a failure. Furthermore, the model in Chapter 5 expands on this by 
demonstrating several component failures and the severity of the consequences. The 
consequences in Chapter 5 are outlined in two ways. Firstly, the potential environmental 
implications of an undetected fuel gas leak, and secondly, the level of consequences if an 
undetected gas leak is ignited. These consequences take the form fire and explosion, as 
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well as damage to the equipment in the immediate vicinity and potential damage to 
equipment in adjacent offshore modules. The models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 focus 
on the risk assessment aspect of the asset integrity case utilising data from previously 
known incidents, however, this is not the case in the real world. Incidents and accidents 
are extremely difficult to predict, hence the development and analysis of a number of 
remote sensing methods was conducted in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 set out to address the issue that real world decision problems and assessments 
are often complex and involve multiple attributes with high uncertainty. Hence, it is 
essential to conduct a coherent, rational, reliable, and transparent decision analysis. This 
research investigated the possible configurations and designs of Wireless Sensor 
Networks that could feasibly operate within an offshore electrical power generator for the 
purpose of asset integrity monitoring. A set of qualitative criteria and attributes was 
outlined to assist with the decision. Similarly, the Evidential Reasoning approach was 
investigated and utilised for the purpose of determining the most suitable WSN design by 
aggregating the multiple attributes. Chapter 6 outlined a number of WSN configurations 
for use in the offshore industry and determined the most suitable based upon a set of 
design criteria. Four WSN configurations were drawn up: i) WSN 1 – Single-hop, ii) 
WSN 2 – Single-hop with cluster nodes, iii) WSN 3 – Multi-hop with a small sensor 
radius and iv) WSN 4 – Multi-hop with a large sensor radius. The subsequent analysis 
determined that a multi-hop configuration with a small sensor radius would be the ideal 
solution to asset integrity monitoring of an offshore electrical generator. 
The issue of remote sensing is key within the development of the Asset Integrity Case as 
it relies on the continuous supply and updating of data to the dynamic risk assessment 
models. Having a strategic and fully operational WSN continually monitoring asset 
integrity of offshore equipment, particularly equipment in remote and hazardous locations, 
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can significantly aid with the reduction of severe offshore incidents and accidents. The 
application of this has the potential to reverse the industry perspective of combating 
incidents from reactive to predictive.  
7.2 Research Limitations 
The overall limitations of the research have been outlined in Chapter 1, with more specific 
limitations stated in each analytical chapter (chapters 4, 5 and 6). However, having 
completed the research, some further key points can be added. The points are as follows: 
 When considering the BNs, the majority of the nodes have incorporated a binary 
method, i.e. the states of most nodes are either “Yes” or “No”. This limits the BN 
models in terms of time-based factors. Similarly, this limits the verification and 
validation of the models to be partially complete. For a full, comprehensive 
validation, the models would have to be tested on board an offshore platform in 
real time.  
 Furthermore, when considering the limited number of states of some nodes in the 
BNs, it reduces the complexity of the CPTs within the nodes. This is to combat 
the limitations regarding the scarcity of available data. Applying the models in the 
real world situations would allow for more complex and intricate CPTs to be used 
to increase the accuracy of the BN models and analysis.  
 When considering the WSNs in Chapter 6, only the hardware and topology was 
considered for analysis. This was to reduce complexity in the development of the 
WSNs and approaching the software based areas of WSNs would drastically 
increase the complexity and time frame of the research.  
 Similarly, the WSNs incorporated a finite number of sensor nodes within the 
electrical generator. This is again to reduce the complexity of the analysis. 
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However, it was also to only outline the components and parameters for asset 
integrity monitoring. It would be much more ideal to consider a much larger 
number of more specific components to apply the WSN to. 
When considering the scope and application of the research for the development of the 
Asset Integrity Case, a key weakness is the age of the data that is used when compared to 
the aged of the data required. What this means is the Asset Integrity Case would function 
in real time with continuously updated data sets. However, in this research only historical 
data can be utilised. This again reiterates the point of practically applying the Asset 
Integrity Case framework, BN models and WSNs to an actual offshore safety critical 
element and/or system. Similarly, some aspects of the analysis require the opinions of 
some experts. This data would undoubtedly need re-assessing as new experts would 
replace the old ones. This in turn affects the level of experience and well as a difference 
of intellect and opinion.  
7.3 Further Research 
As mentions in the previous section there are areas of limitations within the research, 
these areas are a good focus for developing the research further. Some further research 
sections have been demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Considering the BN in Chapter 
4, a suggestion of developing the research to fuel gas fire was applied in Chapter 5. 
However, further development was discussed in terms of other potential generator failures. 
It was suggested that possible modification to the model could be addition of instances 
that induce mechanical failures. In a similar way that a retaining ring within an alternator 
can cause damage and failures of an electrical generator, the turbine running overspeed 
can has a similar effect. A turbine running overspeed has many of its own causes, such as 
loss of load and control system failure, and are not shown here as these are hypotheses 
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that can be expanded on. Overspeed Excursion would potentially have an effect on the 
mechanical equipment related to the rotor on the generator. Nodes indicating “Turbine 
Running Overspeed” as a failure and “Overspeed Detection” could be incorporated into 
the model. These nodes would potentially have an effect on the retaining ring, the 
generator bearings, the turbine blades and the exciter, by increasing the stresses on these 
components that have small mechanical tolerances. From the “Overspeed Excursion” it 
is possible that “Overspeed Detection” could occur and potentially shut down the turbine 
and eliminate the possibility of event escalation.  
Similarly, the research concerning the development of WSNs can be improved by 
applying the development of the WSN software for data aggregation. The initial designs 
of the wireless sensor networks are only concerned with hardware and transmission 
configurations and not any software at all. This has been previously stated in Chapters 1 
and 6. Immediately this is an area for improvement. The software plays a key role in the 
operation and resilience of a WSN, in terms of the data that can be detected and 
transmitted and the issue of cyber-protection. Further study is needed in the area of 
software design and selection, in relation to the designs and assessment outlined in this 
research. This would solidify WSNs as a vital tool in the Asset Integrity Case. Similarly, 
the development of the software for a given WSN would allow the framework outlined 
in Chapter 3 to be fully applied to a real time asset integrity analysis of an offshore system. 
There are a number of areas in which the research can be further expanded and improved. 
Some of these points are outlined as follows: 
 Work can be done to develop the Asset Integrity Case framework and 
methodology across multiple areas and safety critical elements of an offshore 
installations.  
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 Expansion of the BN in Chapter 4 has already be discussed in terms of the turbine 
running overspeed or the fuel gas release within chapter 5. However, it is also 
possible to expand the model in terms of other aspects, such as: an electrical 
overload from the switchboard or the possibility of unburnt fuel gas in the Exhaust 
system.  
 The states within the BNs in Chapters 4 and 5 can be expanded from the simple 
binary, “Yes” and “No”, system. This is briefly demonstrated by some nodes in 
the BNs, such as: the size of a HC leak in Chapter 4 or the level of consequences 
in Chapter 5. Further expansion can be considered in terms of continuous nodes 
for time related failures and releases. Similarly, the type of failure can be taken 
into account in individual nodes, such as: in the “Rotor Retaining Ring Failure” 
node in Chapter 4, the states could be specific in terms of the level of failure. i.e. 
“Fatigue/Stress Cracking” and “Fragmentation”. This would provide a basis for 
expansion into more specific consequences and allow the BN model to be more 
accurate.  
 Further work can also be conducted in terms of the quality of data used. 
Continually, sourcing the most recent data sets would improve the accuracy of the 
model. Similarly, utilising a greater number of experts when gathering primary 
data through questionnaires and surveys. Similarly, the application of AHP and 
the symmetric method to construct CPTs in the absence of data are not the only 
methods that can be applied. A possible technique to consider would be the use of 
Noisy-OR which is applied by Matellini, (2012) to construct CPTs where data is 
unavailable. A disadvantage of Noisy-OR is that it assumes that the causes in the 
BN are independent. Although this assumption simplifies model development and 
CPTs treatment, it is not consistent with many applications and restricts the 
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possibility to model interactions among causes. However, Ashrafi et al., (2017) 
applies the use of Recursive Noisy-OR (RN-OR) which allows combination of 
dependent Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). RN-OR theory presents a 
rule relating various CPT values to each other to estimate the probability of an 
effect, given various causal dependencies (Ashrafi, et al., 2017). This could be a 
potential avenue to pursue as an alternative for constructing CPTs without 
available data. 
 Additional case studies can be undertaken with the results analysed first hand by 
experts in the industry. This would determine whether the developed integrity case 
would be ready for real world experimentation.  
 Similarly, it is possible to improve the analysis at the point of utility estimation 
through the use of the probability method. This involves calculating the utilities 
of the evaluation grades as opposed to estimating them, as was done in this 
research. This area for further expansion is presented in more detail in Chapter 6. 
The presented suggestions are not the only areas in which the research can be further 
developed. Much more research is required before any dynamic risk assessment and 
integrity monitoring techniques, such as the Asset Integrity Case, are applied to the 
offshore industry. However, if the research presented in this thesis can be used to support 
the claims and ideas for development of dynamic risk assessment for offshore 
installations, then it can be deemed to be a value to the offshore industry. 
7.4 Conclusion 
An overview of the BN models in Chapters 4 and 5 are presented as well as the 
development of a WSN in Chapter 6. The analysis and results of the research contained 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and its applicability to the offshore industry have been discussed. 
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More importantly, the applicability of BNs as a viable method for developing dynamic 
risk assessment models was clearly highlighted. As well as, the flexibility of both BN 
models as in terms of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Similarly, the development of the 
WSNs in Chapter 6 was highlighted, emphasising the unity between the data gathering 
method of remote sensing and detecting of asset integrity and the analysis of said data 
within a dynamic risk assessment model. Furthermore, the application of the Asset 
integrity Case framework and methodology was also discussed. Finally, the limitations 
of the research were featured and some further research ideas aimed at improving the 
research were also indicated. These further research ideas aim to address the limitations 
of the research.  
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8 CHAPTER 8:  
CONCLUSION 
Summary 
This chapter highlights the main aims and objectives regarding the development of a 
NUI-Asset Integrity Case. The application of the proposed Asset Integrity Case 
framework, outlined in Chapter 3, is also analysed and discussed. A key part of the 
research and Asset Integrity case development is the formulation of a coherent dynamic 
risk assessment methodology and model. The importance of the model in addressing 
dynamic asset integrity monitoring are highlighted. Furthermore, the applicability and 
application of WSNs for integrity monitoring on offshore platforms is also highlighted.  
8.1 Conclusions 
This research project set out develop and test methodologies development of an NUI-
Asset Integrity Case, to work alongside safety case regulations, enabling the offshore 
industry to move towards a situation where asset integrity can be continually and remotely 
monitored. The research targeted the fulfilment of stated aims and Objectives Outlined in 
Chapter 1. The assessment and conclusions of these objectives are outlined below. 
i. Identify a key offshore system that can be utilised as a base study for the Asset 
Integrity Case. 
This objective assessed in Chapters 1 and 2. When analysing the occurrence of various 
offshore incidents, it was apparent that incidents regarding gas turbine driven offshore 
generators are a consistent issue, as stated by HSE, Health and Safety Executive, 
(2008). This showed that there were approximately 307 hazardous events over a 13 
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year period, from 1991 to 2004.  However, as the Asset Integrity Case would operate 
alongside safety case regulations, ensuring the continued enforcement, more 
information would be provided. It was demonstrated that there was a significant trend 
in terms of the release of key safety case regulations and offshore incidents. Particular 
attention was focused on the trends between ship to platform collision incidents in the 
North Sea and the release of relevant regulations. Trends between gas turbine 
incidents and regulations were difficult to identify due to the vast levels of under-
reporting, as stated in Chapter 2. For example, from 1992 to 2014, 40% of fuel gas 
and power turbine gas releases were not detected by an automatic sensor, but were 
detected by human detection. The human detection includes smell, visual and a 
portable detector. In the instances of human detection, the recording of information is 
scarce, with 56% of fuel gas release incidents having little to no information regarding 
the location and cause of the release and in some cases, the extent of the dispersion. 
Furthermore, the majority of the 56% of releases with incomplete information and 
data were regarded as “Significant”, in terms of their severity level (HSE, 2014). This 
was a key driver in determining a key offshore area to focus the development of the 
NUI-Asset Integrity Case. As the Asset Integrity Case was to focus purely on the asset 
integrity and not on personnel, developing the integrity case around a system that 
demonstrated under-reporting due to human error was vital. Similarly, by developing 
the integrity case around gas turbine incidents and failures, it could further be 
expanded and first developed for an offshore area that would clearly benefit from a 
system of continuous asset integrity management.  
ii. Develop a substantial research methodology and Asset Integrity Case framework for 
producing a dynamic risk assessment model utilising risk assessment and decision-
making modelling methods.  
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This objective was dealt with in Chapter 3. A proposed framework for the 
development of the NUI-Asset Integrity Case was outlined in order to facilitate 
accurate development and research outcomes. The core of the framework was 
developed and analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 through demonstration of BNs as a viable 
method for generating dynamic risk assessment models. The framework also 
incorporated the development and decision making analysis of a WSN for remote 
asset integrity monitoring, as outlined in Chapter 6.  
The importance of such a framework is key as it demonstrates a methodology for 
developing dynamic risk assessment in conjunction with remote monitoring methods, 
which has not been presented before. The components of the framework link together 
in such a way that the BN models are continually expanded to improve clarity and 
accuracy. The linking of the components makes the framework an enhanced risk 
management framework, with key expansions, additions and modifications for 
application in the development of the Asset Integrity Case.  
The framework incorporates to distinct methodologies in a dynamic risk assessment 
methodology and a decision-making methodology. The dynamic risk assessment 
methodology focuses on the development and application of dynamic risk assessment 
models in the offshore industry. While in this research BNs are utilised as the 
modelling tool for the dynamic risk assessment, the frameworks flexibility allows for 
the inclusion of another modelling method. This is possible as the data gathering step 
within the framework are not completely geared to the development of BNs. Similarly, 
the decision-making methodology for the development of WSNs can also utilise other 
decision-making techniques other than Evidential Reasoning which was applied in 
this research. 
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The flexibility of the framework and methodologies is a key factor in developing an 
asset Integrity Case for other systems and safety critical elements of an offshore 
platform. However, the applicability of the framework depends heavily on the 
practical value of the dynamic risk assessment and decision-making methodologies. 
The best and most efficient way of demonstrating the frameworks applicability would 
be to conduct real-time field tests on an offshore platform for an extended period of 
time. Nevertheless, having such a framework can develop not only the management 
and application of the process but also be utilised as a basis for new and improved 
ideas.  
i. Develop flexible risk assessment and decision-making models for modelling offshore 
risk under uncertainty. As well as developing a number of viable methods that allows 
for the detecting and monitoring of asset integrity without a human presence on board 
an offshore installation. 
This objective was dealt with in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Following from the literature 
review and the development of the Asset integrity case framework, it was concluded 
that the application BNs to the development of the dynamic risk assessment model 
would be ideal. Following the literature review it was determined that there were 
several advantages of using BNs over alternate approaches, for example, in BNs 
diverse data, expert judgement and empirical data can all be combined. This is very 
useful in situations where there is incomplete data or a complete absence of data, and 
thus other forms of data and information can be incorporated into the network 
(Bolstad, 2007). The advantageous nature of BNs over other methods is outlined by 
Khakzad, et al., (2011), with the exclusive nature of comparing BNs and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) in safety analysis within the process industry. It was concluded by 
them that a BN is a superior technique in safety analysis due to its flexible structure, 
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which allows for it to fit a wide variety of accident scenarios. In conjunction to this, 
BNs provide a clear visual representation of what they are representing and can be a 
very powerful tool for formulating ideas and expanding the model in itself (Fenton & 
Neil, 2013). This trait is shared by other risk modelling techniques; however, BNs are 
particularly adaptable method. BNs also facilitate inference and the ability to update 
predictions through the insertion of new evidence or observations into its parameters. 
This makes them a very useful tool when dealing with uncertainty. 
Thus, two BN models were developed utilising the methodology outlined in Chapter 
3. Both models focused on the cause and effect relationship of gas turbine failures, 
within an offshore electric power generator. The idea was that later expansion could 
be applied due to the flexible nature of BNs to accommodate new situations and data. 
This trait was demonstrated in Chapter 5 where the BN model in Chapter 4 was 
expanded to focus on a more niche area of the gas turbine and ultimately focus more 
on the possible fire and explosion consequences. What the culmination of Chapters 4 
and 5 demonstrated is that BNs are viable tool for a dynamic risk assessment model 
within the Asset Integrity Case. Furthermore, these models were validated to ensure 
a certain degree of accuracy and confidence within the results, thus, developing a 
flexible method of demonstrating dynamic risk assessment for an offshore system.  
Continually, Chapter 6 dealt with the application of the decision making methodology 
to determine the most suitable method for remote asset integrity monitoring. After the 
literature review, in Chapter 2, a number of WSNs were outlined based upon the four 
main types of data transmission for WSNs. Similarly, based on industry standards, 
the location of 62 wireless sensor nodes were proposed within the electrical 
generation system. These were strategically located, with a given function, to develop 
a comprehensive WSN. The chapter set out to outline a number of WSN 
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configurations for use in the offshore industry and determine the most suitable based 
upon a set of design criteria. Four WSN configurations were drawn up: i) WSN 1 – 
Single-hop, ii) WSN 2 – Single-hop with cluster nodes, iii) WSN 3 – Multi-hop with 
a small sensor radius and iv) WSN 4 – Multi-hop with a large sensor radius. Following 
this a qualitative evaluation hierarchy was established to further solve the decision-
making problem, i.e. which WSN would be most suitable for application within an 
electrical power generation module. The ER approach and algorithm was applied to 
each of the WSNs based upon the outlined attribute hierarchy. The subsequent 
analysis determined that a multi-hop configuration with a small sensor radius would 
be the ideal solution to asset integrity monitoring of an offshore electrical generator.  
vi. Provide validation of the risk assessment and decision-making models, through the 
use of case studies, to demonstrate a reasonable level of confidence in the results.  
This objective was dealt with throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In terms of validating 
the research, a number of axioms were demonstrated. These axioms must be satisfied 
for both methodologies to show a good level of validity.  
In Chapter 4 the partial validation was conducted through the inserting of evidence in 
the form of the initiating component failing or not failing, the posterior probabilities 
for the final events decrease or increase depending on the node in question. This 
analysis also demonstrates that nodes closer to the focus node, in this case node 1, 
will display a larger influence than those which are further away. This exercise of 
increasing each of the influencing nodes as well as the changes displayed when 
increasing or decreasing the probability of the initial event occurring satisfied the 
three axioms stated, thus giving some validation to the BN Model in Chapter 4. 
Similarly, in Chapter 5 three test cases were used to demonstrate the models validity 
and to demonstrate its effectiveness to provide clear cause and effect relationships 
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between initial failures, mitigating barriers, accidents and consequences. Given the 
specific scenario of fuel gas release, it is clearly demonstrated in the test cases how 
severe the consequences can be given that the initial failures occur or the mitigating 
barriers do not function as intended. Test case 1 was designed to demonstrate that the 
model functioned in accordance with the stated axioms. Therefore, some partial 
validation could be stated before conducting Test Cases 2 and 3. Test Case 2 expanded 
upon Test Case 1 by demonstrating the level of consequences that can occur, through 
probabilities, given that a specific barrier failed to operate. The effects on the BN 
showed that the gas detection system is vital in the mitigation of a fuel gas release and 
the fire and explosion consequences. Finally, Test Case 3 illustrated the effects of 
inserting evidence in the “Consequence” node and analysing the effects on the prior 
probabilities. The results achieved from all three test cases provided some validation 
to the BN model. 
In terms of the decision-making analysis in Chapter 6, a separate set of axioms was 
outlined in the decision-making methodology in Chapter 3.  
In order for the decision-making analysis to have any degree of confidence these four 
axioms must have first been fulfilled. Examination of the analysis and results shows 
that when the weights are altered either drastically or by a small margin, then the 
belief degrees are also altered by similar margins. Each Axiom was identified and 
cross examined individually.  
Furthermore, all three Chapters were further validated through a Sensitivity Analysis 
(SA). SA is a measure of how responsive or sensitive the output of the model is when 
subject to variations from its inputs. Having the understanding of how models respond to 
changes in parameters is important when trying to maximise potential and ensuring 
correct use of the modelling techniques throughout the research project. In the context of 
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this research, SA was used in Chapters 4 and 5 as degree of confidence that the BN model 
has been built correctly and is working as intended. In Chapter 6, SA is demonstration to 
determine how deterministic the relative weights of the general attributes are in the 
calculation of the overall belief degrees 
8.2 Concluding Remarks 
A summary of the main conclusions from the research developed in this thesis are 
presented below: 
 A proposed framework and methodology for the development of an NUI-
Asset Integrity Case which links the development of a dynamic risk 
assessment model, along decision-making analysis to determine the most 
suitable remote detection method for asset integrity management. 
 Two methodologies are presented in Chapter 3: the first demonstrating the 
formulation of a coherent BN model, and the second demonstrating a valid 
method of conducting a decision-making analysis through the ER technique. 
 Two BN models are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrating the cause 
and effect relationship of failures within an offshore electrical generation 
system. The first model in Chapter 4 demonstrating the applicability of BNs 
as a good basis for a dynamic risk assessment modelling tool. The second BN 
in Chapter 5 expands on the BN in Chapter 4 by applying several component 
failures to demonstrate undetected fuel gas release consequences of a gas 
turbine. 
 A decision-making algorithm is applied to four WSN designs in order to 
determine the most suitable for use as a remote detection method for asset 
integrity monitoring. 
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The research presented in this thesis has produced a number of contributions to 
knowledge. Some of these contributions can be said to be more significant than others, 
but all have the potential to be applied to real world offshore situations, systems and safety 
critical elements. The idea of the NUI-Asset Integrity Case proposed requires further 
research and work in order to be at the point of readiness for implementation along with 
safety cases for offshore platforms. There are increasing, continued changes to offshore 
safety case regulations and enforcement throughout platforms located across the UKCS, 
in conjunction with the fluctuation of incidents with the enforcement of regulations. This 
will result in further opportunities in research, such as the work presented in this thesis, 
to be considered for application in the offshore industry. In addition, the call for accurate 
coherent dynamic risk assessment tools, for integrity management, for use in the offshore 
and maritime industry is ever increasing. The research presented in this thesis may well 
assist with the facilitation of such risk assessment tools and safety case regulation 
enforcement by furthering the available techniques within the offshore oil and gas 
industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This research focuses on the development of an 
Initial Bayesian Network (BN) model for 
modelling system and component failures on a 
large offshore installation. The intention of the 
presented research is to model a sequence of events 
following a specific component failure, under 
certain conditions and assumptions. This sequence 
of events is then applied to a BN model using a 
proposed methodology. This should provide a base 
with which to expand the BN model to facilitate the 
requirement of having a dynamic risk assessment 
model within an NUI (Normally Unattended 
Installation) - Integrity Case.  
An Asset Integrity Case will enable the user to 
determine the impact of deficiencies in asset 
integrity on the potential loss of life and 
demonstrate that integrity is being managed to 
ensure safe operations. The Integrity Case is an 
extended Safety Case. Where safety cases 
demonstrate that safety procedures are in place, the 
Integrity Case shall ensure that the safety 
procedures are properly implemented. The 
Integrity Case can be applicable to operations for 
any large scale asset, and in the case of this research 
the large asset for which the Integrity Case shall be 
developed is an offshore installation (RMRI Plc., 
2011). By expanding on this Integrity Case 
proposal, it is intended that an Integrity Case be 
developed for a Normally Unattended Installation 
(NUI) in conjunction with a dynamic risk 
assessment model to maintain a live representation 
of an offshore installations integrity. Furthermore, 
it is proposed that the NUI-Integrity Case be 
initially developed utilising a manned installation, 
but modelling failure and risks without human 
presence on board. This is due to a much larger 
range of failure data being available regarding 
manned installations as opposed to unmanned 
installations. Similarly, should a risk assessment 
model be feasible for various hazardous zones of 
an installation, and the dynamic model proves to be 
effective in the detection of failures and mapping 
of consequences, it may be possible to reduce the 
number of personnel on board manned offshore 
installations, to reduce the risk of injury and 
fatality.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents a brief background into the origins of the 
research. A proposed  methodology of constructing 
Asset integrity case development for normally unattended offshore 
installations: Bayesian network modelling 
S. Loughney, J. Wang 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK 
 
D. Lau, D. Minty  
RMRI Consulting Plc., UK 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This research proposes the initial stages of the application of Bayesian Networks in conducting 
quantitative risk assessment of the integrity of an offshore system. The main focus is the construction of a 
Bayesian network model that demonstrates the interactions of multiple offshore safety critical elements to 
analyse asset integrity. A NUI (Normally Unattended Installation) - Integrity Case will enable the user to 
determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity and demonstrate that integrity is being managed to ensure 
safe operations in situations whereby physical human to machine interaction is not occurring. The Integrity 
Case can be said to be dynamic as it shall be continually updated for an installation as the Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA) data is recorded. This allows for the integrity of the various systems and components of an 
offshore installation to be continually monitored. The Bayesian network allows cause-effect relationships to be 
modelled through clear graphical representation. The model accommodates for continual updating of failure 
data. 
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a BN model is shown in section 3. Section 4 
outlines and analyses a case study to demonstrate 
the proposed methodology. Section 5 summarizes 
the work. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 Offshore Safety Assessment  
Following the public inquiry into the Piper 
Alpha disaster, the responsibilities for offshore 
safety regulations were transferred from the 
Department of Energy to the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) through the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) as the singular regulatory body 
for safety in the offshore industry (Wang, 2002) 
(Department of Energy, 1990). In response to this 
the HSE launched a review of all safety legislation 
and subsequently implemented changes. The 
propositions sought to replace the legislations that 
were seen as prescriptive to a more “goal setting” 
approach. Several regulations were produced, with 
the mainstay being the Health and Safety at Work 
Act (HSE, Health and Safety Executive, 1992). 
Under this a draft of the offshore installations 
safety case regulations was produced. The 
regulations required operational safety cases to be 
prepared for all offshore installations, both fixed 
and mobile. Within this all new fixed installations 
require a design safety case and for mobile 
installations, the duty holder is the owner (Wang, 
2002). 
After many years of employing the safety case 
approach in the UK offshore industry, the 
regulations were expanded in 1996 to include 
verification of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). 
Also the offshore installations and wells 
regulations were introduced to deal with various 
stages of the life cycle of the installation. SCEs are 
parts of an installation and its plant, including 
computer programs or any part whose failure could 
cause or contribute substantially to or whose 
purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of 
a major accident (Wang, 2002) (HSE, Health and 
Safety Executive, 1996). 
Recently, however, it is felt that an expansion on 
Safety Cases is necessary, especially in the 
offshore and marine industry, as they are static 
documents that are produced at the inception of 
offshore installations and contains a structured 
argument demonstrating that the evidence 
contained therein is sufficient to show that the 
system is safe (Auld, 2013). However, this is the 
full extent of the Safety Case, it involves very little 
updating unless an operational or facility change is 
made. It can be difficult to navigate through a 
safety case; they can be difficult for project teams 
and regulators to understand, as well as often being 
monolithic (Risktec, 2013). This is where the e-
Safety Case comes into play. e-Safety Cases are 
html web-based electronic Safety Cases. They are 
much easier to navigate and have clear concise 
information about the safety of the facility they are 
provided for. However, the QRA data (Quantified 
Risk Assessment) is only updated with the release 
of updated regulations (Cockram & Lockwood, 
2003). Over the past 10 years it has been stated that 
a dynamic risk assessment model is required within 
the offshore and process industries. Khakzad, et al., 
(2013) proposed to apply BN to Bow-Tie (BT) 
analysis. They postulated that the addition of BN to 
BT would help to overcome the static limitations of 
BT and show that the combination could be a 
substantial dynamic risk assessment tool. 
Similarly, in the oil, gas & process industry Yang 
& Mannan, (2010) proposed a methodology of 
Dynamic operational Risk Assessment (DORA). 
This starts from a conceptual framework design to 
mathematical modelling and to decision making 
based on cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, Eleye-
Datubo, et al. (2006) proposed an offshore 
decision-support solution, through BN techniques, 
to demonstrate that it is necessary to model the 
assessment domain such that the probabilistic 
measure of each event becomes more reliable in 
light of new evidence being received. This method 
is prefered, as opposed to obtaining data 
incrementally, causing uncertainty from imperfect 
understanding and incomplete knowledge of the 
domain being analysed. Finally, RMRI Plc. (2011) 
proposed the idea of a dynamic decision making 
tool in an Asset Integrity Case. 
The Integrity Case, an idea proposed by RMRI 
Plc. (Risk Management Research Institute), can be 
said to be dynamic as it shall be continually 
updated with the QRA data for an installation as the 
QRA data is recorded. This allows for the integrity 
of the various systems and components of a large 
asset, such as an offshore installation, to be 
continually monitored. This continual updating of 
the assets QRA data allows for the users to have a 
clearer understanding of the current status of an 
asset. It also allows the user to identify the impact 
of any deviation from specified performance 
standards, as well as facilitate more efficient 
identification of appropriate risk reduction 
measures, identify key trends within assets (i.e. 
failures, failure modes). Reporting to regulators 
would improve greatly and it would provide a 
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historical audit trail for the asset. Furthermore, the 
integrity of an asset is maintained so that potential 
loss of life is kept ALARP. This means that an asset 
may continue safe operations under circumstances 
that may have instigated precautionary shutdown, 
resulting in considerable cost savings for the owner 
and operator (RMRI Plc., 2011). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 Modelling and Analysis Steps 
There are many step-by-step procedures in use 
that allow for construction of the various parts of 
the BN model. The procedures are useful as it 
allows for maintaining consistency throughout the 
process and offers an element of confidence to the 
model. The procedures have varying parts 
depending on the context of the model and how 
much information is already available (Neil, et al., 
2000). However, there are key elements which all 
the procedures follow, these are: 
 
Establish the domain and project definition   
This involves putting boundaries in place for the 
model. In this analysis the domain is to be defined 
as a module on a large offshore installation. The 
model begins with an initial component failure and 
tracks the cause and effect relationship of this 
failure on various other components and systems. 
The model ends with outlined consequences. The 
objective of the model involves stating what results 
are expected to be achieved from the model. For the 
model in this research the focus is on the interaction 
of the components and their probability of 
occurrence. 
 
Identify the set of variables relative to the problem 
This involves filtering possible parameters that 
are relevant to the description and objective. For 
the model the initial variables were devised 
utilising a sequence of events diagram. This 
sequence of events diagram represents the steps of 
various events with their order and causality. The 
events in the diagram are connected with arcs and 
arrows. This allows for a straightforward transition 
to a BN.  
 
Form Nodes and Arcs for the BN 
The events and consequences in the sequence of 
events are translated to corresponding parent and 
child nodes in the Bayesian Network. The sequence 
of events, however, is basic and the arcs do not 
directly translate to the BN and are determined in 
Step 4. The nodes can be expressed as positive or 
negative. The causality between the events is 
translated to corresponding Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs). The CPTs are constructed in Step 
5. Once the relevant nodes are identified, they are 
input into a BN software package, 
HuginResearcher7.7, and connected. This entails 
referring to the sequence of events from the initial 
failure to determine the most effective way of 
connecting the nodes together. The network is 
reviewed to ensure there are no missing factors. 
 
Data acquisition and analysis  
Primarily, data is sought from various sources 
including: industrial & academic publications, 
offshore risk assessment projects, as well as 
databases such as: the Offshore Reliability 
Database  (OREDA), HSE & the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers database 
(OGP). However, should data not be widley 
available or the CPT for a node be much to large to 
constuct utilising data from the outlined sources, 
then expert judgement is to be utilised. The expert 
judgement is to be obtained using the Pairwise 
Comparision (PC) technique and analysed with the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The data 
from the AHP analysis is translated to the CPTs 
using a Symmetric Method. The data from relevent 
sources is then used to create the marginal or 
conditional probability tables. 
 
 Analysis of BN model and Sensitivity Analysis  
This step concerns itself with the analysis of the 
BN model using Bayesian Inference. The 
probability of failure on demand of the operation is 
obtained by forward analysis. The posterior 
probabilities of the influencing factors can be 
calculated through backward analysis, given some 
evidence entered into the model. the propogation of 
the BN is conducted using Hugin Researcher 7.7. 
The results of the analysis provide useful 
information in handling the the effect of one failure 
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on multiple components and systems. These results 
are demonstrated through a Sensitivity Analysis. 
The data for this analysis is again produced by the 
Hugin Researcher 7.7 software. 
 
Validation of the BN Model  
Validation is a key aspect of the methodology as 
it provides a reasonable amount of confidence to 
the results of the model. In carrying out a full 
validation of the model, the parameters should be 
closely monitored for a given period of time. For 
modelling a specific failure within an electrical 
generator, this exercise is not practical. In current 
work and literature, there is a three axiom based 
validation procedure, which is used for partial 
validation of the proposed BN model. The three 
axioms to be satisfied are as follows (Jones, et al., 
2010): 
 
Axiom i:  
A small increase or decrease in the prior subjective 
probabilities of each parent node should certainly 
result in the effect of a relative increase or decrease 
of the posterior probabilities of the child node. 
 
Axiom ii: 
Given the variation of subjective probability 
distributions of each parent node, its influence 
magnitude to the child node should be kept 
consistent. 
 
Axiom iii:  
The total influence magnitudes of the combination 
of the probability variations from “x” attributes 
(evidence) on the values should always be greater 
than that from the set of “x-y” (y ϵ x) attributes. 
CASE STUDY 
 Establish domain and model definition 
In order to demonstrate the proposed 
methodology a case study is used to evaluate of the 
effects a rotor retaining ring failure has on an 
offshore electrical generation unit. As well as other 
key systems, within and adjacent to a module of a 
large offsore installation. 
The electrical generation unit is considered to be 
of a generic layout for electrical generation on a 
large platform. The generator consists of a primary 
alternator, driven by a gas turbine. Located after the 
alternator is the exciter. The alternator rotor and 
shaft are forged in one piece with the exciter 
coupled on to one end. The opposite end of the 
shaft is coupled to the turbine drive shaft, which has 
an approximate operating speed of 3,600 rpm. The 
main shaft is supported by two main bearings, 
housed in pedastals, on stools on the baseplate. One 
bearing is situated between the turbine and the 
alternator and the other between the alternator and 
the exciter. A generic flowdiagram of an electrical 
generation unit is illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
 Identifying  the set of variables relative to the 
problem 
The variables are identified based upon the 
failure of one specific component, in this case a 
Rotor Retaining Ring. Should one of the retaining 
rings fail, the main shaft would become unbalanced 
causing potential fragmentation of the rings inside 
the alternator. Given the extreme tolerances’ within 
the generator construction, the unbalanced shaft 
could also cause damage to other areas of the 
equipment, such as: the turbine blades and the 
exciter. Should the retaining ring fail within the 
alternator casing and fragment, debris would be 
created within the casing. Furthermore with the 
machine operating at approximately 3,600rpm, an 
out of balance shaft would cause substantial 
vibrations, which could cause the main bearings to 
fail. Should the bearings fail, causing the shaft to 
become misaligned, it would result in increased 
damage to the turbine, alternator and exciter 
(RMRI Plc., 2009).  
From this the most likely point of failure within 
the turbine is the turbine blades shearing. Multiple 
 
Gas turbine 
Alternator 
(Retaining Rings are contained 
within, at each end of the Rotor)  
Main Bearings 
Exciter 
Main Shaft 
Figure 1. Generic diagram of an electrical generator unit 
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blade failure could lead to the turbine casing not 
fully containing the turbine blade debris. This 
would result in turbine blades being expelled 
through the turbine casing as high velocity 
projectiles. Continually, the violent shaft vibrations 
and misalignment could have a severe impact on 
the exciter and may result in the exciter, weighing 
approximately one tonne, becoming detached from 
the main shaft. Some catastrophic failures have 
resulted in the exciter breaking up and some have 
had the exciter remain mostly intact (RMRI Plc., 
2009). Should the bearings not fail, the alternator 
stator coils & casing, can provide enough 
resistance and are substantial enough to prevent the 
debris from the retaining ring penetrating the 
alternator casing. However, it is possible for the 
fragments to be expelled axially towards either the 
turbine or the exciter or both.  (U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
In the event of one or two rotor retaining ring 
failures, significant damage could occur within the 
alternator casing and fragments of the retaining 
ring could be expelled axially. Should the ring 
debris be expelled, it is assumed that it will travel 
in two possible direction; i) towards the turbine or 
ii) towards the exciter and out of the casing. Should 
the debris travel to the turbine there is potential for 
the fragments to impact the fuel gas line within the 
turbine. This then provides the escalation to a fire 
(given the location of the potential release, ignition 
is assumed). Should the debris travel out of the 
casing towards the exciter, it is considered by 
RMRI. Plc (2009) that while the axial velocity may 
be considerable, it is likely to be lower than the 
radial velocity that the debris would be expelled at 
were the casing and stator not there. Therefore, 
while it is possible for the ring debris to penetrate 
the casing, they would not have the required 
velocity to penetrate the module walls or deck. 
From this it is deemed that if retaining ring failure 
does not cause a bearing failure, then the 
consequence of the event is likely to be limited to 
the damages caused by the retaining ring (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
However, should the main bearing fail, the 
potential consequences become much more severe. 
The significant damage caused by the bearing 
failure can potentially produce high velocity 
projectiles from the turbine blades being expelled 
and/or the exciter becoming detached (RMRI Plc., 
2009). In these events, there is potential for the 
projectiles to impact the hydrocarbon containment 
around the module. 
 
Form Nodes and Arcs for the BN 
The initial model is demonstrated in Figure 2 
and is designed around the variables identified 
Figure 2. BN Model shown with the Marginal Probabilities for each node. 
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section 4.2, and is to represent the cause and effect 
of one initial component failure has on systems 
within the stated domain. The Initial BN model is 
not a direct representation of the sequence of events 
in terms of the section of the model where possible 
debris is expelled. Within the sequence of events if 
the debris is not expelled initially, it is assumed to 
remain in the alternator, yet if debris expelled, it is 
assumed to travel towards the exciter. Similarly, 
should the debris not be expelled to the exciter, it is 
assumed to be expelled towards the turbine. While 
this is all possible, it is more realistic to assume that 
if the debris is created from the retaining ring 
failure, it has the potential travel to the turbine and 
the exciter in the same instance. However, it is 
possible for debris to be expelled to the exciter and 
not to the gas turbine, whereby some debris would 
remain in the alternator. The way in which the BN 
model is created ensures it contains all relevant 
possible outcomes.  
In this case the analysis is conducted within an 
electrical generation module of a large offshore 
installation. The initial model is made up of 
seventeen chance nodes labelled 1 to 10 and E1 to 
E7. The latter nodes represent the possible events 
that can result from the initial mechanical failure. 
All nodes have two states (“Yes” and “No”) except 
for event node E6 which has four (“Small”, 
“Medium”, “Full-bore” and “None”). The BN 
constructed from the variables outlined  is shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
 Data acquisition and analysis 
It is important to note that the numerical results 
of the model are not significant in terms of being 
absolute, but rather to serve to demonstrate the 
practicability of the model. Once a full set of 
verified data is fed into the model, the confidence 
level associated with planning and decision making 
under uncertainty will improve.  
To complete the CPTs within a BN, certain data 
and knowledge is required regarding each specific 
node. For some nodes data is limited or not 
available. For cases where there is an absence of 
hard data, CPTs must be completed through 
subjective reasoning or the application of expert 
judgement. This process can be demonstrated by 
looking at the node “Event Escalation”. This node 
represents the chance of escalation following key 
component failures. The parents of this node are: 
“Turbine Blades Expelled”, “Exciter Detaches”, 
“Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” and “HP Flare 
Drum Shell Impact”. In order to put together an 
appropriate estimate, experts must judge the 
situation and provide their opinions. This data 
acquisition can be either qualitative or quantitative 
in nature. However, the child node “Event 
Escalation” has a CPT which is too large for an 
expert to simply fill with their own judgements and 
opinions. Therefore, an effective way to gather 
information, to fill these large CPTs, from experts 
is to apply the use of a Pairwise Comparison (PC) 
technique in questionnaires and make use of the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to analyse the 
results, combined with the symmetric method 
algorithm to fill the large CPTs (Zhang, et al., 
2014).  
The AHP will produce a weighting for each 
parent criterion in the pairwise comparison matrix. 
These weighting are applied to a symmetric method 
which is utilised to fill large CPTs. The symmetric 
method provides an input algorithm which consists 
of a set of relative weights that quantify the relative 
strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes on 
the child-node, and a set of probability distributions 
the number of which grows only linearly, as 
opposed to exponentially, with the number of 
associated parent-nodes (Lin & Kou, 2015) (Saaty, 
1980).  
The PC, AHP and symmetric methods are not to 
be oulined here. However, the PC and AHP 
Figure 3. A) Specific section of BN to be analysed. B) Prior 
Probabilities for Event E5 and its parent nodes. 
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methods can be found in detail in Saaty, (1980) and 
Koczkodaj & Szybowski., (2015). The symmetric 
method can be found in Das, (2008).  Figure 2 
shows the complete BN and the marginal 
probability distributions for each node.  
 
Results and Disscussions 
 Analysis of BN model and Sensitivity Analysis 
Quantitaive analysis is carried out on a specific 
section of the Initial BN model, shown in Figure 3, 
concerning the event “E5. Event Escalation” and its 
parents.  
 
Quantitative Analysis 
This analysis involved systematically inserting 
evidence into each of the parent nodes and finally 
the child node. In addition, nodes 7 and 8 have a 
parent node “Generator Bearings” which has no 
evidence inserted, and there is no evidence inserted 
anywhere else within the model. However, in this 
section of the BN model nodes 7 and 8 are parents 
of nodes 9 and 10 respectively, and therefore will 
alter the posterior probabilities of these nodes when 
evidence is inserted. This relationship has been left 
in the analysis to give an accurate representation of 
the posterior probabilities of the event E5, which is 
the focus node in this analysis. Several scenarios 
are considered for the BN analysis and validation.  
The first scenario is gas turbine blades being 
expelled as projectiles from the generator housing. 
This is completed by inserting 100% to state “Yes” 
in node 7. This increases the probability of the 
events escalating from 25.19% to 35.09%. This 
increase would involve some concern as a potential 
escalation from this is the impact of the turbine 
blades on the Gas Import Riser. Subsequently the 
probability of gas import riser impact increases 
from 6.2% to 25%. 
Furthermore, the second scenario involves the 
expulsion of the turbine blades along with a gas 
riser impact (100% “Yes” to nodes 7 and 9). This 
results in the probability of there being escalation 
increasing from 35.09% to 61.42%. This is a very 
large increase as the impact of a gas riser is the 
largest threat to escalation, due to the loss of 
containment of the gas, this hypothesis was also 
confirmed by expert opinion. It can also be noted 
that evidence is inserted into nodes 7 and 9, there is 
no effect on nodes 8 and 10, which is to be expected 
as they should be independent from each other. 
Should this scenario have the potential to occur, 
immediate action should be taken to prevent a 
major accident in the form of LOC of hydrocarbons 
and potential explosion & fire.  
The third scenario demonstrates the potential for 
escalation by showing that the generator’s exciter 
detaches, along with turbine blades expelled and 
gas riser impact (100% “Yes” to nodes 7, 8 and 9). 
It shows that again the potential for escalation 
increases from 61.42% to 63.86%. This scenario 
also increases the probability of the HP flare drum 
being impacted from 1.47% to 10%, dues to the 
influence of the Exciter Detaching (represented by 
node 8).  
Scenario five demonstrates the final influencing 
factor on the possibility of event escalation, 
whereby the HP flare drum is impacted (100% 
“Yes” to nodes 7, 8, 9 and 10). This increases the 
potential for escalation from 63.86% to 77%.  
The final scenario, shown in Figure 4, 
demonstrates the effect of there being an escalated 
event, for example, observing an explosion or a fire 
within the area of the platform containing the 
electrical generator, and the effect this has on the 
influencing parameters. This serves to obtain areas 
that would require closer inspection. This scenario 
has given insight to the possible causes of the event 
escalation, based upon the data presented. Here the 
influencing factors are: “Turbine Blades Expelled” 
– Yes, increases from 0.12% to 0.17%; “Exciter 
Detaches” –Yes, increases from 0.15% to 0.17%; 
“Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” – Yes, Increases 
from 6.2% to 14.31%; and “HP Flare Drum Shell 
Impact” – Yes, increasing from 0.02% to 0.03%.  
 
Figure 4. BN Model Illustrating when "Event Escalation" takes 
place. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
The Sensitivity Analysis conducted for the 
Initial BN model focuses on the event E5 and its 
parent nodes, shown in Figure 3, to further validate 
the claims in Secton 4.5.1.1. However, the analysis 
will be conducted using smaller increases and 
decreases in the probabilities of the parent nodes as 
opposed to inserting 100% occurrence probability 
into the input node CPTs.  
From the graph in Figure 5 it can be seen that 
the most influential factor on “Event Escalation” is 
“Gas import Riser Impact”, whilst the least 
influential is “Exciter Detaches”. If the probability 
of State - ‘No’, “Gas Riser Impact” increases by 
10%, then the probability of “Event Escalation” 
decreases by 2.63%. Whereas, if the probability of 
State - ‘No’ Detaches” increases by, “Exciter 10%, 
then the probability of “Event Escalation” only 
decreases by 0.29%. From the graph it is also 
apparent that the sensitivity function is a straight 
line which further add to the model validation. The 
sensitivity values computed within Hugin are 
shown in Table 1.  
It should be noted that the sensitivity values 
within Table 1 are negative as in their current states 
of ‘No’, they have a negative effect on the outcome 
of “Event Escalation” – ‘Yes’. For example; with 
the probability of “Turbine Blades Expelled” 
increasingly being ‘No’, it is less likely that “Event 
Escalation” – ‘Yes’ occurs.  
 
Table 1. Sensitivity Values for the four input nodes acting 
upon Event "E5. Event Escalation" 
 
Validation of the BN Model 
 
For partial validation of the model, it should 
satisfy the three axioms stated in Section 3.2.5. 
Examination of a specific part of the model (shown  
in Figure 3), reveals when node 7 is set to 100% 
‘Yes’, this produces a revised increase in 
probability for “Event Escalation” occurring from 
25.19% to 35.09%. A further change including 
both nodes 7 and 9, set at 100% ‘Yes’, results in a 
further increase in the potential for “Event 
Escalation” occurring. Continually, nodes 7, 8, and 
9 being set to 100% ‘Yes’, again results in an 
increase for the potential for “Event Escalation” 
being of the state ‘Yes’. 
When nodes 7, 8, 9 and 10 are set to 100% ‘Yes’, 
it produces yet another increase in the probability 
of “Event Escalation occurring from 63.86% to 
77.00%. Finally,    
This exercise of increasing each of the 
influencing nodes satisfies the three axioms states 
in Section 3.2.5, thus giving partial validation to the 
BN Model.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This research has outlined the Bayesian 
Network technique that has been used to model the 
cause and effect relationship of a specific 
component failure  of an electrical generation 
system, within a module of an offshore platform. It 
has been stated that offshore systems can be very 
complex and when coupled with the volume of data 
required to model failures within these systems, it 
makes BNs a challenge to model effectively. As 
well as in some cases a lack of reliable data means 
that some risk assessment models cannot always be 
applied. With this in mind, the  BN model 
demonstrates that BNs can provide an effective and 
applicable method of determining the likelihood of 
various events under uncertainty. The model can be 
used to investigate various scenarios around the 
Input node: “state” Sensitivity value 
7. Turbine blades expelled: “No” -0.095 
8. Exciter detaches: “No -0.029 
9. Gas import riser impact: “No” -0.263 
10. HP flare drum shell impact: “No” -0.073 
Figure 5. Sensitivity Functions for the four input nodes acting upon 
Event "E5. Event Escalation" 
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systems and components outlined and to show the 
beginnings of establishing where attention should 
be focused within the objective of preventing 
offshore incidents, as well as having a clear 
representation of specifically where these accidents 
can originate from. The presented method of 
modelling offshore risk assessment is to be 
improved upon in future research. It has the 
potential to model larger areas with several systems 
and their components to gain a much wider 
understanding of how offshore systems interrelate. 
There are several interesting and relevant 
possibilities that can be considered and explored 
with relative ease now that the core structure of the 
BN model has been constructed. However, before 
expanding the model it is vital to maintain that it 
must remain practical and close to reality from the 
perspective of gathering data and generating 
results. Continually too many variables which 
display vague information or increasingly 
irrelevant effects can diminish the quality of results 
and findings.  
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Bayesian network modelling of an offshore electrical generation 
system for applications within an asset integrity case for normally 
unattended offshore installations 
S. Loughney, J. Wang 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper proposes the initial stages of the application of Bayesian Networks in 
conducting quantitative risk assessment of the integrity of an offshore system. The main focus is the 
construction of a Bayesian Network (BN) model that demonstrates the interactions of multiple offshore 
safety critical elements to analyse asset integrity. The majority of the data required to complete the BN 
was gathered from various databases and past risk assessment experiments and projects. However, 
where data was incomplete or non-existent, expert judgement was applied through Pairwise Comparison, 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and a Symmetric Method to fill these data gaps and to complete 
larger Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs).  A NUI (Normally Unattended Installation) - Integrity 
Case will enable the user to determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity and demonstrate that 
integrity is being managed to ensure safe operations in situations whereby physical human to machine 
interaction is not occurring. The Integrity Case can be said to be dynamic as it shall be continually 
updated for an installation as the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) data is recorded. This allows for 
the integrity of the various systems and components of an offshore installation to be continually 
monitored. The Bayesian network allows cause-effect relationships to be modelled through clear 
graphical representation. The model accommodates for continual updating of failure data. 
Keywords: Offshore safety, Integrity case, Bayesian networks, Offshore installations, Electrical 
generation systems 
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APPENDIX C: Bayesian Network Modelling for Offshore 
Installations: Gas Turbine Fuel Gas Release with Potential 
Fire and Explosion Consequences 
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INTRODUCTION 
This work focuses on the development of a 
Bayesian Network (BN) model for modelling 
control system and physical failures of a gas turbine 
utilized in offshore electrical generation. The 
intention is to model a sequence of events 
following several component failures, under 
certain conditions and assumptions. These initial 
failures are defined in two categories; control 
system failures and physical or structural failures. 
This should provide a base with which to expand 
the BN to facilitate the requirement of having a 
dynamic risk assessment model that allows for 
accurate representation of the hazards and 
consequences associated with gas turbine fuel gas 
releases. 
The research presented within this report is an 
expansion of previous research conducted for an 
electrical generation system of an offshore 
installation. The initial research, conducted by 
Loughney & Wang (2016), focused on creating a 
dynamic risk assessment model for an electrical 
generation system, based upon one initial 
component failure in the form of a Rotor Retaining 
ring failure. The dynamic risk assessment model is 
for application in an Integrity Case. The Integrity 
Case is, in principle, an extended Safety Case. 
From the initial research a sequence of events and 
a BN was produced to demonstrate the cause and 
effect relationships between the safety critical 
elements of the electrical generator. The BN 
demonstrated a number of potential consequences, 
such as: Gas Import Riser failure, High Pressure 
Gas Flare Drum failure and Fuel Gas Release & 
fire. These final consequences were not expanded 
or demonstrated in great detail to keep the initial 
model as less complex as possible while achieving 
valid results. This is where the research presented 
in this paper expands upon this. The BN to be 
presented here is an expansion of the previous 
model, focused on the consequence Fuel Gas 
release and Fire & Explosion. In the initial BN, a 
gas fire was represented as one event in the 
network, this research expands by constructing an 
entire new network to demonstrate the 
consequence of Fuel Gas release in much more 
detail (RMRI Plc., 2009). 
 
BACKGROUND 
Gas turbines are used for a variety of purposes on 
offshore installations, such as: power generation, 
compression pumping and water injection, most 
often in remote locations. Gas turbines are most 
Bayesian network modelling for offshore installations: Gas turbine fuel 
gas release with potential fire and explosion consequences 
S. Loughney, P.A. Davies & J. Wang 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper illustrates the benefits of applying a Bayesian Network in quantitative risk assessment.  
The focus of the illustration is based on the potential release of fuel gas from a gas turbine used for electrical 
power generation on an offshore platform. The potential consequences that follow said release, such as: fire, 
explosion and damage to equipment within an electrical generation module are also analysed. The construction 
of a Bayesian Network model, based upon initial research work, shall illustrate the interactions of potential 
initial failures, hazards, barriers (gas detectors and fuel shut off systems) and the subsequent consequences of 
a fuel gas release. This model allows for quantitative analysis to show partial validity of the BN. Partial validity 
of the model is demonstrated in a series of test case. 
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commonly duel fueled. They have the ability to run 
on fuel taken from the production process under 
normal operations, known as fuel gas. They can 
also run on diesel fuel in emergency circumstances. 
Typically, offshore gas turbines run from 1 to 50 
MW and may well be modified from aero-engines 
or industrial engines. The most often used gas 
turbines are Aeroderivative, particularly for the gas 
generator. It is known that relatively little 
information is contained within safety cases 
regarding the operation and safety of gas turbines. 
What is contained is the model, manufacture, ISO 
power rating (in Mega Watts (MW)), the fuel types 
and the location of the turbine shown on the 
respective installations drawings. Additional 
information can be found on occasion, such as: text 
regarding the power generation package or back-up 
generators. However, information in reference to 
integrity management and maintenance can be very 
limited (HSE, 2006). This information, or lack of, 
provides sound reasoning to produce dynamic risk 
assessment models regarding the integrity and 
safety of gas turbines. 
Industrial power plants are critical systems on 
board offshore platforms as they supply electrical 
power to safety critical systems, which not only 
provide safe working for crew and other personnel, 
they also protect the integrity of the offshore 
platforms systems and structures. All of this 
protection stems from power supplied by the 
electrical generation systems, which is why 
offshore platforms and marine vessels ensure they 
have back-up generators in the event that one or 
two generators fail to operate (Perera, et al., 2015). 
Usually, on offshore platforms, there are three 
electrical generation systems, with two in the same 
module and the third in a separate module on a 
higher level which usually acts as the emergency 
generator. Despite the safety precautions behind 
the number of generators and their locations, there 
is still the possibility of all generators failing to 
operate (Ramakrishnan, 2007).  
Furthermore, in recent years there has been a 
marked increase in fires associated with fuel gas 
leaks with offshore gas turbines. A detailed review 
of offshore gas turbines incidents conducted in 
2005 showed that there were 307 hazardous events 
over 13-year period, from 1991 to 2004. The 
review concerned itself with over 550 gas turbine 
machines. The analysis concluded that the majority 
of incidents (approximately 40%) occurred during 
normal operations, with approximately 20% during 
start-up, another 20% during or after maintenance 
and the remaining 10% of fuel gas leaks occur 
during fuel changeover. With the majority of 
incidents occurring during normal operations, the 
fuel gas detection is heavily reliant on either turbine 
fuel detectors and/or fire and gas system detectors. 
This is due to the modules containing the electrical 
power generators being almost totally unmanned 
during normal operation. It was also found that 
based upon the review conducted on machines in 
the stated 13-year period, shows that approximately 
22% of gas leaks remained undetected. 
Subsequently, 60% of those undetected leaks were 
found to have ignited (HSE, 2008). 
It is situations such as those described that 
increase the requirement for a dynamic risk 
assessment model to accurately monitor the 
consequences of failures within gas driven 
generators as they are critical in the survival of 
crew members as well as the integrity of the 
respective offshore installation. 
 
FUEL GAS RELEASE MODEL 
The model representing the potential for fuel gas 
release from an offshore gas turbine, along with the 
further consequences of fire and explosion, begins 
at the point of several initiating events. These 
events are the beginning of the sequence of events 
and continues through the point of a potential gas 
release, the barriers involved in preventing and 
stopping the release and the potential consequences 
should these barriers fail. A full step by step 
procedure of constructing the BN can be found in 
the initial research of Loughney & Wang (2016). 
 
Model Limitations 
Space and Domain Limitations 
The purpose of the model is to show what the 
effects of several component failures have on a gas 
turbine which can lead to a fuel gas release. Hence, 
the consequences of said fuel release are analyzed, 
and in order to do this, the boundaries of the model 
need to be defined. These boundaries are concerned 
with the affected area, the detail of the 
consequences and the ignition types & sources. The 
outlined assumptions and limitations concerned 
with the model domain are as follows:   
 The model has been built for the situation 
where there the offshore platform contains no 
crew and hence does not consider fatalities. 
There are two key reasons for this: The first is 
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that the BN model is to be for an NUI 
(Normally Unattended Installation) Integrity 
Case, where humans are not present on the 
platform for large periods of time, and are 
monitored from other platforms or onshore. 
Secondly, the BN is part of continual 
development of an Integrity Case which shall 
focus on maintaining the integrity of the 
equipment as a priority, as well as the effects of 
incidents on the environment. Hence fatalities 
are not part of the BN model consequences. 
 The model is designed to demonstrate the 
hazards and consequences associated with the 
fuel gas release from an offshore gas turbine. 
Hence, the consequences regarding fire and 
explosion are not concerned with the 
probability of other hydrocarbon releases 
contributing to fires and explosions.  
 The scope of the model is primarily within the 
power generation module of a large fixed 
offshore platform. Therefore, the section of the 
model assigned to the probability of equipment 
damage due to fire and explosion is confined to 
the equipment and machinery located only 
within the stated module. 
 The model is representative of fuel gas being 
released into the module and not within the gas 
turbine itself. This is due to the fact that should 
there be a gas release the turbine, it is assumed 
that the combustion chamber is of sufficient 
temperature to ignite the fuel. However, the 
presence of an ignition source within the 
confines of the module is not a total certainty. 
The node “Ignition Source” represents this 
uncertainty and possibility of a source being 
present. 
 While the level of consequence is confined to 
the module, and the presence of an ignition 
source is not certain, it is still possible for the 
gas levels to reach dangerous levels. These 
dangerous levels do not represent a direct threat 
to human personnel as it has been stated that 
humans are not present in the module. The 
dangerous levels relate to the potential 
environmental impact of harmful substances 
being released into the atmosphere. This is in 
conjunction with the revised requirement of 
safety cases for offshore installations to contain 
precautions for potential environmental impact 
of offshore incidents and accidents (HSE, 
2015). 
 
Data Limitations 
It is important that some remarks are made 
regarding the uniformity of the data within the 
model. Statistics exist in a number of formats and 
originate from many sources. When formulating a 
model as specific and confined as the one being 
created, it is almost impossible to gather data sets 
from the same consistent sources.  
It is important to understand that many statistics 
are not fully representative of reality. For instance, 
there are cases where the full extent of an incident 
is not reported, such as a fuel gas release. For 
example, from 1992 to 2014, 40% of fuel gas and 
power turbine gas releases were not detected by an 
automatic sensor, but were detected by human 
detection. The human detection includes smell, 
visual and a portable detector. In the instances of 
human detection, the recording of information is 
scarce, with 56% of fuel gas release incidents 
having little to no information regarding the 
location and cause of the release and in some cases, 
the extent of the dispersion. Furthermore, the 
majority of the 56% of releases with incomplete 
information and data were regarded as 
“Significant”, in terms of their severity level (HSE, 
2014). It is inconsistencies within the data, such as 
this, that provide sound reasoning to limit data to 
automatic detection and fuel shut down barriers. 
There are some differences in terms of data 
relating the type of installation operating the same 
type of gas turbine generator. However, the 
location of the installations is restricted to the 
UKCS (United Kingdom Continental Shelf) and 
the North Sea. Much of the data represented in the 
model is adapted from gas turbines operating on 
fixed platforms, yet it is not feasible to obtain data 
from all sources relating to fixed installations. This 
limitation with the data goes back to either the 
absence of data or the lack of appropriate data 
recording. Hence, data is obtained from fixed 
installations and FPSOs (Floating, Production, 
Storage and Offloading) which make use of very 
similar gas turbine machines.  
There are also differences with the age of the 
data and the data sources used in the Fuel Gas 
Release model. All data utilized is taken from 
sources post 2002. Most of the data close to 2002 
has been obtained from OREDA-2002 (Offshore 
Reliability Data) as full access to the database at 
this time was available. On the other hand most of 
the conditional data used to complete the CPTs 
(Conditional Probability Tables) for the nodes, in 
the BN, has come from risk assessment projects 
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conducted on offshore installation for gas turbines, 
with the main focus of the projects being 
hydrocarbon and fuel gas release. These risk 
projects were conducted post-2009 by RMRI Plc., 
Petrofac and Maersk.  
Finally, most of the nodes are based upon hard 
evidence statistics, while two of the nodes 
incorporate subjective judgement by utilizing a 
symmetric algorithm from hard evidence. By 
combining information in this way it allows for 
situations that have little to no information to be 
overcome. This process does not compromise the 
validation and analysis of the model however it is 
important to take note of this when interpreting the 
information presented in the results. 
 
Structure of the Model 
The fuel gas release model is shown in Figure 1, 
which also depicts the marginal probabilities for 
each node. The BN is primarily designed to 
represent key initial events of gas turbine failure, in 
two main areas: the turbine control system and the 
physical structure. Following the initial events and 
failures the BN model is designed to show the 
possible progression of these failures into fuel gas 
release and the potential fire & explosion 
consequences that can occur. There are a number 
of more intimate functions that the model provides. 
Firstly, the initial stages of the model demonstrate 
which initial event or hazard demonstrates the 
greater probability for potential gas release, as well 
as whether the greatest threat originates from the 
turbine control system or the physical structure. 
Secondly, the cause and effect relationships 
between the barriers is demonstrated in terms of the 
probability of whether a certain barrier operates as 
expected, based upon the operation of the previous 
barriers. Thirdly, the type of consequence that can 
occur following a fuel gas release. These 
consequences can be; none, a gas leak only, fire, 
explosion and resulting equipment damage from a 
fire and/or an explosion. 
The graphical structure of the model is designed 
to keep the nodes that fall under the same group 
together and organized in a “top down” manner. 
The five root nodes and the inference node are 
close together at the top. Then the categorized 
nodes are next in the top down sequence. 
Continuing from the failures there is a potential 
incident, which then leads to the barrier nodes. 
Pending the probability of success or failure of the 
barriers there is potentially another incident 
(“Continuous Gas Release”). Following from the 
barriers there are further incidents, accidents and 
consequence nodes which are systematically 
introduced. One node does remain slightly 
anomalous from this organization. The “ignition 
Source” node is grouped along with the incidents, 
accidents and consequences as it directly affects 
one of the incidents. 
There is one transfer node within the fuel gas 
release BN which links the initial research 
conducted by Loughney & Wang (2016). This node 
is “Fuel Gas Feed Impact”. Through this node any 
updates from the initial BN model shall result in 
updates to the posterior probabilities of the fuel gas 
release BN.  The model contains nineteen chance 
nodes with either two or three states. Figure 2 
Demonstrates the Structure of the fuel gas release 
model. 
 
Establishing Conditional Probabilities 
When constructing a BN, the prior probabilities 
are required to be assigned locally to the probability 
link, P(Parent(Ai)) → P(Child(Bi)), as a 
conditional probability, P(Bi|Ai). Where i is the 
number of possible states of the parent node and the 
child node. However, it is not always a 
straightforward process to obtain the relevant data. 
In principle, the majority of the data can be 
acquired through failure databases or 
experimentation. However, designing and 
conducting experiments can prove difficult and 
historical data does not always satisfy the scope of 
certain nodes and CPTs within a BN. Therefore, in 
practice, it is necessary to rely on subjective 
probabilities provided by expert judgement as an 
expression of an individual’s degree of belief. 
However, since subjective probabilities are based 
on informed guesses, it is possible for deviation to 
occur when the data is expressed as precise 
numbers. It is possible to apply a fully subjective 
approach to construct conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs) in a BN (S. Loughney, 2016).  
This process involved experts providing their 
judgement through a Pairwise Comparison (PC) 
method. The data from the PC is further analyzed 
using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
relative importance weights were determined from 
this for each parent node in question. These weights 
are then applied to an algorithm that allows a large 
child CPT to be constructed cell by cell. This 
method of compiling data for large CPTs proved 
simple to implement and produced accurate results 
for the BN. However, it was found that a time-
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consuming part was the gathering of data from 
experts through PC in questionnaires. 
As the process of creating PC questionnaires, 
distributing them and waiting for feedback can be 
time consuming, this process is to be amended by 
utilizing hard data from risk assessment 
experimentation and historical data. This entails 
utilizing hard data from the parent nodes and 
sections of the child node CPT to create relative 
weights for the parent nodes and apply those to the 
symmetric method algorithm. 
Symmetric Algorithm Utilizing Hard Data 
The symmetric method provides an input algorithm 
which consists of a set of relative weights that 
quantify the relative strengths of the influences of 
the parent-nodes on the child-node, and a set of 
probability distributions the number of which 
grows only linearly, as opposed to exponentially, 
with the number of associated parent-nodes. Yet 
the most common method of gathering the required 
data for the algorithm is to use expert judgements. 
However, it is also possible to utilize the symmetric 
method with historic data and experimentation. 
While it is very difficult or not possible to complete 
a large CPT in a BN using only hard data, it is 
possible to obtain key conditional probabilities for 
a node and apply them to the symmetric method to 
complete the CPT. 
The derivation symmetric method algorithm is 
not to be outlined here, but the method of 
determining the relative weights of parent nodes 
will be outlined. The derivation of the symmetric 
method can be found in Das, (2008).   
 
Determining Relative Weights Utilizing Hard Data 
To demonstrate the method of determining 
relative weights through hard data, take the 
example network in Figure 1. 
While it is not possible to accurately obtain 
P(D|A, B, C) or even P(D|A, B) through historical 
or experimental data. It is possible to obtain the 
conditional probability of event Z give the 
individual parents. i.e.; P(D|A), P(D|B) and 
P(D|C).  These conditional probabilities can be 
used to develop normalized weights for the parent 
nodes. 
As mentioned previously, in the symmetric 
model the individual local conditional probabilities 
of the parent to child can be distributed by relative 
importance for the associated child node, i.e. the 
normalized weight. Hence, in normal space and 
using the notation outlined in Figure 1, the 
probability of D being of state “Yes” given that the 
probability of A being in state “Yes” is equal to ?̂?𝑎 
, where ?̂?𝑎  is the relative importance of the parent 
node A. This is applied across all the parent nodes 
and is demonstrated by Equation 1 (Riahi, 2010). 
 
𝑃(?̂?𝑎) =  𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”)  
=
𝑃(𝑋𝑎)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎,𝑏,…
 
…      (1) 
      
     
 𝑃(?̂?𝑛) =  𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝑛 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) 
=
𝑃(𝑋𝑛)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎,𝑏,…
 
 
Therefore, 
 
𝑃(?̂?𝐴) + 𝑃(?̂?𝐵) + ⋯+ 𝑃(?̂?𝑛) = 1 
In normalized space, based on the influence of 
each parent node, the conditional probability of a 
binary child node "D" given each binary parent 
node, Xr , where r = a, b, ..., n., can be estimated 
using Equation 2. 
 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤1 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐵 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤2 
…      (2) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝑛 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) =  𝑤𝑛 
 
∑ 𝑤𝑛 = 1
𝑛
𝑛=1
 
 
Following from Equations 1 and 2, it is possible to 
calculate the weights of the parents given the 
individual parent to child conditional probabilities 
(Riahi, 2010). In order to demonstrate the 
calculation of relative weights for parent nodes, the 
network shown in Figure 1 shall be used as an 
example. Table 1 shows the local conditional 
probabilities for the child node “Control System 
Failure” (“D”) given each individual child node.  
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Table 1: Individual conditional probabilities for Control 
System Failure 
D A B C Sum 
 Yes Yes Yes  
Yes 0.0584 0.0610 0.1330 0.2524 
 
The information presented in Table 1 can be 
represented by Equation 3: 
 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐴 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.0584 = 𝑃(𝑋𝑎) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐵 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.0610 = 𝑃(𝑋𝑏) 
𝑃(𝐷 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”|𝐶 = “𝑌𝑒𝑠”) = 0.1330 = 𝑃(𝑋𝑐) (3) 
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=1
= 0.2524 
 
Hence, with the individual conditional 
probabilities, the relative weights of the parent 
nodes can be calculated utilizing equation 1. 
 
𝑃(?̂?𝑎) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑎)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎,𝑏,..
=
0.0584
0.2524
= 0.2314 = 𝑤1 
 
𝑃(?̂?𝑏) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑏)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎,𝑏,…
=
0.0610
0.2524
= 0.2417 = 𝑤2 
 
𝑃(?̂?𝑐) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑐)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=𝑎,𝑏,…
=
0.1330
0.2524
= 0.5269 = 𝑤3 
 
Following from this, Equation 2 can be used to 
show that the summation of the relative weights 
should be equal to 1. 
A C 
D 
B 
Figure 1: Simple BN representing 3 parents and 1 child 
Figure 2: Marginal probabilities for each node within the Fuel Gas Release BN 
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∑ 𝑤𝑛 =
𝑛
𝑛=1
𝑤1 + 𝑤2 + 𝑤3 = 
0.2314 + 0.2417 + 0.5269 = 1 
 
As the relative weights for parent nodes A, B and 
C have been calculated and assigned accordingly, 
they can be applied to the weighted sum algorithm. 
Along with the linear compatible parental 
configuration to produce complete the CPT.  
Two CPTs were compiled using this method due 
to the nature of their scope being specific to this 
model. These nodes are “Control System Failures” 
and “Physical/Structural Failures”. Figure 2 shows 
the complete BN and the marginal probability 
distributions for each node.  
 
BN TEST CASES  
The BN is now used to analyze a series of 
possible real world scenarios. All variables from 
external BNs, i.e. the transfer node “Fuel Gas Feed 
Impact”, are to remain unchanged and only those 
directly linked to the study for Fuel Gas Release 
shall be altered using the Hugin BN software. The 
Hugin software allows for evidence to be inserted 
to all nodes within the network in its “Run Mode” 
function. This evidence is to the degree of 100% in 
a given state of a node. It is the posterior 
probabilities that are of interest and are computed 
given particular evidence of specific nodes. 
 
Test Case 1: Control System Failures 
This case study demonstrates the effects of 
individual and combined control system failures 
within the fuel gas release model. The effect on the 
likelihood of a gas release is demonstrated along 
with the effects on the fuel shut off system. The 
consequences from these likelihoods is also 
demonstrated. In this case the likelihood of a 
continuous fuel release is analyzed as well as the 
probability of the “Consequence” node being in 
states “Y-Leak” and “None”. This case study is 
split into two test cases: 1A) is a demonstration of 
the effects of control system failures on the 
network, 1B) is a demonstration of the control 
system failures with the presence of an ignition 
source.  
The probability of a fuel gas release from a gas 
turbine due to the turbines control system, is mostly 
dependent on three key events; “Exceeding System 
Capability” (ESC), “Operational Error” (OE) and 
“System Defects” (SD). The results of test case 1A 
are presented in Table 2, which shows the 
probability of gas release, fuel shut off, continuous 
release and the consequence (“Y_Leak” & “None”) 
 
Table 2: Effects of the turbine control system failures on the 
posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", "Fuel Shut Off", 
"Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-
Leak & None" 
Focus Nodes 
No evidence 
(%) 
ESC 
(%) 
OE 
(%) 
SD 
(%) 
Gas Release 57.85 63.00 63.18 69.50 
Fuel Off 35.39 38.43 38.53 42.25 
Cont. 
Release 
62.48 59.21 59.09 55.08 
Y-Leak 64.56 61.53 61.43 57.71 
None 35.41 38.45 38.55 42.27 
It is evident that a major system defect would 
have the greatest effect on the probability of the gas 
release, as shown by the increase in probability 
from 57.85% without evidence, to 69.5% when a 
potential system defect causes a failure. The 
likelihood of consequences and continuous release 
decreases with the inserted evidence in control 
system failures as it is assumed in the model that 
the gas detection system has no reason to not 
function correctly at this stage. Therefore, the 
increase in the probability and level of gas release 
will increase the probability of gas detection. 
Test 1B demonstrates the effects of the control 
system failures, in the presence of an Ignition 
Source (IS), on ignition, fire and explosion nodes. 
Table 3 demonstrates the results of test case 1B. 
 
Table 3: Effects of Turbine Control System failures, with an 
ignition source present, on the posterior probabilities of 
“Gas Detection”, "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed 
Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to Fire & 
Explosion" 
Focus Nodes 
100 % IS 
(%) 
ESC 
(%) 
OE 
(%) 
SD 
(%) 
Gas Detection 43.4 47.25 47.38 52.1 
Y-Ignition 29.34 27.97 27.92 26.23 
Y-Leak 9.29 8.85 8.84 8.30 
Immediate Ig. 23.31 22.04 22.01 20.68 
Delayed Ig. 32.20 30.69 30.64 28.78 
Explosion 22.51 21.45 21.42 20.12 
Fire 13.56 12.93 12.9 12.12 
F&Ex Damage 2.55 2.44 2.43 2.29 
The probability of gas detection increases 
proportionally to the probability of gas release. 
This affects the relationship between the 
probability of detection and the probability of 
accidents and consequence. When evidence is 
inserted into the “System Defects” node, the 
posterior probabilities for fire and explosion 
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decrease from 13.56% to 12.12% and 22.51% to 
20.12%. This is because the probability of the gas 
detection increases with the probability of the gas 
release, as it is assumed that the gas detectors 
function as expected. This also has an effect on the 
fuel gas shut off by increasing the probability that 
fuel gas will be shut off. Hence the probability that 
a fire or explosion will occur decreases. 
 
Test Case 2: Gas Release without Gas Detection 
Test case 2A demonstrates the effects a 
malfunctioning gas detection (No GD) system in 
the event of a gas release. In test 2A it is assumed 
that one or more of the initial events has occurred 
and a Gas Release (GR) is observed. In this case the 
likelihood of a continuous fuel release is analysed 
as well as the probability of the “Consequence” 
node being in states “Y-Leak” and “None”. Table 
4 demonstrates the results. 
 
Table 4: Effects of a Gas Release without Gas Detection on 
“Consequences”, “Continuous Gas Release”, “Fuel Shut Off” 
(TCS, F&G and Fuel Off) and “Gas Detection” 
Focus Nodes 
No Evidence 
(%) 
GR 
(%)  
No GD 
(%) 
Gas Detection 43.4 74.87 - 
None 35.41 60.2 1.22 
Y-Leak 64.56 39.78 98.74 
Cont. Release 58.81 29.26 99.57 
Fuel off: TCS 27.76 47.47 0.58 
Fuel off: F&G 20.37 34.7 0.61 
Fuel off (All) 35.39 60.19 1.18 
If there is a gas release and the gas detectors do 
not function, then there is a very high probability of 
there being a gas leak as a consequence as well as 
a continuous leak from the system. The continuous 
leak would occur because the fuel shut off systems 
would not react to the gas detection. This effect can 
be seen in the posterior probabilities of the fuel shut 
off systems. Furthermore, given a gas release and 
no gas detection, the probability of a continuous 
gas release increases from 58.81% to 99.57%, and 
the probability of a gas leak, increases from 64.56% 
to 98.74%. The significance of these percentage 
increases in the posterior probabilities indicates 
that the gas detection system is a vital barrier in the 
mitigation of accidents resulting from fuel gas 
releases. 
The emphasis of Test Case 2B shall be on a gas 
release not being detected and the effects that an 
Ignition Source (IS) has on the posterior 
probabilities of several nodes. The nodes in 
question are; “Consequences” (States “Y-Ignition” 
and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” 
(States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), “Explosion”, 
“Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & Explosion” and 
“Explosion Damage to Adjacent Areas”.  Table 5 
demonstrates the results of Test Case 2B. 
 
Table 5: Effects of no Gas Detection and presence of an 
Ignition Source on “Consequences” (“Y-Ignition” & “Y-
Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (“Immediate” & 
“Delayed”), “Explosion”, “Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & 
Explosion” and “Explosion Damage to Adjacent Modules” 
Focus Nodes 
No 
Evidence 
(%) 
No GD 
(%) 
No GD 
& IS 
(%) 
Y-Ignition 0.02 0.04 44.88 
Y-Leak 64.56 98.74 14.20 
Immediate Ig. 0.02 0.03 35.38 
Delayed Ig. 0.03 0.04 49.25 
Explosion 0.02 0.03 34.43 
Fire 0.01 0.01 20.74 
F&Ex Damage 0.00 0.00 3.91 
Dam. Adj. Mod. 4.10E-05 6.31E-05 0.076 
The emphasis in this analysis is on the more severe 
accidents and consequences in terms of fire, 
explosion and the damage that they can cause. 
From Table 5 it can be seen that in the event of a 
100% failure of the gas detection system, the 
probability of there being any accidents or 
consequences related to ignition remain virtually 
negligible. However, the final column in Table 5 
demonstrates the effects on the fire & explosion 
consequences given no gas detection and an 
ignition source present. The purpose of this is to 
show how sensitive the fire & explosion 
consequences are given an ignition source and a 
likely chance of a gas release. It can be seen that 
the posterior probabilities increase drastically when 
an ignition source is present without gas detection. 
 
Test Case 3: Effects of observed Consequences (Y-
Leak and Y-Ignition) on prior probabilities 
To provide further verification of the BN model it 
is important to demonstrate the effects of inserting 
evidence as a consequence and observing the 
effects on prior nodes. The key node in this test 
case is the “Consequence” node, with attention 
being focused on inserting 100% evidence to states 
“Y-Leak” and “Y-Ignition”. Table 6 demonstrates 
the effects of 100% “Y-Leak” on the mitigating 
barriers of a gas release.  
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Table 6: Effects of 100% "Y-Leak" on the prior probabilities 
of the mitigating barriers and “Continuous Release” as well 
as 100% “Y-Ignition” on the consequence and accident 
nodes. 
Focus Nodes 
No Evidence 
(%) 
Y-
Leak 
(%) 
Y-
Ignition 
(%) 
Fuel off (All) 35.39 0.00 - 
Fuel off: TCS 27.76 0.10 - 
Fuel off: F&G 20.38 0.03 - 
Cont. Release 62.48 96.19 - 
Gas Detection 43.40 13.44 - 
Ignition Source 0.083 - 100.00 
Immediate Ig. 0.019 - 78.82 
Delayed Ig. 0.027 - 21.18 
Fire 0.011 - 31.69 
Explosion 0.019 - 14.80 
Table 6 shows that given 100% probability of “Y-
Leak”, the prior probabilities concerned with the 
fuel shut off system nodes, all being State “Yes”, 
greatly decrease to almost zero. Similarly, the 
probability of the gas being detected also 
decreases. However, not to the extent of the fuel 
shut off systems. Table 6 also indicates that prior to 
a 100% consequence of ignition, the likelihood of 
any ignition, fire and explosion accidents or 
consequences are almost negligible. However, 
when evidence is inserted into the state “Y-
Ignition” in the consequence node, the prior 
probabilities greatly increase. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The BN model presented in this research 
demonstrates the effect that several initial failures 
have on a potential fuel gas release as well as the 
potential fire and explosion hazards that can occur. 
These consequences are equally important for 
offshore platform operators due to the improved 
HSE regulations within Safety Cases regarding 
hazards to the environment in any instance. 
Therefore, if there is a fuel gas leak without 
ignition, it poses a large issue for operators and 
duty holders given that the release is undetected.  
The analysis presented in the three test cases 
clearly demonstrates the vital role that the 
mitigating barriers play in preventing severe 
consequences due to a gas turbine fuel leak. The 
BN model also clearly demonstrates that it can 
provide an effective and applicable method of 
determining the likelihood of various events under 
uncertainty, and more importantly show increased 
uses as a dynamic risk assessment tool. This is 
especially applicable in monitoring offshore areas 
where human presence has been removed, i.e. NU-
Installations. 
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No. Year Source Accident Date Name of Unit Floating/Fixed Type of Unit Shelf Damage 
1 1971 WOAD 08/04/1971 NEPTUNE 7 Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor damage 
2 1972 WOAD 10/22/1972 ZAPATA NORDIC Floating Jack-Up Norway Minor damage 
3 1973 WOAD 12/29/1973 BRITANIA Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor damage 
4 1974 WOAD 12/06/1974 BRITANIA Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor damage 
5 1974 WOAD 06/02/1974 ZAPATA UGLAND Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor damage 
6 1975 WOAD 12/05/1975 STADRILL Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
7 1975 WOAD 10/28/1975 BORGNY DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
8 1975 WOAD 09/03/1975 FRIGG,10/1,CPD1 Fixed Concrete structure UKCS Minor damage 
9 1975 WOAD 8/29/1975 AUK,30/16,A Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
10 1975 HSE 29/08/1975   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Severe  
11 1975 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
12 1975 HSE 20/09/1975   Floating Jack-Up UKCS moderate 
13 1975 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
14 1975 HSE 16/01/1975   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
15 1975 HSE 17/01/1975   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
16 1975 HSE 08/03/1975   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
17 1975 HSE 19/06/1975   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
18 1976 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
19 1976 HSE 14/08/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
20 1976 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
21 1976 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor  
22 1976 HSE 25/02/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
23 1976 HSE 17/03/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
24 1976 HSE 08/04/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
25 1976 HSE 11/04/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
26 1976 HSE 12/04/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
27 1976 HSE 18/09/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
28 1976 HSE 17/10/1976   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
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29 1976 HSE 25/10/1976   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
30 1977 HSE 12/04/1977   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Severe  
31 1977 HSE 05/11/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Severe  
32 1977 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
33 1977 HSE 11/02/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
34 1977 HSE 18/02/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
35 1977 HSE 19/04/1977   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
36 1977 HSE 23/04/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
37 1977 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
38 1977 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
39 1977 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
40 1977 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
41 1977 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor  
42 1977 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
43 1977 HSE 14/01/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
44 1977 HSE 21/03/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
45 1977 HSE 06/05/1977   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor  
46 1977 HSE 07/05/1977   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
47 1977 HSE 07/10/1977   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor  
48 1977 HSE 22/11/1977   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
49 1977 HSE 17/12/1977   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
50 1978 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
51 1978 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
52 1978 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
53 1978 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
54 1978 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor  
55 1978 HSE 04/01/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
56 1978 HSE 02/02/1978   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor  
57 1978 HSE 02/02/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
58 1978 HSE 13/02/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
59 1978 HSE 14/02/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
60 1978 HSE 31/03/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor  
61 1978 HSE 16/08/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
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62 1978 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
63 1978 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
64 1978 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
65 1978 HSE 10/01/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
66 1978 HSE 05/02/1978   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
67 1978 HSE 16/06/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
68 1978 HSE 05/08/1978   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
69 1979 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
70 1979 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
71 1979 HSE 28/06/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
72 1979 HSE 06/11/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
73 1979 HSE 14/11/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
74 1979 HSE 19/11/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
75 1979 HSE 01/01/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
76 1979 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
77 1979 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
78 1979 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
79 1979 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
80 1979 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
81 1979 HSE 16/01/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
82 1979 HSE 03/02/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
83 1979 HSE 11/03/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
84 1979 HSE 17/03/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
85 1979 HSE 02/05/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
86 1979 HSE 11/05/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
87 1979 HSE 07/09/1979   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
88 1979 HSE 11/09/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
89 1979 HSE 16/10/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
90 1979 HSE 23/10/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
91 1979 HSE 27/11/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
92 1979 HSE 07/12/1979   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
93 1979 HSE 21/12/1979   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
94 1979 WOAD 11/17/1979 NORSKALD Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
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95 1980 WOAD 12/18/1980 OCEAN BOUNTY Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
96 1980 WOAD 11/10/1980 BRENT,211/29,C Fixed Concrete structure UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
97 1980 WOAD 10/20/1980 BRENT,211/29,C Fixed Concrete structure UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
98 1980 WOAD 5/15/1980 TRANSWORLD RIG 58 Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
99 1980 WOAD 02/06/1980   Fixed Fixed Steel   
Significant 
damage 
100 1980 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
101 1980 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
102 1980 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
103 1980 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
104 1980 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
105 1980 HSE 07/01/1980   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
106 1980 HSE 18/04/1980   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
107 1980 HSE 21/05/1980   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
108 1980 HSE 23/05/1980   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
109 1980 HSE 28/05/1980   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
110 1980 HSE 23/07/1980   Floating Drill Ship UKCS Minor 
111 1980 HSE 26/10/1980   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
112 1980 HSE 25/11/1980   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
113 1981 WOAD 9/15/1981 DIXILYN-FIELD RIG 97 Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
114 1981 WOAD 02/08/1981 DIRK Floating Jack-Up Sweden Minor damage 
115 1981 WOAD 03/10/1981   Floating Semi-submersible   
Significant 
damage 
116 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
117 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
118 1981 HSE 10/02/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
119 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
120 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
121 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
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122 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
123 1981 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
124 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
125 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
126 1981 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
127 1981 HSE 15/01/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
128 1981 HSE 16/01/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
129 1981 HSE 12/02/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
130 1981 HSE 15/02/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
131 1981 HSE 16/02/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
132 1981 HSE 01/03/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
133 1981 HSE 19/03/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
134 1981 HSE 10/04/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
135 1981 HSE 25/05/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
136 1981 HSE 13/07/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
137 1981 HSE 04/08/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
138 1981 HSE 20/09/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
139 1981 HSE 27/09/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
140 1981 HSE 02/10/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
141 1981 HSE 06/10/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
142 1981 HSE 02/11/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
143 1981 HSE 12/11/1981   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
144 1981 HSE 24/12/1981   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
145 1982 WOAD 9/29/1982 SEDCO 707 Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
146 1982 WOAD 7/20/1982 
WESTERN 
PACESETTER 2 
Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
147 1982 WOAD 4/13/1982 BORGLAND DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
148 1982 WOAD 07/01/1982 VALHALL,2/8A,QP Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
149 1982 WOAD 4/13/1982 EKOFISK,2/4,H HOTEL Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
150 1982 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
151 1982 HSE 08/02/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
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152 1982 HSE 24/02/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
153 1982 HSE 27/02/1982   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
154 1982 HSE 06/04/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
155 1982 HSE 06/05/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
156 1982 HSE 13/05/1982   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
157 1982 HSE 22/05/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
158 1982 HSE 10/07/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
159 1982 HSE 19/07/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
160 1982 HSE 17/09/1982   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
161 1982 HSE 24/09/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
162 1982 HSE 13/12/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
163 1982 HSE 28/12/1982   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
164 1982 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
165 1982 HSE 25/03/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
166 1982 HSE 09/07/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
167 1982 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
168 1982 HSE 18/07/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
169 1982 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
170 1982 HSE 18/10/1982   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
171 1983 WOAD 01/12/1983 EKOFISK WEST,2/4A,D Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
172 1983 WOAD 6/29/1983 PENROD 85 Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor damage 
173 1983 WOAD 11/10/1983 ODIN,30/10A Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
174 1983 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
175 1983 HSE 10/03/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
176 1983 HSE 09/11/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
177 1983 HSE 16/07/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Severe  
178 1983 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
179 1983 HSE 21/01/1983   Floating TLP UKCS Minor 
180 1983 HSE 24/01/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
181 1983 HSE 02/02/1983   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
182 1983 HSE 05/02/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
183 1983 HSE 24/03/1983   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
184 1983 HSE 28/05/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
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185 1983 HSE 30/05/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
186 1983 HSE 15/07/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
187 1983 HSE 17/07/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
188 1983 HSE 10/08/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
189 1983 HSE 16/08/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
190 1983 HSE 03/10/1983   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
191 1983 HSE 26/10/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
192 1983 HSE 18/11/1983   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
193 1984 HSE 12/01/1984   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
194 1984 HSE 19/01/1984   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
195 1984 HSE 21/04/1984   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
196 1984 HSE 23/05/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
197 1984 HSE 30/05/1984   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
198 1984 HSE 14/07/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
199 1984 HSE 08/10/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
200 1984 HSE 21/11/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
201 1984 HSE 10/05/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
202 1984 HSE 28/08/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
203 1984 HSE 10/11/1984   Floating Jack-Up UKCS moderate 
204 1984 HSE 30/11/1984   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
205 1985 WOAD 11/04/1985 GULLFAKS,34/10,B Fixed Concrete structure Norway 
Significant 
damage 
206 1985 WOAD 6/26/1985 LEMAN,49/27,H Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
207 1985 WOAD 08/01/1985 EKOFISK,2/4A,C Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
208 1985 WOAD 7/31/1985 GILBERT ROWE Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
209 1985 WOAD 7/31/1985 FORBES,43/8,AW Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
210 1985 HSE 17/01/1985   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
211 1985 HSE 05/01/1985   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Severe  
212 1985 HSE 10/01/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Severe  
213 1985 HSE 26/09/1985   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Severe  
214 1985 HSE 13/01/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
215 1985 HSE 29/03/1985   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
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216 1985 HSE 04/05/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
217 1985 HSE 11/05/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
218 1985 HSE 04/06/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
219 1985 HSE 11/07/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
220 1985 HSE 04/08/1985   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
221 1985 HSE 10/08/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
222 1985 HSE 15/09/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
223 1985 HSE 18/09/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
224 1985 HSE 22/10/1985   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
225 1986 WOAD 12/24/1986 ODIN,30/10A Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
226 1986 WOAD 5/25/1986 COD,7/11,A Fixed Jacket Norway 
Significant 
damage 
227 1986 WOAD 7/29/1986 GULLFAKS,34/10,A Fixed Concrete structure Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
228 1986 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
229 1986 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
230 1986 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
231 1986 HSE 05/01/1986   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
232 1986 HSE 08/06/1986   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
233 1986 HSE 08/10/1986   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
234 1986 HSE 11/10/1986   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
235 1986 HSE 12/12/1986   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
236 1986 HSE 13/12/1986   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
237 1986 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
238 1986 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
239 1986 HSE 22/01/1986   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
240 1986 HSE 17/04/1986   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
241 1987 WOAD 12/01/1987 EKOFISK,2/4A,A Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
242 1987 WOAD 10/05/1987 BRAE NORTH,16/7A,B Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
243 1987 HSE 28/07/1987   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
244 1987 HSE 08/08/1987   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
245 1987 HSE 17/08/1987   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
246 1987 HSE 06/09/1987   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
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247 1987 HSE 02/10/1987   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
248 1988 WOAD 15/05/1988 STATPIPE,16/11S,RISER Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
249 1988 HSE 11/01/1988   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
250 1988 HSE 20/05/1988   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
251 1988 HSE 12/07/1988   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
252 1988 HSE 31/08/1988   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
253 1988 HSE 05/09/1988   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
254 1988 HSE 13/11/1988   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
255 1988 HSE 18/11/1988   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
256 1989 WOAD 12/14/1989 FRIGG,25/1,TCP2 Fixed Concrete structure Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
257 1989 WOAD 12/11/1989 GYDA,2/1 Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
258 1989 WOAD 11/05/1989 DEEPSEA BERGEN Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
259 1989 HSE 28/08/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Moderate 
260 1989 HSE 01/01/1989   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
261 1989 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
262 1989 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
263 1989 HSE 03/02/1989   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
264 1989 HSE 08/04/1989   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
265 1989 HSE 08/04/1989   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
266 1989 HSE 23/04/1989   Floating TLP UKCS Minor 
267 1989 HSE 01/05/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
268 1989 HSE 20/05/1989   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
269 1989 HSE 15/06/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
270 1989 HSE 03/08/1989   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
271 1989 HSE 01/09/1989   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
272 1989 HSE 12/09/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
273 1989 HSE 18/09/1989   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
274 1989 HSE 21/09/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
275 1989 HSE 14/10/1989   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
276 1989 HSE 28/10/1989   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS   
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277 1990 WOAD 09/11/1990 MONTROSE,22/17,A Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
278 1990 WOAD 7/15/1990 POLYCONFIDENCE Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
279 1990 WOAD 7/26/1990 POLYCONFIDENCE Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
280 1990 WOAD 5/18/1990 OSEBERG,30/9,A Fixed Concrete structure Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
281 1990 WOAD 2/25/1990 LEMAN,49/27,G Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
282 1990 WOAD 12/25/1990 ARCH ROWAN Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor damage 
283 1990 WOAD 7/22/1990 LEMAN,49/27,AP Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
284 1990 WOAD 4/24/1990 STATFJORD,33/9A,A Fixed Concrete structure Norway Minor damage 
285 1990 HSE 14/01/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
286 1990 HSE 14/03/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
287 1990 HSE 21/03/1990   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
288 1990 HSE 22/04/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
289 1990 HSE 29/04/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
290 1990 HSE 25/05/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
291 1990 HSE 28/06/1990   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
292 1990 HSE 23/07/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
293 1990 HSE 11/10/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
294 1990 HSE 18/10/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
295 1990 HSE 22/10/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
296 1990 HSE 16/11/1990   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
297 1990 HSE 03/12/1990   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
298 1990 HSE 07/12/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
299 1990 HSE 09/12/1990   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
300 1990 HSE 31/12/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
301 1990 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS moderate 
302 1990 HSE 29/05/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
303 1990 HSE 12/10/1990   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Severe  
304 1991 WOAD 10/21/1991 OCEAN KOKUEI Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
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305 1991 WOAD 04/02/1991 POLAR PIONEER Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
306 1991 WOAD 4/15/1991 PENROD 81 Floating Jack-Up Netherlands Minor damage 
307 1991 WOAD 01/05/1991 WEST SOLE,48/6,WC Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
308 1991 WOAD 11/03/1991 GYDA,2/1 Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
309 1991 WOAD 8/16/1991 WEST OMIKRON Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
310 1991 HSE 10/02/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
311 1991 HSE 11/10/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS moderate 
312 1991 HSE 01/01/1991   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
313 1991 HSE 03/01/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
314 1991 HSE 03/01/1991   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
315 1991 HSE 21/01/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
316 1991 HSE 04/03/1991   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
317 1991 HSE 09/03/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
318 1991 HSE 18/03/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
319 1991 HSE 28/04/1991   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
320 1991 HSE 22/08/1991   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
321 1991 HSE 31/08/1991   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
322 1991 HSE 04/09/1991   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
323 1991 HSE 07/11/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
324 1991 HSE 18/11/1991   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
325 1991 HSE 27/11/1991   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
326 1992 WOAD 12/23/1992 LEMAN,49/27,CP Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
327 1992 WOAD 12/06/1992 GANNET,22/26,A Fixed Jacket UKCS Minor damage 
328 1992 HSE 21/01/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
329 1992 HSE 31/01/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
330 1992 HSE 05/02/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
331 1992 HSE 11/02/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
332 1992 HSE 27/02/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
333 1992 HSE 07/04/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
334 1992 HSE 23/04/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
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335 1992 HSE 04/05/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
336 1992 HSE 07/05/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
337 1992 HSE 15/05/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
338 1992 HSE 21/05/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
339 1992 HSE 27/05/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
340 1992 HSE 31/05/1992   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
341 1992 HSE 14/06/1992   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
342 1992 HSE 19/06/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
343 1992 HSE 20/09/1992   Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
344 1992 HSE 02/10/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
345 1992 HSE 25/10/1992   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
346 1992 HSE 16/11/1992   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
347 1992 HSE 22/11/1992   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
348 1992 HSE 11/12/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
349 1992 HSE 16/12/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
350 1992 HSE 19/04/1992   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Severe 
351 1993 WOAD 8/30/1993 ULA,7/12A,Q Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
352 1993 WOAD 5/20/1993 OSEBERG,30/9,A Fixed Concrete structure Norway Minor damage 
353 1993 WOAD 04/12/1993 SLEIPNER,15/9,RISER Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
354 1993 HSE 11/01/1993   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
355 1993 HSE 14/01/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
356 1993 HSE 16/01/1993   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
357 1993 HSE 02/02/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
358 1993 HSE 04/02/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
359 1993 HSE 06/02/1993   Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
360 1993 HSE 25/03/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
361 1993 HSE 27/03/1993   Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
362 1993 HSE 28/03/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
363 1993 HSE 01/07/1993   Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
364 1993 HSE 27/07/1993   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
365 1993 HSE 07/09/1993   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
366 1993 HSE 29/10/1993   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
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367 1993 HSE 10/12/1993   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
368 1994 WOAD 10/12/1994 VALHALL,2/8A,PCP Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
369 1994 WOAD 8/14/1994 WEST SIGMA Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
370 1994 WOAD 04/03/1994 F G MCCLINTOCK Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
371 1994 WOAD 2/27/1994 SEDCO 706 Floating Semi-submersible Netherlands Minor damage 
372 1994 WOAD 8/21/1994 BRAGE,31/4 Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
373 1994 HSE 17/01/1994   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
374 1994 HSE 11/03/1994   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
375 1994 HSE 14/03/1994   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Minor 
376 1994 HSE 10/04/1994   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
377 1994 HSE 01/07/1994   Uknown   UKCS Minor 
378 1994 HSE 09/07/1994   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
379 1994 HSE 19/08/1994   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
380 1994 HSE 06/11/1994   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
381 1994 HSE 01/12/1994   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
382 1994 HSE 11/12/1994   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
383 1995 HSE 11/09/1995   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
384 1995 HSE 17/11/1995   Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
385 1995 HSE 23/12/1995   Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
386 1996 WOAD 9/15/1996 SCARABEO 5 Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
387 1996 WOAD 05/08/1996 SCARABEO 5 Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
388 1996 WOAD 3/18/1996 ROSS RIG Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
389 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS   
390 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS   
391 1996 MAIB     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS None 
392 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
393 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
394 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
395 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
396 1996 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
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397 1997 WOAD 02/07/1997 NEDDRILL 9 Floating Jack-Up Netherlands 
Insignif/no 
damage 
398 1997 WOAD 02/11/1997 OSEBERG,30/9,B Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
399 1997 WOAD 11/23/1997 VALHALL,2/8A,PCP Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
400 1997 WOAD 08/12/1997 CAPTAIN, 13/22A, FPSO Floating FPSO/FSU UKCS Minor damage 
401 1997 WOAD 3/26/1997 BYFORD DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
402 1997 WOAD 3/21/1997 DEEPSEA TRYM Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
403 1997 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
404 1997 MAIB     Floating FPS UKCS Unspecified 
405 1997 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
406 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
407 1997 HSE     Floating FPS UKCS Unspecified 
408 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
409 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
410 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS None 
411 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
412 1997 HSE     Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
413 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
414 1997 HSE     Floating FPS UKCS Minor 
415 1997 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
416 1997 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
417 1997 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
418 1998 WOAD 04/09/1998 SCARABEO 5 Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
419 1998 WOAD 1/22/1998 MAERSK GUARDIAN Floating Jack-Up Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
420 1998 WOAD 11/11/1998 VARG,15/12B,B-FPSO Floating FPSO/FSU Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
421 1998 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
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422 1998 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
423 1998 HSE     Floating FPS UKCS Unspecified 
424 1998 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
425 1998 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
426 1998 HSE     Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS Unspecified 
427 1998 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
428 1998 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
429 1998 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
430 1998 HSE     Floating FPS UKCS   
431 1998 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
432 1998 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS   
433 1998 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS   
434 1998 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS   
435 1998 HSE     Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS   
436 1998 HSE     Uknown Uknown UKCS   
437 1999 WOAD 12/31/1999 GULLFAKS,34/10,A Fixed Concrete structure Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
438 1999 WOAD 09/10/1999 
EKOFISK,2/4,K 
WATERFLOOD 
Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
439 1999 WOAD 02/01/1999 DEEPSEA TRYM Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
440 1999 WOAD 2/23/1999 TRANSOCEAN ARCTIC Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
441 1999 WOAD 11/29/1999 
TRANSOCEAN 
WILDCAT 
Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
442 1999 WOAD 8/25/1999 BIDEFORD DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
443 1999 WOAD 6/20/1999 MAERSK GUARDIAN Floating Jack-Up Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
444 1999 WOAD 5/31/1999 ELDFISK,2/7,A Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
445 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
446 1999 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
447 1999 HSE     Uknown Uknown UKCS None 
330 
  
448 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS None 
449 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS None 
450 1999 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS None 
451 1999 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
452 1999 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
453 1999 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
454 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
455 1999 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
456 1999 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
457 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
458 1999 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
459 2000 WOAD 4/13/2000 AASGARD B Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
460 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Unspecified 
461 2000 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
462 2000 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Unspecified 
463 2000 HSE     Uknown Uknown UKCS None 
464 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
465 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
466 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
467 2000 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
468 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
469 2000 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Minor 
470 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
471 2000 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
472 2000 MAIB     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
473 2001 WOAD 4/23/2001 P/15(RIJN)-F Fixed Jacket Netherlands 
Insignif/no 
damage 
474 2001 WOAD 1/19/2001 DEEPSEA BERGEN Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
475 2001 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
476 2001 HSE     Floating Semi-submersible UKCS Unspecified 
477 2001 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS None 
478 2001 HSE     Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor 
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479 2001 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
480 2001 HSE     Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS Minor 
481 2001 HSE 37013 , John Shaw Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
482 2001 HSE 37063 , Captain WPP Fixed Jacket  UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
483 2001 HSE 37087 , Viking CD Fixed Fixed steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
484 2001 HSE 37192 , Murdoch 44/22A-MD Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
485 2002 WOAD 12/29/2002 STENA DEE Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
486 2002 WOAD 05/08/2002 ROUGH,47/8,BD Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Significant 
damage 
487 2002 HSE 05/01/2002 Ocean Guardian Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
488 2002 HSE 11/04/2002 Magellan Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
489 2002 HSE 25/04/2002 Sedco 706 Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
490 2002 HSE 19/10/2002 Alba FSU Floating FSU UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
491 2002 MAIB   
BRAVO DELTA (Fixed 
Steel) 
Uknown Uknown UKCS Minor 
492 2003 WOAD 11/21/2003 EIDER 211/16A Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
493 2003 HSE 37658   Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
494 2003 HSE 37764   Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
495 2003 HSE 37918   Fixed Fixed Concrete UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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496 2003 HSE 37979   Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
497 2004 WOAD 03/07/2004 West Venture Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
498 2004 HSE 03/03/2004 C Prospect Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
499 2004 HSE 26/03/2004 Douglas Complex Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
500 2004 HSE 26/08/2004 West Sole Alpha Platform Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
501 2004 HSE 07/10/2004 Forties Charlie Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
502 2005 WOAD 06/02/2005 Ekofisk T Fixed Concrete structure Norway Minor damage 
503 2005 WOAD 4/14/2005 Ensco 70 Floating Jack-Up Denmark 
Significant 
damage 
504 2005 WOAD 4/27/2005 Grane Fixed Jacket Norway 
Significant 
damage 
505 2005 WOAD 10/30/2005 BORGLAND DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
506 2005 WOAD 06/02/2005 EKOFISK,2/4A,P Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
507 2005 WOAD 18/07/2005 Noble Al White Floating Jack-Up Netherlands 
Insignif/no 
damage 
508 2005 HSE 27/03/2005 GSF Galaxy III Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
509 2005 HSE 11/05/2005 Buchan Alpha Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
510 2005 HSE 21/05/2005 Forties Alpha Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
511 2005 HSE 24/07/2005 Brent A Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
512 2005 HSE 25/08/2005 Forties Delta Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
513 2005 HSE 09/10/2005 Buchan A Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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514 2005 HSE 03/11/2005 BP Schiehallion FPSO Floating FPSO UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
515 2006 WOAD 11/13/2006 NJORD B Floating FPSO/FSU Norway Minor damage 
516 2006 WOAD 02/10/2006 HEIMDAL,25/4,A Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
517 2006 WOAD 06/03/2006 SNORRE, 34/7 Floating TLP Norway Minor damage 
518 2006 WOAD 06/07/2006 TYRA, 5504/6.2, TW-A Fixed Jacket Denmark 
Insignif/no 
damage 
519 2006 WOAD 28/02/2006 BIDEFORD DOLPHIN Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
520 2006 HSE 16/08/2006 Douglas DW Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
521 2006 HSE 11/09/2006 Shearwater WHP Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
522 2006 HSE 07/10/2006 Buzzard Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
523 2006 HSE 25/10/2006 The FPSO Uisge Gorm Floating FPSO UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
524 2006 HSE 30/11/2006 
Rig E92 - Vessel - Havila 
Fame 
Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
525 2006 HSE 08/12/2006 ETAP CPF Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
526 2007 WOAD 07/09/2007 Grane Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
527 2007 HSE 11/03/2007 FPSO Maersk Curlew Floating FPSO UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
528 2007 HSE 02/06/2007 
Sea fox 4 and the power 
express 
Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
529 2007 HSE 16/06/2007 Rowan Gorilla V11 Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
530 2007 HSE 08/07/2007 Sedco 704 Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
531 2007 HSE 27/07/2007 Rowan Gorilla VI Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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532 2007 HSE 28/07/2007 GSF Galaxy Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
533 2007 HSE 31/07/2007 GSF Labrador Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
534 2007 HSE 04/08/2007 
Viking Echo Delta 
Platform NUI 
Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
535 2007 HSE 01/10/2007 Leman Alpha Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
536 2007 HSE 04/11/2007 Borgholm Dolphin Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
537 2007 HSE 24/12/2007 BP Harding Platform Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
538 2008 WOAD 11/04/2008 
TRANSOCEAN 
WINNER 
Floating Semi-submersible Norway Minor damage 
539 2008 HSE 05/05/2008 Noble Julie Robertson Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
540 2008 HSE 02/09/2008 
Goldeneye Offshore 
Platform Installation 
Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
541 2008 HSE 29/09/2008 Transocean Rather Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
542 2008 HSE 05/10/2008 ENSCO 100 Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
543 2008 HSE 06/10/2008 n.k Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
544 2008 HSE 03/11/2008 Stamford Well Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
545 2008 HSE 17/11/2008 Sedco 704 Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
546 2008 HSE 26/11/2008 Noble Julie Robertson Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
547 2009 WOAD 02/04/2009 Ensco 92 Floating Jack-Up UKCS Minor damage 
548 2009 WOAD 05/03/2009 Thistle, 211/18A, A Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
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549 2009 WOAD 10/09/2009 K5-P Fixed Jacket Netherlands 
Insignif/no 
damage 
550 2009 WOAD 06/08/2009 EKOFISK,2/4,W Fixed Jacket Norway Total loss 
551 2009 HSE 28/06/2009 Stena Spey Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
552 2009 HSE 08/10/2009 Schiehallion FPSO Floating FPSO UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
553 2010 WOAD 1/18/2010 Songa Dee Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Significant 
damage 
554 2010 HSE 40238 FPSO Petrojari Foinaven Floating FPSO UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
555 2010 HSE 40251 
Ensco 100 MMSI 
636009436 - Cygnus 
Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
556 2010 HSE 40401 Byford Dolphin Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
557 2010 HSE 40460 Ocean Princess Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
558 2010 HSE 40503 Leman 49 / 27 / AC Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
559 2011 WOAD 4/22/2011 
Magnus,211/12, 
Production 
Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Insignif/no 
damage 
560 2011 WOAD 09/03/2011 
Unknown fixed platform 
WACP 
Fixed Uknown Netherlands Minor damage 
561 2011 WOAD 1/23/2011 Ekofisk J Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
562 2011 HSE 40594 Britannia Platform Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
563 2011 HSE 40695 Piper B Platform Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
564 2011 HSE 40737 
Noble Julie Robertson 
(Jack-up MODU) 
Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
565 2011 HSE 40775 Gannet Alpha/ Edda Fides Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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566 2011 HSE 40846.14236 Starboard Aft Column Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
567 2012 WOAD 03/11/2012 COSLPioneer Floating Semi-submersible Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
568 2012 HSE 29/03/2012 North side of installation Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
569 2012 HSE 16/09/2012 Walk to work platform Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
570 2012 HSE 18/09/2012 Clipper PT leg C1 Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
571 2013 WOAD 01/04/2013 ELDFISK,2/7,B Fixed Jacket Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
572 2013 WOAD 02/06/2013 
VALHALL FLANKE 
NORD 
Fixed Jacket Norway Minor damage 
573 2013 WOAD 12/10/2013 MAERSK INNOVATOR Floating Jack-Up Norway 
Insignif/no 
damage 
574 2013 HSE 20/01/2013 unknown Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
575 2013 HSE 29/01/2013 Well Head Platform Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
576 2013 HSE 12/05/2013  Janice Alpha  Floating Semi-submersible UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
577 2013 HSE 26/06/2013 Installation legs Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
578 2013 HSE 29/06/2013 Judy Riser Platform  Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
579 2013 HSE 22/09/2013 48/29A-48/29Q bridge  Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
580 2013 HSE 12/12/2013 Preload Tank 7P2 Uknown Uknown UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
581 2014 HSE 04/01/2014 PW jacket Fixed Jacket UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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582 2014 HSE 01/03/2014 
Nexen Golden Eagle 
Platform 
Floating Jack-Up UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
583 2014 HSE 30/05/2014 
Leman Alpha AD1 Jacket 
leg B1. 
Fixed Fixed Steel UKCS 
Collision that 
causes damage 
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Introduction 
The goal of this study is to determine which factors have greater influence on two failure modes 
regarding offshore equipment, these are; i) The key factors affecting Severe Damage occurring to 
offshore equipment, on both attended and Normally Unattended (NU) installations; ii) The key 
factors affecting failure an offshore Electrical Generation system, on both attended and Normally 
Unattended (NU) installations. Hence, the Failure Mode and System & Component are outlined 
in Table 1, and these are the parameters to be evaluated utilising a Pair-wise Comparison 
technique. In all instances, the life of the crew is not part of the criteria, only damage to equipment. 
 Table 1: List of Failure Modes and System & Component Failures  
Failure Mode System Level Component Level 
Severe Damage observed to 
an attended installation 
Gas Import Riser  
Failure 
N/A 
High Pressure Gas 
Flare drum Failure 
N/A 
Electrical Generator 
Failure 
Turbine Blades escaping housing and being expelled 
as projectiles 
Generator Exciter detaching and becoming a projectile 
Severe Damage observed to a 
NU installation 
N/A 
      
Failure of the Electrical 
Generation System on an 
attended installation 
N/A 
Turbine blade damage and failure 
Armature damage and failure 
Exciter damage and failure 
Failure of the Electrical 
Generation System on a NU 
installation 
N/A 
 
To proceed with the Pair-wise Comparison technique, one must first understand the weighting 
measurement used in the study. Table 2 contains two weighting scales for “IMPORTANT” and 
“UNIMPORTANT”, along with an explanation of what each weighting denotes.  
Table 2: Weighting scale for the Pair-wise Comparison 
IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
1 
Equally 
important 
1 
Equally 
important 
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3 
A little 
important 
 1/3 
A little 
unimportant 
5 Important  1/5 Unimportant 
7 Very important  1/7 
Very 
unimportant 
9 
Extremely 
important 
 1/9 
Extremely 
unimportant 
2, 4, 6, 8 
Intermediate 
important 
values 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 
1/8, 
Intermediate 
unimportant 
values 
 
Using Table 2 as a reference, it is required that possible judgement to all questions is to be given 
based upon one’s expertise and experience in the offshore industry. The judgement provided 
should be focused on the objective presented for each section, and to do this please ‘mark’ (*) the 
importance weighting of each failure mode or component failure in the presented column. The 
following is a brief example of how to apply Table 2. 
Objective: To select the most important elements of a car. 
 
Explanation of the example: 
1) The Steering Wheel  
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Radio/Sound System? 
                                * 
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to a Rear 
View Mirror? 
                    *             
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Engine? 
*                                 
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 The Steering Wheel is 9 times more IMPORTANT that the Radio/Sound System. This is 
because it is still possible to operate the car if the Radio/Sound System is not functioning. 
 The Steering Wheel is 3 times more IMPORTANT than the Rear View Mirror. This is 
because, while it is harder to operate a car without the rear view mirror, one can still navigate 
with the side mirrors and moving ones head to see traffic. 
 The Steering Wheel is 1/9 times more UNIMPORTANT that the Engine. This is because 
without the engine, the car would not function.
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Questionnaire  
Severe Damage to Offshore Equipment 
Objective: To select the most important factors affecting severe damage to offshore equipment. 
1)  Observing and not observing failures. 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is it to have Severe 
Damage observed on an 
attended installation, 
compared to a NU 
installation?  
                                  
2) Observing System failures.     
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
353 
  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Gas Import Riser 
failure, compared to HP 
Gas Flare drum failure? 
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Gas Import Riser 
failure, compared to 
failure of an Electrical 
Generator? 
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is HP Gas Flare drum 
failure, compared to 
failure of an Electrical 
Generator? 
                                  
 
3)  Observing Component failures. 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
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To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is Turbine 
Blades expelled as 
projectiles, compared 
to the Exciter 
becoming a projectile? 
                                  
 
 
Offshore Electrical Generator Unit failure. 
Objective: To select the most important factors causing failure of an offshore Electrical Generation System. 
1)  Observing and not observing failures. 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is failure of 
the Electrical 
Generation System on 
an attended 
installation, compared 
to a NU installation?  
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2) Observing Component Failures     
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is Turbine 
Blade failure, 
compared to 
Armature Failure? 
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is Turbine 
Blade failure, 
compared to Exciter 
Failure? 
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is 
Armature failure, 
compared to Exciter 
Failure? 
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PART A:  Severe Damage        
              
              
Failure Mode       
Severe Damage observed to an attended 
installation 
SD       
Severe Damage observed to a NU 
installation 
SD - NUI       
              
              
Pair-wise Comparisons         
  SD SD - NUI         
SD 1 10/3         
SD - NUI 29/100 1         
SUM 129/100 217/50         
              
              
  SD SD - NUI Weight       
SD 0.77 0.77 77.00%       
SD - NUI 0.23 0.23 23.00%       
SUM 1 1 100.00%       
              
              
  SD SD - NUI Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
    
SD 0.77 0.77 1.54 2.00     
SD - NUI 0.23 0.23 0.46 2.00     
      Count 2     
      
Lambda 
Max  
2     
              
              
              
              
System Failures      
Electrical Generator Failure EG     
Gas Import Riser Failure GIR     
High Pressure Gas Flare drum Failure HPD     
    
    
Pair-wise Comparisons       
  GIR HPD EG       
GIR 1 17/5 19/3       
HPD 29/100 1 5           
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EG 4/25 1/5 1       
SUM 29/20 461/100 12.26       
              
Standardised Matrix     
  GIR HPD EG Weight     
GIR 0.69 0.74 0.52 64.88%     
HPD 0.20 0.22 0.40 27.31%     
EG 0.11 0.04 0.08 7.81%     
SUM 1 1 1 100.00%     
              
              
  Sum Row 
Sum 
Weight 
  
GIR 0.65 0.93 0.50 2.07 3.20   
HPD 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.85 3.10   
EG 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.24 3.02   
        Count 3   
        
Lambda 
Max  
3.11   
        CI 0.05   
        CR 0.09 <0.1 
              
              
              
Component Failures       
Turbine Blades escaping housing and 
being expelled as projectiles 
TBP       
Generator Exciter detaching and 
becoming a projectile 
GED       
              
Pair-wise Comparisons         
  TBP GED         
TBP 1 2             
GED 12/25 1         
SUM 37/25 61/20         
              
  TBP GED Weight       
TBP 0.67 0.67 67.19%       
GED 0.33 0.33 32.81%       
SUM 1 1 100.00%       
              
              
  TBP GED Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
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TBP 0.67 0.67 1.34 2.00     
GED 0.33 0.33 0.66 2.00     
      Count 2     
      
Lambda 
Max  
2     
      CI 0     
              
              
              
PART B:  Electrical Generator Failure     
              
              
Failure Mode       
Failure of Electrical Generation system on 
attended installation 
EG       
Failure of Electrical Generation system on 
a NU- Installation 
EG - NUI       
              
Pair-wise Comparisons         
  SD SD - NUI         
SD 1 5/3         
SD - NUI 59/100 1         
SUM 159/100 67/25         
              
              
  SD SD - NUI Weight       
SD 0.63 0.63 62.73%       
SD - NUI 0.37 0.37 37.27%       
SUM 1 1 100.00%       
              
              
       
       
       
       
       
       
  SD SD - NUI Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
    
SD 0.63 0.63 1.25 2.00     
SD - NUI 0.37 0.37 0.75 2.00     
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      Count 2     
      
Lambda 
Max  
2     
              
              
              
System Failures      
Turbine Blade Failure TB     
Armature Failure AM     
Exciter Failure EX     
              
Pair-wise Comparisons       
  TB AM EX       
TB 1 19/6 11/5       
AM  1/3 1     1 2/9       
EX  1/2  5/7 1       
SUM 16/9 44/9 4 2/5       
              
Standardised Matrix     
  TB AM EX Weight     
TB 0.56 0.65 0.50 56.98%     
AM 0.18 0.20 0.28 21.95%     
EX 0.26 0.15 0.23 21.07%     
SUM 1 1 1 100.00%     
              
              
  GIR HPD EG Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
  
TB 0.57 0.70 0.46 1.73 3.03   
AM 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.66 2.99   
EX 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.63 2.99   
        Count 3   
        
Lambda 
Max  
3.00   
        CI 0.00   
        CR 0.00 <0.1 
              
              
361 
  
APPENDIX H: CPTs for the Initial BN Model 
 
  
362 
  
 
Failure 1 Failure Success
Success Yes 0.25 0.006
No 0.75 0.994
2 Yes No 2 Yes No
Yes 0.5 0.006 Yes 0.5 0.006
No 0.5 0.994 No 0.5 0.994
3 Yes No 1 Yes No
Yes 0.1 0.032 Failure 0.066 0.001
No 0.9 0.968 Success 0.934 0.968
6 Yes No 6 Yes No
Yes 0.25 0.0009 Yes 0.5 0.0008
No 0.75 0.9991 No 0.5 0.9992
7 Yes No 8 Yes No
Yes 0.25 0.062 Yes 0.1 0.000057
No 0.75 0.938 No 0.9 0.999943
4
3
2 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Yes 0.37 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.43 0.49 0.57 0.63
No 0.63 0.57 0.49 0.43 0.57 0.51 0.43 0.37
4 Yes No 5 Yes No
Yes 0.0002 0.006 Yes 0.0002 0.0001
No 0.9998 0.994 No 0.9998 0.9999
5 Yes No
Yes 0.0002 0.076
No 0.9998 0.924
10
8
7
9 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
No 0.23 0.58 0.26 0.61 0.24 0.60 0.27 0.62 0.38 0.73 0.40 0.76 0.39 0.74 0.42 0.77
Yes 0.77 0.42 0.74 0.39 0.76 0.40 0.73 0.38 0.62 0.27 0.60 0.24 0.61 0.26 0.58 0.23
9 Yes No 10 Yes No
Small 
(10mm)
0.00066 0.00033 Yes 0.000845 0.000007
Med. 
(50mm)
0.00015 0.00008 No 0.999160 0.999993
Fullbore 0.00027 0.00017
None 0.99893 0.99942
0.002
0.998
1. Retaining Ring Failure 2. Debris Expelled
E1. Debris Contained in Alternator
4. Debris Expelled to Exciter3. Debris Expelled into Turbine
5. Fuel Gas Feed Impact 6. Generator Bearings
7. Turbine Blades Expelled 8. Exciter Detaches
9. Gas Import riser Impact 10. HP Flare Drum shell Impact 
Yes No
Yes No Yes No
Yes No
Yes
E2. Debris Escapes Generator 
Housing
E3. Fuel Gas Fire
No
E6. Gas Import Riser LOC E7. H.P. Flare Drum LOC
No Yes No
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
E4. Debris Remains in Turbine 
Housing
E5. Event Escalation
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Introduction 
The goal of this study is to determine which factors have greater influence on the design characteristics 
of and offshore Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The WSN in question focuses on key structural and 
operational integrity points of an offshore electrical generation system. The design criteria focus on 
three general attributes: i) the Complexity of the WSN, ii) The Resilience of the WSN, and iii) The 
Maintainability of the WSN. Each general attribute contains a set of sub-criteria or basic attributes as 
outlined in Table 1. Furthermore, the attributes are based around the design and orientation of the WSN. 
Four possible WSN orientations have been drawn up: i) Single-hop, ii) Single-hop with cluster nodes, 
iii) Multi-hop with the smallest possible sensor radius, and iv) Multi-hop with the largest possible sensor 
radius. 
Part A consists of a Pairwise Comparison of the general and basic attributes, with Part B consisting of 
a grading assessment across the design attributes and the four WSN design orientations. All criteria is 
outlined in Table 1. 
 
 Table 1: List of Failure Modes and System & Component Failures  
General Attributes Basic Attributes 
Complexity  
Transmitting information over the shortest possible route 
Transmitting information over the longest possible route  
Large No. of cluster nodes in order to reliably transmit data  
Resilience  
Battery Life  
Relaying Data  
Maintainability 
Ease of Maintenance given the Complexity of the nodes  
Auto-Configuration 
 Cost  
 
To proceed with the Pair-wise Comparison technique, one must first understand the weighting 
measurement used in the study. Table 2contains two weighting scales for “IMPORTANT” and 
“UNIMPORTANT”, along with an explanation of what each weighting denotes.  
 
Table 2: Weighting scale for the Pair-wise Comparison 
IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
Numerical 
Weighting 
Explanation 
1 
Equally 
important 
1 
Equally 
important 
3 
A little 
important 
 1/3 
A little 
unimportant 
5 Important  1/5 Unimportant 
7 Very important  1/7 
Very 
unimportant 
9 
Extremely 
important 
 1/9 
Extremely 
unimportant 
2, 4, 6, 8 
Intermediate 
important 
values 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 
1/8, 
Intermediate 
unimportant 
values 
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Using Table 2 as a reference, it is required that possible judgement to all questions is to be given based 
upon one’s expertise and experience in the offshore industry. The judgement provided should be 
focused on the objective presented for each section, and to do this please ‘mark’ (*) the importance 
weighting of each failure mode or component failure in the presented column. The following is a brief 
example of how to apply Table 2. 
Objective: To select the most important elements of a car. 
 
Explanation of the example: 
 The Steering Wheel is 9 times more IMPORTANT that the Radio/Sound System. This is because 
it is still possible to operate the car if the Radio/Sound System is not functioning. 
 The Steering Wheel is 3 times more IMPORTANT than the Rear View Mirror. This is because, 
while it is harder to operate a car without the rear view mirror, one can still navigate with the side 
mirrors and moving ones head to see traffic. 
 The Steering Wheel is 1/9 times more UNIMPORTANT that the Engine. This is because without 
the engine, the car would not function.
1) The Steering Wheel  
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  
 
1/9 
 
1/8 
 
1/7 
 
1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Radio/Sound System? 
                                * 
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to a Rear 
View Mirror? 
                    *             
To achieve the stated 
objective, how 
important is a 
Steering Wheel, 
compared to the 
Engine? 
*                                 
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Part A: Pairwise Comparison   
General Attributes 
Objective: To select the most important general attributes relating to the design of an offshore WSN. 
 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Complexity compared 
to Resilience?  
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Complexity compared 
to Maintainability 
                 
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Resilience compared to 
Maintainability? 
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Basic Attributes (Complexity) 
Objective: To select the most important basic complexity attributes relating to the design of an offshore WSN. 
 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is to relay data over the 
shortest route compared to 
the longest route?  
                                  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is to relay data over the 
shortest route compared to 
the Number of Cluster 
Nodes? 
                 
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
to relay data over the 
longest route compared to 
the number of Cluster 
Nodes? 
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Basic Attributes (Resilience) 
Objective: To select the most important basic resilience attributes relating to the design of an offshore WSN. 
 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is the Battery Power 
compared to the ability to 
Relay Data between 
sensor nodes (Transmit 
AND Receive)?  
                                  
 
 
Basic Attributes (Maintainability) 
Objective: To select the most important basic maintainability attributes relating to the design of an offshore WSN. 
 
    Unimportant 
Equally 
Important 
Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Ease of Maintenance 
given the Complexity 
of the nodes compared to 
the ability for the WSN to 
Auto-Configure itself 
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after maintenance?  
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is Ease of Maintenance 
compared the cost of the 
WSN (both installation 
and maintenance)? 
                 
To achieve the stated 
objective, how important 
is the ability for the WSN 
to Auto-Configure itself 
after maintenance 
compared to the cost of 
the WSN (both 
installation and 
maintenance)? 
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Part B: Grading Assessment 
 
This section concerns itself with the performance of the WNSs given the various criteria previously 
outlined. The grading system is split between the three main attributes and involves. The basic attributes 
within Complexity, Resilience and maintainability are graded on how well the design of the WSN 
performs. i.e. How well does a multi-hop network with a small radius perform given the need for the 
network to auto-configure after maintenance? Graded as: 1) Poor, 2) Indifferent, 3) Average, 4) good, 
5) Excellent. 
 
The design of the network and placement of the nodes requires there be 62 sensor nodes in the network, 
spread none uniformly, over a circular area of approximately 420m2. 
 
Brief Descriptions of each network design: 
 
Single-Hop: 
Nodes connect directly to the Gateway node. Due to congestion, Nodes transmit data in sequence. i.e. Node 1 
transmits data, Node 2 cannot transmit until the gateway has received information from Node 1, and so on. 
Complexity is not applicable to the S-H design as all nodes send data to the same destination and do not relay 
data. 
Single-Hop (with Cluster nodes): 
Nodes transmit data to the nearest cluster node in sequence. Hence, several nodes can transmit simultaneously to 
different cluster nodes. Theoretically requires less battery power than S-H as there are two short connections from 
the node to the cluster and from the cluster to the gateway. As opposed to on connection over a longer distance. 
Multi-Hop (Small sensor radius):  
Nodes relay (transmit/ receive) information from each other to achieve the best route from the source node to the 
cluster node. The small radius denotes the smallest transmittable distance of the node. i.e. it would require more 
connections to reach the cluster node. Theoretically requires more battery than S-H as the nodes must transmit 
and receive. 
Multi-Hop (Large sensor radius):  
The theory is the same for the M-HS, however, nodes have a larger sensor radius and can transmit/receive data 
from nodes further away. Meaning fewer connections to the cluster node. Requires much increased battery power 
to transmit/receive over a large area. Due to the large area, the network can almost act as a single-hop cluster 
network
A B 
C 
Figure 1: A) Single-Hop Network, B) Single-Hop Network with Cluster nodes, C) Multi-Hop Network 
Gateway 
Node Sensor Node 
Cluster Node 
 374 
  
Given each WSN type, please grade each attribute by its relevance to the design of the network 
using the Assessment Grades provided. 
Assessment Grade 
M
ai
n
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 
Complexity 
Single Hop 
(Cluster)  
(S-HC) 
Multi-Hop (Small 
Radius)  
(M-HS) 
Multi-Hop (Large 
Radius)  
(M-HL) 
1 = Poor 
2 = Indifferent 
3 = Average 
4 = Good 
5 = Excellent 
B
as
ic
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Transmitting information over the shortest possible route 
(e1) 
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
Transmitting information over the longest possible route (e2) 
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
Large No. of cluster nodes in order to reliably transmit data 
(e3) 
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
1   2   3   4   
5  
e1 = The ability of the network to transmit information over the shortest 
possible route to the Gateway node. 
 
e2 = The ability of the network to relay information over the longest possible 
distance to the Gateway given that one or more nodes fail to transmit/receive 
data.  
 
e3 = The necessity of the network to have many cluster nodes in order to 
reliably transmit data to the Gateway. 
S-H = Nodes connect directly to the Gateway node. Due to congestion, Nodes transmit 
data in sequence. i.e. Node 1 transmits data, Node 2 cannot transmit until the gateway has 
received information from Node 1, and so on. Complexity is not applicable to the S-H 
design as all nodes send data to the same destination and do not relay data. 
S-HC = Nodes transmit data to the nearest cluster node in sequence. Hence, several nodes 
can transmit simultaneously to different cluster nodes. Theoretically requires less battery 
power than S-H as there are two short connections from the node to the cluster and from 
the cluster to the gateway. As opposed to on connection over a longer distance. 
M-HS = Nodes relay (transmit/ receive) information from each other to achieve the best 
route from the source node to the cluster node. The small radius denotes the smallest 
transmittable distance of the node. i.e. it would require more connections to reach the 
cluster node. Theoretically requires more battery than S-H as the nodes must transmit and 
receive 
M-HL = The theory is the same for the M-HS, however, nodes have a larger sensor radius 
and can transmit/receive data from nodes further away. Meaning fewer connections to the 
cluster node. Requires much increased battery power to transmit/receive over a large area. 
Due to the large area, the network can almost act as a single-hop cluster network. 
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Given each WSN type, please grade each attribute by its relevance to the design of the network 
using the Assessment Grades provided. 
Assessment Grade 
M
ai
n
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 
Resilience Single-Hop 
Single Hop 
(Cluster) 
Multi-Hop 
(Small 
Radius) 
Multi-Hop 
(Large 
Radius) 
1 = Poor 
2 = Indifferent 
3 = Average 
4 = Good 
5 = Excellent 
B
as
ic
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s Battery Power (e4) 
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
Relaying Data (e5) 
Not 
Applicable 
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
e4 = The necessity of the network to have a substantial source of battery 
power for the longevity of the network life and reduced time between 
maintenance. Battery power must be sufficient to power the sensors for 
several months. 
 
e5 = The necessity of the network to relay information between nodes in the 
event of sensor node failures and/or network disruptions. 
S-H = Nodes connect directly to the Gateway node. Due to congestion, Nodes transmit data 
in sequence. i.e. Node 1 transmits data, Node 2 cannot transmit until the gateway has 
received information from Node 1, and so on. Complexity is not applicable to the S-H 
design as all nodes send data to the same destination and do not relay data. 
S-HC = Nodes transmit data to the nearest cluster node in sequence. Hence, several nodes 
can transmit simultaneously to different cluster nodes. Theoretically requires less battery 
power than S-H as there are two short connections from the node to the cluster and from the 
cluster to the gateway. As opposed to on connection over a longer distance. 
M-HS = Nodes relay (transmit/ receive) information from each other to achieve the best 
route from the source node to the cluster node. The small radius denotes the smallest 
transmittable distance of the node. i.e. it would require more connections to reach the cluster 
node. Theoretically requires more battery than S-H as the nodes must transmit and receive 
M-HL = The theory is the same for the M-HS, however, nodes have a larger sensor radius 
and can transmit/receive data from nodes further away. Meaning fewer connections to the 
cluster node. Requires much increased battery power to transmit/receive over a large area. 
Due to the large area, the network can almost act as a single-hop cluster network. 
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Given each WSN type, please grade each attribute by its relevance to the design of the 
network using the Assessment Grades provided. 
Assessment 
Grade 
M
ai
n
 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 
Maintainability 
Single-Hop 
(S-H) 
Single Hop 
(Cluster)  
(S-HC) 
Multi-Hop 
(Small 
Radius)  
(M-HS) 
Multi-Hop 
(Large 
Radius)  
(M-HL) 
1 = Poor 
2 = Indifferent 
3 = Average 
4 = Good 
5 = Excellent 
B
as
ic
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Ease of Maintenance given the Complexity of the nodes 
(e6) 
1   2   3 
  4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
Auto-Configuration on start-up and after maintenance 
(e7) 
1   2   3 
  4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
 Cost by the number and sophistication of nodes and the 
cost of maintenance. (e8) 
1   2   3 
  4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
1   2   3   
4   5  
e6 = Ease of maintenance is dependent on the Complexity of the nodes, 
i.e. the number of components within the nodes (sensor, transmitter, 
receiver, battery size). Location is not a factor as all nodes in this study 
are located within a gas turbine.  
 
e7 = The ability of the network to auto configure on start-up and after 
maintenance. Nodes that can relay information can ease this issue, 
however, it is easier to program networks to auto-configure with less 
complex and fewer connections. 
 
e8 = The cost of the network is determined by the number of nodes 
required (including cluster nodes), the sophistication of the nodes (battery 
size, transmitters and receivers) and the cost of maintenance 
S-H = Nodes connect directly to the Gateway node. Due to congestion, Nodes transmit 
data in sequence. i.e. Node 1 transmits data, Node 2 cannot transmit until the gateway 
has received information from Node 1, and so on. Complexity is not applicable to the 
S-H design as all nodes send data to the same destination and do not relay data. 
S-HC = Nodes transmit data to the nearest cluster node in sequence. Hence, several 
nodes can transmit simultaneously to different cluster nodes. Theoretically requires 
less battery power than S-H as there are two short connections from the node to the 
cluster and from the cluster to the gateway. As opposed to on connection over a longer 
distance. 
M-HS = Nodes relay (transmit/ receive) information from each other to achieve the 
best route from the source node to the cluster node. The small radius denotes the 
smallest transmittable distance of the node. i.e. it would require more connections to 
reach the cluster node. Theoretically requires more battery than S-H as the nodes must 
transmit and receive 
M-HL = The theory is the same for the M-HS, however, nodes have a larger sensor 
radius and can transmit/receive data from nodes further away. Meaning fewer 
connections to the cluster node. Requires much increased battery power to 
transmit/receive over a large area. Due to the large area, the network can almost act as 
a single-hop cluster network. 
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APPENDIX K: AHP Results for Wireless Sensor Network 
Analysis 
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General Attributes       
              
              
General Attributes       
Complexity x       
Resilience y       
Maintainability z       
              
Pair-wise Comparisons       
  x y z       
x 1.00 0.48 0.66       
y 2.09 1.00 1.95       
z 1.52 0.51 1.00       
SUM 4.61 1.99 3.61       
              
Standardised Matrix     
  x y z Weight     
x 0.22 0.24 0.18 21.34%     
y 0.45 0.50 0.54 49.86%     
z 0.33 0.26 0.28 28.80%     
SUM 1 1 1 100.00%     
              
              
  x y z 
Sum 
Row 
Sum 
Weight 
  
x 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.64 3.008   
y 0.45 0.50 0.56 1.51 3.020   
z 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.87 3.012   
        Count 3   
        
Lambda 
Max  
3.013   
        CI 0.007   
        CR 0.011 <0.1 
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Basic Attributes (Complexity)     
Transmitting information over the shortest possible 
route  
e1     
Transmitting information over the longest possible 
route  
e2     
Large No. of cluster nodes in order to reliably 
transmit data  
e3     
              
Pair-wise Comparisons       
  e1 e2 e3       
e1 1 3     2           
e2 0.334163 1  1/2       
e3 0.525306 2.091279 1       
SUM 1.859468 6.083835 3.381830189       
              
Standardised Matrix     
  e1 e2 e3 Weight     
e1 0.54 0.49 0.56 53.09%     
e2 0.18 0.16 0.14 16.18%     
e3 0.28 0.34 0.30 30.73%     
SUM 1 1 1 100.00%     
              
              
  e1 e2 e3 Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
  
e1 0.53 0.48 0.59 1.60 3.01   
e2 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.49 3.00   
e3 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.92 3.01   
        Count 3   
        
Lambda 
Max  
3.01   
        CI 0.00   
        CR 0.01 <0.1 
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Basic attributes (Resilience)       
Battery Power e4       
Relaying Data e5       
              
              
Pair-wise Comparisons         
  e4 e5         
e4 1 1 6/7         
e5 0.536492 1         
SUM 1.536492 2.86396         
              
              
  e4 e5 Weight       
e4 0.65 0.65 65.08%       
e5 0.35 0.35 34.92%       
SUM 1 1 100.00%       
              
              
  e4 e5 Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
    
e4 0.65 0.65 1.30 2.00     
e5 0.35 0.35 0.70 2.00     
      Count 2     
      
Lambda 
Max  
2     
      CI 0     
      CR #DIV/0! <0.1   
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Basic attributes (Maintainability)     
Ease of Maintenance given the Complexity of the 
nodes  
e6     
Auto-Configuration on start-up and after 
maintenance  
e7     
Cost e8     
              
Pair-wise Comparisons       
  e6 e7 e8       
e6 1 3 1/2 1 5/8       
e7  2/7 1     1           
e8  5/8 1     1       
SUM 2     5 1/2 3 2/3       
              
Standardised Matrix     
  e6 e7 e8 Weight     
e6 0.53 0.64 0.45 53.62%     
e7 0.15 0.18 0.28 20.46%     
e8 0.32 0.18 0.27 25.92%     
SUM 1 1 1 100.00%     
              
              
  e6 e7 e8 Sum 
Sum 
Weight 
  
e6 0.54 0.71 0.42 1.67 3.12   
e7 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.62 3.04   
e8 0.33 0.20 0.26 0.79 3.05   
        Count 3   
        
Lambda 
Max  
3.07   
        CI 0.03   
        CR 0.06 <0.1 
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